Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-105
Thursday
30 May 1996

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Daily Report
East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-105 *30 May 1996*

CONTENTS

NOTICE: This volume contains a representative selection of material previously disseminated in softcopy format.

ALBANIA

Albania: Berisha Urges Respect for 'Rules of Democracy' *[Tirana TV]* 1
Albania: Election Commission Final Results *[Tirana Radio]* 1
Albania: Dailies Comment on Postelection Situation *[ATA]* 4

BULGARIA

Bulgaria: Foreign Minister on Planned Balkan Meeting *[DEMOKRATSIYA 29 May]* 5
Bulgaria: Paper Expects Ministerial Resignations on Friday *[DUMA 30 May]* 5
Bulgaria: Socialist Party Deputies Demand Cabinet Reshuffle *[DEMOKRATSIYA 29 May]* 5
Bulgaria: Prime Minister Meets Russian Defense Official *[TRUD 30 May]* 6
Bulgaria: Russia's Sukhoy Aircraft Company Offers Barter Deal *[24 CHASA 29 May]* 6
Bulgaria: Commentary Urges Retired Spies To Serve Country *[24 CHASA 29 May]* 6

CZECH REPUBLIC

Czech Republic: Zieleniec on NATO, Ties to Neighbors *[LIDOVE NOVINY 24 May]* 8
Czech Republic: Poll Puts ODS 6 Points Ahead of CSSD *[LIDOVE NOVINY 25 May]* 10

SLOVAKIA

Slovakia: Kovac Speaks Out Against Neutrality Option *[SME 28 May]* 12
Slovakia: Daily Discusses Integration Into Europe *[NARODNA OBRODA 24, 25 May]* 12
Slovakia: Deputy: Opposition Preparing Foreign-Assisted Coup *[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA 27 May]* 14
Slovakia: Current Account Slides From Surplus to Deficit *[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY 28 May]* 15

HUNGARY

Hungary: Article Views IFOR Relationship to NATO Admission *[MAGYAR NEMZET 25 May]* 16
Hungary: Horn, Opposition Clash Over Air Force Exercise *[NEPSZABADSAG 29 May]* 17
Hungary: Defense Committee Supports Chief of Staff Candidate *[Budapest Radio]* 18

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

B-H: Comment on U.S. 'Impotence' in Implementing Dayton Accord *[GLAS SRPSKI 29 May]* 19
B-H: UN's Steiner Sees Possible Reintroduction of Sanctions *[NEDELJNI TELEGRAF 29 May]* 19
B-H: Bildt: No Further International Contacts With Plavsic *[AFP]* 21
B-H: Serb Republic Vice President Plavsic Interviewed *[NASA BORBA 25-26 May]* 21
B-H: 8,000 Show Support for Karadzic, Mladic in Modrica *[Banja Luka TV]* 23
B-H: Karadzic Supports Proposal To Return 'Confiscated' Land *[SRNA]* 23
B-H: Brcko Mayor Claims Town's Status 'Politicized' *[NASA BORBA 28 May]* 24
B-H: Senior Serb Officers on Talks With IFOR Gen Walker *[TANJUG]* 24
B-H: No Agreement Reached on Opening Banja Luka Airport *[SRNA]* 24
B-H: Ninkovic Sends Greetings to Troops on Air Force Day *[Banja Luka Radio]* 25
B-H: IFRC Explains Humanitarian Aid Plans in Pale *[Banja Luka Radio]* 25
B-H: UNHCR Interentity Bus Lines Currently Suspended *[Sarajevo Radio]* 25
B-H: Serb PM on Opposition to Cross-Border Bus Services *[Pale Radio]* 25

B-H: Klickovic, UNHCR Discuss Freedom of Movement, Refugees *[TANJUG]* 26
B-H: Official Warns Krajina Serbs Registering for Sep Elections *[Sarajevo Radio]* 26
B-H: Serb Official Announces Formation of Ribnik Municipality *[Banja Luka Radio]* 26
B-H: IFOR Confirms Bridge Near Bijeljina Dynamited *[AFP]* 27
B-H: Official Says 'Muslims' Blew Up Bridge Near Bijeljina *[SRNA]* 27
B-H: Mostar Elections To Be Held 30 Jun *[AFP]* 27
B-H: Opposition Parties To Contest Mostar Elections *[Mostar Radio]* 27
B-H: Silajdzic Interviewed on Politics, Elections *[NOVI LIST 20 May]* 27
B-H: Zubak Says Assembly Usurping Federation Rights *[Mostar Radio]* 30
B-H: UN: Little Hope of Fair Trial for 'Zvornik Seven' *[Sarajevo Radio]* 30
B-H: Transit Countries Grant Visa-Free Travel to Refugees *[Sarajevo Radio]* 31
B-H: Daily Examines AID 'Overthrow' Attempt, Power Struggle *[AVAZOV FOCUS 16 May]* 31

CROATIA

Croatia: Party Leaders Voice Disappointment With Tudjman *[NOVI LIST 28 May]* 33
Croatia: Tudjman, IFOR Officer Praise Croatian-U.S. Ties *[Zagreb Radio]* 34
Croatia: Tudjman Pardons Several Accused of Armed Insurrection *[Zagreb Radio]* 34
Croatia: President Tudjman Profiled *[London FINANCIAL TIMES 30 May]* 35
Croatia: SDA Leader Accuses Zagreb of 'Xenophobia' *[NOVA BOSNA 29 May]* 36
Croatia: Slavonia Serbs' Hadzic Insists on Regional Autonomy *[Bad Vilbel VESTI 24 May]* 36

POLAND

Poland: Prime Minister Voices Doubts About Intelligence Service *[Warsaw TV]* 39
Poland: Papers React to Dismissal of 4 UOP Officers *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 29 May, etc.]* 40
Poland: Presidential Aide on Relations With Ukraine *[TRYBUNA 29 May]* 41
Poland: Official: Poles in Lithuania Victims of Discrimination *[PAP]* 42
Poland: Government Criticizes Draft Laws 'Adverse' to Church *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 29 May]* ... 43
Poland: Bishop Expresses Hope for Church-State Accord *[Warsaw Radio]* 43
Poland: Cabinet Approves Communications Development Project *[NOWA EUROPA 29 May]* 43
Poland: Walesa: U.S. Polonia Head's Letter on Jews 'Mistake' *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 30 May]* 44
Poland: Defense Commission Head on Hellfire Missiles Issue *[ZYCIE WARSZAWY 29 May]* 44
Poland: Activities of Organized Criminal Groups Outlined *[SZTANDAR 27 May]* 45

ROMANIA

Romania: Defense Minister To Visit Peacekeepers in Bosnia *[Bucharest Radio]* 46
Romania: Senate Head Reiterates Country's Wish To Join EU *[Bucharest Radio]* 46
Romania: Uruguayan President Arrives on Official Visit *[Bucharest Radio]* 46
Romania: Bucharest Poll Shows CDR's Ciorbea Leading Nastase *[ROMANIA LIBERA 23 May]* 47
Romania: PDSR's Nastase Calls For Tolerance Toward Minorities *[JURNALUL NATIONAL 27 May]* 48
Romania: Constantinescu Opposes Separate Elections *[ZIUA 23 May]* 48
Romania: UDMR To Support CDR Candidate for Cluj Mayoralty *[ROMANIA LIBERA 27 May]* 49
Romania: CDR Candidate Complains About Election Tactics *[ROMANIA LIBERA 28 May]* 49

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

FRY: Milutinovic, Primakov Sign Cooperation Protocol *[TANJUG]* 50
FRY: Statement on Milutinovic Talks With Russian FM *[TANJUG]* 50
FRY: Milutinovic Says Talks With Primakov 'Constructive' *[Belgrade Radio]* 51
FRY: Primakov Calls For Definitive Lifting of Sanctions *[AFP]* 51
FRY: Montenegrin President Holds Talks With Russia's FM *[TANJUG]* 51

FRY: Government Accuses Croatia of Holding Serb Prisoners *[SRNA]* 52
FRY: Status of Human Rights in Kosovo Defended *[POLITIKA 17 Apr]* 52
FRY: Milosevic Accused of Preparing War in Kosovo *[SRPSKA REC 6 May]* 53

Serbia

Serbia: Belgrade Defends Cooperation With War Crimes Tribunal *[AFP]* 56
Serbia: SPS Leader Praises Milosevic's Policy on Kosovo *[Bad Vilbel VESTI 26 May]* 56

Montenegro

Montenegro: Djukanovic Views Republic's Status in FRY *[BORBA 29 May]* 56
Montenegro: PM Blames Failure To Arrest Mladic on 'Negligence' *[NASA BORBA 27 May]* 57
Montenegro: Commentary Says Karadzic Has Become 'Stronger' *[MONITOR 24 May]* 58

Kosovo

Kosovo: Rugova Welcomes EU Efforts To Improve Situation *[KOSOVA DAILY REPORT]* ... 60
Kosovo: Parties Consider Albanian Elections 'a Historic Victory' *[Tirana TV]* 60

Albania: Berisha Urges Respect for 'Rules of Democracy'

AU2905195696 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 29 May 96

[Announcer-read statement by Albanian President Sali Berisha; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] I would like to stress that the situation in Albania is calm and stability is certain. I invite all Albanian citizens to reject every provocation with dignity and calmness. I invite the opposition to respect the rules of democracy, and I assure it that its seats in the future parliament will always be reserved for all those who deserved the people's free vote and those who will deserve it in the second round of elections.

I invite the opposition candidates to take part in the voting in balloting constituencies and all the voters to participate in the second round of elections. I would like to assure you that the elections will be held in accordance with the law. All human rights and freedoms are and will be guaranteed in Albania, including the right to gatherings and protests in conformity with the law. However, I think that the calls to occupy streets and squares, accompanied with slogans like Our Votes—a Bullet for You and We Will Hang You are calls of the most fierce communism in Europe, which suffered its final defeat in the free elections of 26 May, and calls that have nothing in common with a democratic government.

Every citizen, group, or political force in Albania enjoys the right to protest. Albania has not limited and does not limit demonstrations. Yesterday's protests in Skenderbeg Square were not in accordance with the law, and that is why I condemn them. I thank the police for implementing the law. Meanwhile, I have asked the Prosecutor's Office to begin an investigation into current abuses and adopt the relevant verdict in accordance with the law.

Albanian democracy today is more certain than ever in its history. With the free vote on 26 May, democracy received the blessing of the entire Albanian people and the blessing of God. The secret police of Enver Hoxha are undergoing a crisis and are left with no hope at all, including the alleged friends of Albanian terrorists who helped them and attempted, especially recently, to bring to power in Albania elements who had undertaken state killings and would order the killing of Albanian youngsters. The Albanians have voted for democracy and their place in Europe, the statement by President Berisha ends.

Albania: Election Commission Final Results

AU2905223696 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 2000 GMT 29 May 96

[Communique by the Central Election Commission on voting results of the first round elections for deputies to the People's Assembly of the Republic of Albania, issued in Tirana on 29 May]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 26 May 1996, the first round of elections for deputies to the People's Assembly of the Republic of Albania was held nationwide. After examining all the documentation received from the election commissions of 115 constituencies, the Central Election Commission [KQZ] officially declares the following results:

Out of 2,204,002 citizens registered on the voting lists, 1,963,344 persons—89 percent—participated in the voting.

According to constituencies, the candidates who have won in the first round of elections are as follows:

Winners in First Round of Elections for Deputies to People's Assembly

		Percent
Human Rights Union Party		
Constituency 112	Vangjel Jorgji Dule	51
Constituency 114	Thoma Jorgo Mico	62
Democratic Party [PD]		
Constituency 1	Edmir Luc Malaj	81.7
Constituency 2	Rrok Kol Smajlaj	82
Constituency 3	Sabri Vejsi Bushati	65
Constituency 4	Ali Sulejman Spahia	66
Constituency 5	Pjeter Filip Arbnori	79
Constituency 6	Lorenc Karlet Luka	68
Constituency 7	Lazer Fane Stani	71
Constituency 8	Menduh Fadil Mushani	87
Constituency 9	Josefina Filip Topalli	69
Constituency 10	Ali Ahmet Kazazi	57
Constituency 12	Bashkim Bahri Kopliku	71
Constituency 13	Besnik Dervish Gjongecaj	71
Constituency 14	Maxhun Ibish Peka	53

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

		Percent
Constituency 15	Urim Vehap Muja	53
Constituency 16	Jemin Ramadan Gjana	59
Constituency 17	Roza Gjergj Pati	74
Constituency 18	Luigj Gjok Gjoka	62
Constituency 19	Gjon Dede Nikaj	66
Constituency 21	Alfred Engjell Serreqi	5
Constituency 22	Feim Skender Godo	63
Constituency 23	Jaroullav Tosum Alla	56
Constituency 24	Idriz Daut Xhamara	61
Constituency 25	Safet Selfi Zhulali	75
Constituency 26	Azem Shpend Hajdari	54
Constituency 27	Luan Eqerem Lazimi	66
Constituency 28	Shkelqim Sulejman Hoxha	67
Constituency 29	Natasha Muntaz Shehu	69
Constituency 30	Njazi Azem Kosovrasti	59
Constituency 31	Dashamir Shaqir Cela	61
Constituency 32	Ferdinand Mynyr Xhaferi	71
Constituency 33	Petrit Ashim Derhami	68
Constituency 34	Fadil Emerla Gjata	76
Constituency 35	Genc Yzetber Juka	72
Constituency 36	Nela Koci Moisiu	55
Constituency 37	Xhevdet Hamdi Ferri	67
Constituency 38	Zafer Asllan Ypi	68
Constituency 39	Bedri Sadik Collaku	58
Constituency 40	Zamir Myrteza Topi	58
Constituency 41	Shaban Rexhep Memia	73
Constituency 42	Fadil Tahir Kepi	62
Constituency 43	Ymer Kasem Balla	61
Constituency 44	Ndricim Xhavit Xhepa	59
Constituency 45	Alush Mustafa Shima	73
Constituency 46	Emin Selman Riza	64
Constituency 47	Hysen Gani Heta	59
Constituency 48	Ekrem Ali Kastrati	72
Constituency 49	Ylli Medit Vejsiu	63
Constituency 50	Margarita Telemak Qirko	56

		Percent
Constituency 51	Albert Beqir Brojka	57
Constituency 52	Pellumb Tasim Karagjozi	56
Constituency 53	Zana Shani Panariti	59
Constituency 54	Rexhep Mustafa Karapici	68
Constituency 55	Marjeta Bektash Pronjari	59
Constituency 56	Maksim Manol Konomi	59
Constituency 57	Aleksander Gabriel Meksi	64
Constituency 58	Halit Osman Shamata	90
Constituency 59	Tritan Masar Shehu	92
Constituency 60	Luan Shyqyri Skuqi	81
Constituency 61	Ariana Hiqmet Nati	79
Constituency 62	Ali Etem Gripshi	78
Constituency 63	Engjell Ethem Dakli	61
Constituency 64	Zigfrid Ipokrat Jorgaqi	60
Constituency 65	Abdyl Ismail Xhaja	67
Constituency 66	Kasem Tasim Dylgjeri	57
Constituency 69	Bardhyl Riza Musai	57
Constituency 73	Visar Hekuran Zhiti	70
Constituency 74	Maksim Zisa Cikuli	73
Constituency 75	Agim Kasem Fuga	53
Constituency 77	Belul Celo Celo	68
Constituency 78	Edmond Kozma Lulja	59
Constituency 79	Fadil Tali Cepele	64
Constituency 80	Hasan Ismail Halili	72
Constituency 83	Sokol Gezim Bejleri	69
Constituency 84	Ylli Abdurrahman Shalaj	67
Constituency 85	Agron Neki Musaraj	65
Constituency 86	Kozeta Ymer Menkulasi	64
Constituency 87	Dylber Irfan Vrioni	81
Constituency 89	Mirko Anastas Haxhistasa	58
Constituency 90	Vili Shefki Minarolli	58
Constituency 92	Bujar Hysni Isak	53

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

		Percent
Constituency 93	Robert Kico Ceku	60
Constituency 94	Kleri Petraq Kasimati	54
Constituency 95	Koco Vangjush Bode	54
Constituency 96	Selim Feti Belortaja	61
Constituency 98	Pandeli Dhimiter Pasko	53
Constituency 100	Ridvan Vait Bode	58
Constituency 101	Blerim Neim Cela	63
Constituency 103	Pertef Fejzi Lameborshi	59
Constituency 104	Shpetim Maliq Mezini	50
Constituency 105	Dashamir Hamit Shehi	53
Constituency 106	Gezim Kamber Zilja	84
Constituency 107	Esat Njazi Hasani	58
Constituency 109	Uran Safet Butka	52
Constituency 113	Burim Xhelil Hysi	59
Constituency 115	Leonard Petrik Demi	50
Socialist Party [PS]		
Constituency 70	Luan Skender Shahollari	51
Constituency 72	Sali Sadik Rexhepi	50
Constituency 88	Erion Murdash Brace	51
Constituency 91	Ilir Rexhep Metaj	51
Constituency 102	Hamit Shahin Gjoni	50

At the end of the first round, the PD candidates have won in 95 constituencies, the PS candidates in five constituencies, and the Human Rights Union in two constituencies.

In 10 constituencies—specifically in Constituency 20 in Mirdite, Constituency 67 in Elbasan, Constituency 68 in Elbasan, Constituency 71 in Librazhd, Constituency 76 in Lushnje, Constituency 97 in Korce, Constituency 99 in Pogradec, Constituency 108 in Vlore, Constituency 110 in Permet, and Constituency 111 in Gjirokaster—because none of the candidates has won more than 50 percent of the votes, the second round of elections will be held on Sunday, 2 June 1996.

In Constituencies 20, 67, 68, 71, 76, 97, 99, 105, 110, and 111, on the basis of the results, the PS candidates had the right to compete in the second round. According to Decision No 187, dated 26 May 1996, the PS General Steering Committee has informed the KQZ that the PS is withdrawing its candidates for deputies and does not recognize the election results.

On the basis of Paragraph 4 of Article 8 of the Law on the Elections to the People's Assembly of the Republic of Albania, these candidates will be substituted and will be represented by those having the highest percentage among the other candidates who participated in the first round of elections.

Due to numerous irregularites observed since the voting procedures and until the results were announced, the KQZ also unanimously decided not to recognize these results in Constituencies 81 and 82 in Fier and Constituency 11 in Puke, and rules that voting be repeated in these constituencies.

The Council of Ministers, the local government secretariat, the local power authorities, and other bodies assigned by law are instructed to take all the technical and organizative measures for a normal development of the second round of elections.

The KQZ expresses its hope that even in this round, the elections will be completely free and fair.

Albania: Dailies Comment on Postelection Situation

AU2905153896 Tirana ATA in English 1207 GMT 29 May 96

["Press Review"—ATA headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, May 29 (ATA)—Albanian dailies comment the post-election situation. RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE carries an appeal of President Berisha to citizens entitled "Former Secret Police Chieftains Seek Destabilization of Democracy," and the editorial "Albanians Celebrate, Red Fanatics Provoke Tensions." The paper publishes a declaration of the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Lenni Fischer under the title "The Boycott of Elections by Socialist Party [PS] and Other Opposition Parties, an Unprecedented and Premeditated Act." The paper carries opinions by representatives of European institutions who came to Albania for May 26 elections. In the second page RILINDJE DEMOKRATIKE carries opinions by opposition members of the election commissions describing the elections as normal. Also coverage by German media of the elections in Albania are published under the title "End of Communists."

ZERI I POPULLIT carries an editorial entitled "Squares Belong to the People, Violence Is Illegal." The paper today carries a PS declaration demanding that the elections be annulled. Under the title "Will of the Albanian People Was Not Freely Expressed in May 26 Elections," the paper carries opinions by 11 OSCE [Organization

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

for Security and Cooperation in Europe] observers. The paper reflects yesterday's press conference of opposition leaders.

REPUBLIKA today carries a statement of the Leading Committee of the Republican Party [PR] which says among others that law violations have been noticed in many constituencies. Today this paper publishes a statement by the Right Wing League saying that the subjects of these league have noticed grave violations in the May 26 elections.

POLI I QENDRES carries the editorial "Illegitimate Reaction of Berisha Stains With Blood Scanderbeg Square." The paper writes that 11 OSCE observers have pronounced themselves against Sunday elections. The paper writes that three people have threatened Neritan Ceka, leader of Democratic Alliance Party.

RILINDJA carries an editorial entitled "PD [Democratic Party] Has Won in Most of the Constituencies." Under the headline "Kosova a Day After Elections in Albania," the paper carries the report "Victory of Democracy, Victory of the Albanians."

ALBANIA carries an article entitled "Communists Provoke a Civil War." The paper carries an article "Socialists Have Signed Process-verbaux of Elections" and pronunciations by representatives of important European institutions saying that Sunday's elections have been orderly.

DITA INFORMACION carries a report entitled "Blue Rain in Tirana Yesterday."

KOHA JONE has an article under the title "Opposition Leaders Hit and Detained," and another "Albania in Chaos From the Stolen Victory." This paper also writes an article under the title "Men and Women Barbarously Beaten" and another "PR Does Not Recognise May 26 Elections."

TRIBUNA carries an editorial "The Zyuganovs of Tirana Seek Civil War" and another article "International Observers Refute Claims by Opposition Parties in Albania That General Elections Were Not Fair."

GAZETA SHQIPTARE writes of the illegal rally by opposition yesterday in the Scanderbeg Square under the title "No to the Rally, Clashes in the Square."

LIRIA in its editorial commemorates a revolt of former politically prisoners in the jail of Spac 23 years ago against the communist dictatorship.

SINDIKALISTI carries an article entitled "Selection of the New Government, Sanctioning of the Victory in Parliamentary Elections."

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Bulgaria: Foreign Minister on Planned Balkan Meeting

AU2905202496 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 29 May 96 p 2

[Article by Lyuba Manolova: "Pirinski Knows of No States That Have Refused To Come to the Balkan Meeting"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday, prior to Foreign Minister Pirinski's departure for Paris, a report was disseminated that Angel Dimitrov, Bulgarian ambassador in Skopje, had been summoned to the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Foreign Ministry, where he was told that the Republic of Macedonia demanded that the meeting of the Balkan foreign ministers be postponed until the end of June. A few minutes before boarding the airplane, Minister Pirinski told correspondents: "So far, I only have the media report, and I still have not seen the information provided by our ambassador. All Balkan states agreed to this meeting. We also have an agenda that has been agreed upon and a final document that has nearly been coordinated."

Pirinski maintains that he has seen a letter from his Macedonian counterpart [as published], Saso Todorovski [assistant FYROM foreign minister], dated three or four days ago, which does not question the facts of the holding of the meeting, but only comments on the form of participation. On his return from Paris, the Bulgarian foreign minister and his aides will assess what are the best possibilities of successfully conducting the Balkan meeting. According to Skopje, postponing the meeting would allow those states in the region that, for various reasons, are prevented from participating to take part in the forum. The states in question are apparently Albania (because of the elections) and Turkey (because of the UN Habitat forum, which will take place in Istanbul at the same time). Both countries have expressed reservations regarding the dates Bulgaria proposes—8 and 9 June.

Pirinski said the following regarding the name under which Macedonia wants to participate in the Sofia forum: "In anything related to this position of the Republic of Macedonia, you must ask yourselves whether this is a selective or a universal practice on the part of the Macedonian side."

Bulgaria: Paper Expects Ministerial Resignations on Friday

AU3005110196 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 30 May 96 pp 1-2

[DUMA PRESS Report: "Ministerial Resignations Could Be Demanded on Friday"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Ministerial resignations could be expected at the Friday meeting of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] Supreme Council, members of the Democratic Left are saying. The deputies are angry, above all, at Agriculture Minister Shivarov because of the bread crisis. At the closed meeting of the Democratic Left parliamentary faction on Tuesday, when Prime Minister Videnov described the serious situation that is expected as a result of the agreement with the IMF, some discontented deputies have called for the resignations of Ministers Kostov [finance], Vuchev [industry], and Gechev [deputy prime minister]. Concern with the situation in the country has been expressed in the corridors, and the need to change the entire cabinet expressed.

Even the angriest members of the Democratic Left, however, are categorically saying that the cabinet cannot and must not be toppled as a result of a no-confidence vote proposed by the opposition. According to them, the leftist forces must make the necessary changes on their own. The deputies do not tend to believe that all the problems were inherited, and they find mistakes in the activity of the cabinet. [passage omitted]

Bulgaria: Socialist Party Deputies Demand Cabinet Reshuffle

AU2905200596 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 29 May 96 p 2

[Article by Ekaterina Nikolova: "According to Democratic Left, Videnov Cannot Conduct Reform"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 28 May, after the meeting of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] parliamentary faction, it became clear that the cabinet will be reshuffled by the end of June. The changes will be discussed as early as Friday, at the national conference on the accountability-election campaign in the party. Some 15 deputies have demanded the resignation of Agriculture Minister Svetoslav Shivarov because of the grain crisis. Shivarov was accused of lack of professionalism, arrogant behavior on Bulgarian National Television, lack of information on the bread balance, repeated refusal to meet the Socialist deputies, and hiding from the press. Not one of the red Agrarians [Aleksandur Stamboliyski Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, BSP's

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

coalition partner] in the BSP parliamentary faction defended their party comrade.

The BSP deputies also demanded the ouster of Deputy Prime Minister Rumen Gechev, Industry Minister Kliment Vuchev, and Culture Minister Georgi Kostov. The majority of the BSP parliamentary faction categorically claims that with this membership Videnov's cabinet cannot implement the BSP tasks related to the structural reform and privatization. Data arriving from the accountability-election campaign in the party, which just ended, shows that the BSP basic organizations have massively demanded the removal of the four ministers.

Bulgaria: Prime Minister Meets Russian Defense Official

AU3005115796 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 30 May 96 p 3

[Article by Vasil Lyutskanov: "We Negotiate on New Licenses With Russian Arms Minister"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 29 May Deputy Prime Minister Doncho Konakchiev met Gennadiy Voronin, Russia's deputy minister of defense industry, and discussed with him the establishment of mixed arms companies and the receipt of new licenses.

Joint production and appearance on third markets are planned in the spheres of artillery and missile ammunition, optical electronics, and automatic systems of communications and fire control.

On Tuesday Voronin reviewed the Khemus' 96 arms exhibition in Plovdiv and had talks with the chiefs of "Electron Consortium" and "Metalkhim Holding." Voronin and Ivan Kolev, deputy chief of Bulgaria's Interdepartmental Arms Council, are heads of the expert working group which is preparing the September session of the Bulgarian-Russian Commission on Cooperation in Specialized Production. At this session we expect to receive new licenses and extend the old licenses of our military enterprises. Two weeks ago Russian President Yeltsin signed a decree by which he elevated the former Russian Committee on Defense Industry to the rank of a ministry.

Bulgaria: Russia's Sukhoy Aircraft Company Offers Barter Deal

AU2905140796 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 29 May 96 p 4

[Interview with Vladimir Babek, chief engineer of the Russian Sukhoy Aircraft Company, by L. Denov; place and date not given: "We Offer Aircraft Barter Deal"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Denov] Mr. Babek, does the Bulgarian military have a real chance to get at least two Sukhoy squadrons?

[Babek] Yes, your chances are very real. Furthermore, this could be accomplished not only in exchange for foreign currency, but also in exchange for Bulgarian goods. We propose the following barter deal: Sixty percent of the deal's value could be paid in Bulgarian goods, and 40 percent in foreign currency. Could you imagine what a stimulus for the development of your food industry and agriculture such a deal could be?

[Denov] Why should we prefer the Sukhoy-39 to the MiG-29M?

[Babek] They are two different airplanes. The Sukhoy-39 can carry out the missions of the MiG-29M, but the MiG-29M cannot cope with the Sukhoy-39's tasks.

The MiG-29 is mainly intended for dogfights. It has difficulties in coping with ground targets—bridges, fortifications, armored targets, and so forth, while maintaining a precision of up to 1 meter from the target's center. No one in the world can fire with such a precision. The bombs and missiles are too expensive to waste them. In addition, the MiG-29M cannot open fire against ships, and you have such a long coast. The Sukhoy-39 has powerful antiship missiles. In addition, it can easily destroy antiaircraft complexes, which protect all major tank units.

Finally, the Sukhoy-39 is 15-29 percent cheaper than the MiG-29M.

[Denov] How many airplanes does Bulgaria need today?

[Babek] Two squadrons of 18 airplanes each should be enough even in the 21st century.

Bulgaria: Commentary Urges Retired Spies To Serve Country

AU3005101196 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 29 May 96 p 10

[Commentary by Velyo Rusev: "How Former Spies Work for Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The time again came for agents who have worked as spies abroad to come out into the open.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

The Association of Retired Bulgarian Spies, headed by General Vlado Todorov, the last chief of our intelligence during the time of Todor Zhivkov, announced that it will work for our national security.

Persons who resigned or were fired from the intelligence service united in a private organization. They said they will help in the war against gangsters and will convey information from their agents to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the foreign intelligence service. Precisely, as they used to do until now, despite the fact that no one asked them to do anything or imposed any tasks on them.

The former spies claim that there are no former spies. The intelligence service implements tasks related to Bulgaria's national security regardless of whether the regime is communist or not. However, the question emerged as to where were they in 1990-92 when our intelligence was destroyed, and when we gave our new allies in the West the list of our undercover agents in Europe and closed the intelligence stations in the developed countries. We did these new allies a favor and said that they do not interest us any longer. However, they sent to Bulgaria twice as many spies as in the past. They created for them covers such as sociology experts, foundations with noble goals, personnel-training companies, and so forth.

Now the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] is in power. Most of the retired and fired spies used to work under the watchful eye of the party-another Bulgarian Communist Party. Now they seem to believe that the country needs them again to advise the young leaders on how to guard our national security.

The singer-minister, Nachev [former minister of internal affairs], correctly understood them and restored some of the younger among them to their posts.

Nikolay Dobrev [minister of internal affairs] likes the old spies, who used to give him advice when he was chairman of the National Assembly Commission on National Security. Now it appears that the old hands from the State Security First Directorate have a chance to return to the helm.

Until then those old hands will continue to leak information according to which Zhelev and the old Union of Democratic Forces leadership destroyed Bulgaria's intelligence in order to curry favor with their new protectors.

While this actually is true, one must remember that the presidential elections are around the corner, and if a BSP president is elected the National Intelligence Service, which is being revived, will not escape the control of the 100-year-old party.

The old hands present their concern as their professional duty, but should we fully believe them? They know a lot and have enough relations and old agents abroad—chemistry professors in the Scandinavian countries, business managers in England and Austria, scientists in Germany, France, Spain... and informers in Bulgaria. They resemble a parallel structure or private intelligence service which could move things here and there.

It would really be good if the old spies use their knowledge and contacts for the benefit of Bulgaria rather than the party which is now in power and offers its hand to them.

Otherwise, they should stick to their fat business relations with the companies of their brothers from the USSR intelligence, something that provides them with a decent living.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Czech Republic: Zieleniec on NATO, Ties to Neighbors

AU2905190996 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 24 May 96 p 11

[Interview with Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec by Petr Zavadil and Stanislav Drahny in Prague; date not given: "Our Status in the World Is Given by Our Successes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [LIDOVE NOVINY] Baroness Thatcher declared at the Prague congress of the New Atlantic Initiative that the intensification of European integration could weaken Europe's ties to the United States. Do you agree with this?

[Zieleniec] I do not agree with it. I think that the very traditional and natural British insular view of Europe is projected in this statement. Despite all of the problems that are always associated with this in Europe, I personally can imagine an intensified European cooperation that, as a whole, will be a harmonious element of an effective transatlantic relationship. This is important for Europe and the Czech Republic. Because you have cited the example of Lady Thatcher's clear-cut view, I would like to refer to the view of the Netherlands, a country that is, as a part of Benelux, very pro-European and extremely focused on intensifying European integration. At the same time, however, it is a traditionally Atlantic country, and the transatlantic relationship forms the basis of the Dutch foreign policy doctrine.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] The necessity of intensifying European integration is also often rationalized by the U.S. concentration on parts of the world other than Europe. Is there a risk that America will become absorbed in Southeast Asia and will pay less attention to Europe?

[Zieleniec] There are all sorts of propensities in the United States preordained by its natural position, ethnic composition, and other factors. On the other hand, we too play a certain role here, and how America is depends a great deal on us Europeans. The issue of intensive transatlantic commercial cooperation is terribly important. This is a project that we have been discussing for a long time—for example, with our Canadian partners: a project for free trade, maybe in the future, for a transatlantic common market that would give the transatlantic relationship another dimension, another pillar on which it would stand. You know that the Czech Republic is a country for which free trade means more than just economic ties. For us, a small country in the center of Europe, it is a vital national interest. I feel that the liberalization of trade is a means of strengthening the transatlantic relationship.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] Baroness Thatcher said in Prague that, in her opinion, the most suitable time for enlarging NATO has already passed. Do you also feel that way?

[Zieleniec] Mrs. Thatcher was undoubtedly talking about the developments in Russia, about Russia's changing power and international weight, and about Moscow's attitudes ensuing from this toward the alliance's enlargement. On the other hand, it is necessary to say that enlarging the alliance is an incredibly important undertaking and a step that will have far-reaching strategic consequences. Therefore, enlarging the alliance has to be accompanied by many other activities in all sorts of spheres. I am convinced that the alliance will be enlarged at a time we can describe as the next few years and that the Czech Republic will enter into NATO in the first wave.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] The effort not to isolate Russia is often discussed along with enlarging the alliance; giving it a greater role, as a compromise, in European affairs—for example, in the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] or the Council of Europe—is being mentioned.

[Zieleniec] I feel that no compromise is being sought here. We have already said many times that NATO enlargement is a matter for the states striving for membership and for the alliance itself. I am convinced that these statements are meant seriously. The issue involves creating an atmosphere of trust in Europe and also with regard to Russia. This means reducing the undesirable things that could lead to an increase in international tension to a minimum. Again, the issue only involves Russia. NATO enlargement, without doubt, will not mean the admission of nine or 12 countries at once. It will mean an enlargement by a small number of states. This step must not be taken as a sign that the other countries of Central and East Europe are being left to Russia's sphere of influence or that the West does not want to cooperate with these states and has written them off as partners. For this very reason, NATO enlargement has to be a structured decision that will mean something to those states that become members immediately, but will also be an accommodating step that will lay the foundations of a security structure for its future plans and will create a platform of trust with regard to Russia. We must remember not only the importance of the smaller countries of Central and East Europe, but also the importance of Ukraine, which does not want to be a NATO member but whose independence and prosperity is a key to stability in Europe. The closer we are to membership in the alliance, the clearer we realize that we are also jointly responsible for this endeavor.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] Poland and the Czech Republic will obviously be in the first wave of potential NATO members. Relations between these countries have improved recently. Should this not have happened sooner?

[Zieleniec] We have always strived for intensive and friendly relations with Poland. The concept of Visegrad cooperation persevered at the beginning of our new democratic history after 1990. This concept was meaningful as long as it involved facing up to a common—at this time, Soviet—threat. The moment Visegrad began to seek a new direction in the so-called joint endeavor for entry into the European institutions or, God forbid, in concepts for an alternative to the European institutions—now I am talking about the proposal by former Polish President Walesa for a so-called second NATO—we had to say: Watch out! Not because we would want to raise ourselves above anyone or compete with anyone, but because we were aware that integration into the European Union is, first and foremost, a process of the internal transformations taking place within states. And, if we had acceded to a doctrine of joint endeavor for admission into the Union, we would have sent our citizens, and also the citizens of the other countries, a very bad signal—namely, that we are not members of the Union or that there are certain problems with this is a matter for the civil servants in Brussels and not of our own endeavor. We have based the whole of our economic reform on the doctrine of our own responsibility for this state, and, therefore, we could not accede to a concept of banging loudly together on Europe's doors. Year by year, it has become ever more obvious—and to our partners in neighboring countries—that our stance is leading to this objective and that making cooperation with the EU conditional upon Visegrad cooperation is counterproductive. I have the feeling that almost all of the politicians in the region now recognize this and that the current model is the optimum one for our region. But the very intensive bilateral contacts, the very dynamically developing Central European free trade zone [CEFTA], which is, first and foremost, an economic organization, provide a politically substantial supportive mechanism for our mutual relations. By the way, CEFTA is currently the most dynamic free trade zone in the world. At the same time, it is a community open to other countries: Slovenia has already joined. Compared with this, Visegrad was a club that banked on exclusiveness. The current intensity of bilateral relations with Poland and the other countries in the region is proof of how important it was to abandon the Visegrad concept. I have the feeling that many of those who endorsed this concept in the past would now agree with me.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] In conjunction with the improving relations with Poland, it may seem that contacts with Slovakia are stagnating.

[Zieleniec] Slovakia is a very important economic partner for us: Few people know that it is the second biggest after Germany. First and foremost, because of our common history and traditional tries—from commercial to interhuman ones—we are trying the best we can to cultivate good relations. It is, however, true that the complicated domestic political developments in Slovakia make some things difficult. Nevertheless, I would object to the word "stagnation." If you were to take inventory, you would ascertain, for example, that something functions with regard to Slovakia that is not common even in relations with many other neighboring states: Officials, including the ministers responsible for the individual departments, meet at all sorts of levels. Look at how often Ministers Ruml, Strasky, and Tigrid meet with their counterparts. I believe that relations with Slovakia will develop intensively because I know that this is in the vital interest of the Czech Republic, and I think this is viewed similarly in Slovakia.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] Concern is being expressed—mainly in Budapest with regard to Hungary's geographical position—about Slovakia's future political orientation. Could Slovakia's stronger orientation toward the east be unpleasant for us?

[Zieleniec] If you are talking about Slovakia's strategic importance for the Czech Republic, this is obvious. The notion that there would be some kind of border between blocs—between political or economic groupings—on the Morava River is extremely traumatizing for us, and there is no state in Europe for which it would be worse than for us.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] What do you think of the statements by the Slovak prime minister that the alliance should enlarge more slowly?

[Zieleniec] We are of a different opinion. The alliance should be enlarged as fast as possible.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] Austria is the neighbor about whom the least is said. It often seems that, compared with the others, mutual relations are the least extensive.

[Zieleniec] I would not say so. During my last visit to Austria, we agreed with Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister Schuessel that we would meet twice a year. Other officials meet often; look at the contacts between towns. Relations with Austria are intensive and good. This is borne out by how we manage to deal with the problems that crop up naturally between neighbors.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] Of our neighbors, only Germany remains. During the past four years, has there been any significant shift in Czech-German relations?

[Zieleniec] Within the framework of the election campaign, I took part in a recent Debata [Debate] program on television with representatives of the key political parties in the Czech Republic, including the opposition. The topics were introduced by our political opponents, and, despite this, not only did Czech-German relations not dominate this discussion, but also none of our partners thought it necessary to go into this subject confrontationally and discuss it for a long time. This testifies to a shift in the perception of Czech-German relations in Czech society. The discussion on these relations has been rationalized. The same debate a year ago would have been incredibly stormy, would have lasted terribly long, and a lot of nonsense would have been said in it. I feel that this, too, is one of the repercussions of the process that is taking place between the Czech Republic and Germany, the process in which we are seeking common words to state that the governmental and political problems stemming from the past will no longer burden our relations. It is important to look at the effort associated with the formulation of a declaration not only from the point of view of the objective, but also from the point of view of the importance of the discussion that is taking place around it. Namely, it has been obvious from the beginning that it is impossible to enter into these negotiations without a clearly formulated consensus on our domestic political scene that would lead across the key parties and also encroach upon the opposition. Thanks to this, we have been able to formulate the Czech point of view precisely and not only from the point of view of the ministry or the governing parties.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] What are the most recent developments in the talks on a joint declaration?

[Zieleniec] As far as the current state of the talks with Germany are concerned, they are complicated, because each of the partners—my counterpart and I—is aware of the complexity of the domestic political background in each country. This is because our countries did not communicate with one another for 50 years. Despite the fact that the negotiations are very complex from this point of view, I am aware of considerable progress and of a very strong desire on the German side to see them through to the end. I envisage that we should complete this work during the next half year. But I have to reiterate that not only the outcome, but also the process itself has been of fundamental importance for the Czech Republic. The fact that Czech-German relations have entered into the position of being just one of a number of Czech foreign policy issues—albeit a major one—and that they are not superimposed on our entire view of the world and do not dominate our every step is also a result of this process. If we had not undergone a domestic discussion on this issue, I am convinced that the election campaign would virtually be about nothing else. Today's situation makes it possible to understand Czech-German relations objectively and to not burden the campaign with foreign policy issues, which is always to the detriment of the whole state.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] In your opinion, how have the Czech Republic's foreign political position and our surroundings changed over the past four years?

[Zieleniec] There has been a significant shift from the Czech Republic's point of view: From the beginning, we have declared our desire to become a member of the EU and NATO, but this was only a declaration on our part. On the part of the West, this was a manifestation of polite interest and nothing more. At the moment, NATO enlargement—that is, the Czech Republic's entry into the alliance—is a key matter of East-West discussion. Expanding the EU is also a key matter that is being discussed within the Union. Furthermore, it is no longer being dealt with only on a general level, but also an intergovernmental conference is a session that should be completed roughly within a year. Within six months of its conclusion, the negotiations on admission—with the Czech Republic, too—should begin. The alliance has already clearly articulated its vision of enlargement.

I would like to emphasize one thing: The status of the Czech Republic in the world and its authority are given, first and foremost, by what it has achieved at home. This is a unique result. Not foreign political diplomatic activities, but, first and foremost, the domestic success of economic transformation and the successful development of our political scene plus an unequivocal foreign political orientation have taken us to where we are.

Czech Republic: Poll Puts ODS 6 Points Ahead of CSSD

AU3005105796 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 25 May 96 p 1

[Article by Ladislav Jakl: "The ODS Wants a Three at the Beginning"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The actual difference between support for the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] and the Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD] amounts to six percentage points. This is clear from the results of definitely the last preelection survey published yesterday by STEM [Center for Empirical Research] and STEM/MARK.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Some 27.8 percent of citizens would have voted for the ODS in mid May, while 21.8 percent would have voted for the CSSD. This was announced yesterday by the Center for Empirical Research on the last possible date on which publishing preelection surveys was permitted. The results published yesterday come from a poll conducted on 13-20 May among the largest sample (5,800 people) to date.

Compared with the results that STEM published on Monday [20 May] and that came from a poll conducted 10 days earlier, the ODS has improved by roughly five percentage points, while the CSSD has improved by only three percentage points. According to STEM Director Jan Hartl, the different values have been caused not only by a shift in moods before the elections, but also by a change in the method: Potential nonvoters were excluded from the sample and those hesitating were included in it. Compared with the previous survey, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia [KSCM], the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party [KDU-CSL], and the Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia [SPR-RSC] have also improved. Of the strongest parties, only support for the Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA] has declined.

ODS Chairman and Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus welcomed the rise in support for his party on NOVA Television, for which the survey was carried out, and added with pleasure: "I hope this is not the final figure. The number of our list of candidates is three, so I hope our election result will also begin with a three." The results of the survey also put CSSD Chairman Milos Zeman in an optimistic mood. Zeman views them as a manifestation of the constant rise in the number of [CSSD] supporters in the run-up to the elections. KDU-CSL Chairman Josef Lux hopes "we will still overtake the communists after all."

Four years ago, the election results differed from the final preelection polls. In a poll conducted then by the IVVM [Institute for Public Opinion Research] and carried out three weeks before the elections, the ODS had 16 percent of support but won almost 30 percent in the elections. The CSSD had 6 percent support and gained 6.5 percent in the elections.

Comparison of STEM Polling Results

	3-12 May	13-20 May
ODS	24.0	27.8
KSCM	10.3	11.0
ODA	9.1	7.1
CSSD	19.3	21.8
KDU-CSL	8.7	10.1
LB	2.7	2.2
DEU	1.8	2.7
SD-LSNS	2.5	2.2
SPR-RSC	7.1	8.9
DZJ	1.2	3.3

NOTE: LB = Left Bloc; DEU = Democratic Union; SD-LSNS = Free Democrats-Liberal National Social Party; DZJ = Pensioners for a Secure Life

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Slovakia: Kovac Speaks Out Against Neutrality Option

AU2905174796 Bratislava SME in Slovak 28 May 96 p 2

[Report by "r": "According to Michal Kovac, Slovakia Cannot Be Neutral"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Slovakia cannot remain a neutral country because that would mean the Slovak Republic's isolation from European developments and would be damaging to the interests of all citizens of the Slovak Republic, President Michal Kovac told Radio Twist's Journal yesterday at noon. He was reacting to contradictory statements by representatives of the government coalition regarding the Slovak Republic's entry into NATO. At a recent meeting with deputies to the Russian State Duma, Jan Luptak, deputy chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] and chairman of the Association of Workers of Slovakia, declared that Slovakia should be neutral, while Dusan Slobodnik (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]), chairman of the NRSR Foreign Affairs Committee, stated that the HZDS supports Slovakia's entry into NATO. In its policy statement, the Government of the Slovak Republic endorsed the idea of the Slovak Republic's NATO entry. Regarding the diverse statements by representatives of the coalition, President Kovac said yesterday that, while they have a right to their own opinion, they are in the government coalition and statements by members of the government coalition that differ from the government's call into question the credibility of the government's policy.

Slovakia: Daily Discusses Integration Into Europe

AU3005083196 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 24, 25 May 96 p 9

[Article by Ivan Horsky: "At This Time, Slovakia Is Eliminated From the First Round"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The admission of new members into NATO, and from among the Central European countries, has recently become more of a topic of discussion. The impetus for this was given by the session of the North Atlantic Assembly in Athens and the visit by Slovene Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek to Brussels.

Although NATO political head Javier Solana, who also recently visited Bratislava, obstinately claimed that the list of hopefuls was not definitely approved because the process of individual interviews has not been completed, sources in Brussels rule out the possibility of the Slovak Republic being in the first wave. To put it more precisely, they rule out the possibility of Slovakia's becoming a member of the Atlantic Alliance with the present government in office. Regardless of what its representatives claim concerning this topic on the domestic scene, including the repeated promises of dedication to affiliation to the Atlantic community, many actual political measures, and not only on the domestic political scene but even in the foreign political sphere, have been viewed, particularly by the Brussels (i.e., the decisive) political leadership as directly contrary to this. The surprising element is that the Slovak activities in the military sphere—be it within the framework of the Partnership for Peace plan or the operation of Slovak sappers in Croatia, Bosnia, or now in East Slavonia—have been highly valued by the NATO experts. They ask, however, and it is not at all difficult to understand this, why these two spheres, which should complement each other, in the interest of the proclaimed priority goal—the entry into NATO—are in such sharp contrast.

In private talks, the Alliance representatives openly express their doubts regarding the sincerity of these endeavors. They have actually become so open that they no longer beat around the bush. Especially, when they learn that the prime minister's advisers are offering a very curious deal in Moscow—neutrality in exchange for an increase of Slovak exports to Russia. The subsequent denial has not changed anything.

The continuing insecurity arising from the obfuscated relations between Bratislava and Moscow disqualifies the Slovak Euroatlantic aspirations because it does not concern only NATO but also the EU, or the West European Union. In this context, the words addressed to the Slovak diplomats, some of whom deliberately misinterpret the results of their talks, and send to the center "groomed" reports, in which they embellish the actual, not very good situation or comment, or the open inquiries from their partners.

Slovakia has the present political representatives under the leadership of Vladimir Meciar to thank for becoming a pariah of Central Europe. In Brussels, be it NATO or the EU, Meciar is considered untrustworthy because of his ambiguous behavior—on the one hand, beautiful talk but, on the other hand, deeds that simply do not correspond either to the spirit or the written principles of these two organizations. These two organizations, then, whether you like it or not, do not accept new members on the basis of figures and words that are impressive on the surface but rather on the basis of deeds. I emphasize the word "accept." Namely, the membership of each novice must be approved by national parliaments, and Slovakia has not yet convinced these that it belongs there.

When one speaks without beating about the bush about the elimination of Slovakia from the first wave of

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Alliance-membership hopefuls, it is necessary to say one more thing. Until recently, as is his habit, Vladimir Meciar believed that NATO will have to agree to the entry of Slovakia for geopolitical reasons, because the opposite would result in a "hole" in the communication and supply routes between Poland and Hungary. This was a politically myopic stand, however, on the border of blackmail. He apparently misunderstood the point of the entire matter, and forced the political planners on both sides of the Atlantic to change their views, and prepare a new alternative of measures. [passage omitted]

Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar is either behaving like an irresponsible pupil or, as his activities can also be interpreted, like he is disguising his true colors. These possibilities are also being discussed aloud in Brussels, which should evoke at least an inkling of dissatisfaction and bring about increased activity.

There are several alternatives in the works over admitting new members into the Alliance. Only one of them, however, reckons with Slovakia. Another one is the joining of only the Czech Republic and Poland, possibly as a trio with Slovenia. It is a response to the domestic political and obfuscated real foreign policy orientation on the part of Bratislava.

The rise of the chances of Ljubljana is given by the fact that, despite some minor flaws, it dropped out of the bag of the post-Yugoslav states by its willingness to settle bilateral problems with neighboring Italy, which had impeded its international assessment. That is, from the vantage point of politics and security, the strategists had to seek a substitute alternative because of Slovakia's inability hitherto to join NATO.

After all, Slovenia is a neighbor of the Alliance member Italy and of Hungary, in which there is bilateral interest in its becoming a member of the Alliance. Of course, under the condition that it would somehow settle its relations with neighbors, which bear the heavy burden of ethnic minority problems.

Because of the continuing animosity in relations between Budapest on the one hand, and Bratislava and Bucharest on the other, the Hungarian politicians should also reflect on their activities. The incessant lamentations over the aftermath of Trianon, which Hungary caused itself by its not exactly reasonable aggressive policy—be it within the framework of Austria-Hungary or Horthyite Hungary—the hidden or open support for the unrealistic demands of some representatives of Hungarian minorities do not have sufficient political backing in the world. Or rather—do not have it so far.

This is the fundamental stumbling block of the Slovak diplomats in the rendition of Vladimir Meciar and the group around him, who, despite a quantity of signals from outside, cannot step outside their own shadow, and gamble with the fate of all citizens of the country. The development shows that Slovakia does not have good relations with any of its neighbors. Whether it is presented for one reason or another is absolutely irrelevant from the point of view of the security situation.

For a while, the focus was only on the improvement of the relations with Hungary, but except for some cosmetic improvements, no turnabout has taken place to date, despite the ratified basic treaty. From the political point of view, Meciar's governments neglected relations with Poland, which is a key Central European state, even a regional power. Disregarding relations with the Czech Republic, whose prime minister Meciar has not met with, despite proclaimed efforts, for quite a while. Warsaw and Prague, by their very location, could, if nothing else, have covered Bratislava's back in the talks with Budapest, a possibility that was criminally neglected. Moreover, with a slightly more reasonable policy, small Slovakia, even if it has a great prime minister, could have hitched a ride with Poland.

If Slovakia could not be managed otherwise, if it becomes an object to geopolitical games through its own fault, or rather more precisely through the irresponsible policy of some of its representatives, it might face the fate of Bosnia. As the development there has shown, there is nothing easier than to start a civil war based on nationalism.

Meciar, I do not know why, acts as if he has forgotten the memorable May night in Washington three years ago, when a renowned political scientist, Zbigniew Brzezinski, scared him to death by the possible scenario of Slovakia's disappearance off the map. If he depends on help from Russia, he is not only politically myopic but also a gambler. It seems that Moscow has already lost the battle for Central Europe. A change in the post of foreign minister will not change anything in this fact.

So far, they have been using the Slovak prime minister in Moscow as a disturbing element in the battle for Central Europe. They are well aware, however, that Slovakia is important but too small to play the key role. Moreover, only one power group accepts him there, while for others, he is not a trustworthy politician. They do not want to sacrifice their own, much higher interests for him, or even Slovakia.

So, it could happen that after the Russian presidential elections, and that even in the instance of Yeltsin's victory, apparently connected with Chernomyrdin's departure from the scene, Meciar will remain all alone, with-

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

out any security (NATO) or political economic backing through the elimination from the EU membership.

In this instance, the black scenario could begin to be implemented, and precisely this should be the Slovak prime minister's nightmare, and not the efforts to survive each day, even thanks to the weak people in his own environment, who actually pull him down to the bottom with his own support.

Slovakia: Deputy: Opposition Preparing Foreign-Assisted Coup

AU2905133696 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 27 May 96 pp 1, 3

[Commentary by Roman Hofbauer, Movement for a Democratic Slovakia deputy: "Concerted Attack by the Opposition"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Older citizens surely remember the postwar years when, in the wake of the general parliamentary elections of 1946, the communists unleashed a merciless struggle to reverse the political situation. The realization of their plan in February 1948 was preceded by communists seizing control of key positions in the state—the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, the judiciary, and the press. Once this was accomplished, with the help of advisers and protagonists from abroad, nothing stood in the way of "Victorious February."

The massive attack on the Slovak Information Service [SIS] and its director Ivan Lexa is aimed at laying bare [dekonspiracia] and undermining the SIS and at rendering the state defenseless against foreign intelligence interests. Use is being made for this purpose of the case of the so-called kidnapping of Michal Kovac Jr. (while the Technopol affair is passed over in silence) and of the Christian Democratic Movement's [KDH] so-called independent investigative commission. This commission, headed by former minister of interior Ladislav Pittner and mostly made up of former members of the Federal Security and Information Service and the Office for the Protection of Constitutional Officials, as well as former members of the Police Corps and the SIS, does not investigate but represents a shadow anti-government intelligence service!

The aim of the attack on Interior Minister Ludovit Hudek is to break up this government department and pit the Police Corps against its own minister. This aim is being served by the forged alleged recording of the interior minister's conversation with the SIS director, a compilation of sound cuttings and voice imitations fabricated on the sound mixer. While the use of such methods is utterly anticonstitutional, Ladislav Pittner referred to it in a laudatory way as "the strawberry on the icing" of the attacks on the SIS and the Ministry of Interior....

The third direction of the attack by the opposition, headed by the KDH, is aimed against Prosecutor General Michal Valo with the aim of breaking up the judiciary and seizing control over it.

The fourth direction of the current massive onslaught by the opposition centers on the media sphere, by means of piles of lies about alleged lack of journalistic freedom, all that in a situation when all newspapers with the exception of a single daily (just as in 1946) are rigorously antigovernment. This is why the opposition attacks center on Slovak Television [STV] and, in particular, its director, Jozef Darmo. This is not surprising. During the attempt at reversing the political system in the former USSR in 1991, the Moscow opposition did not direct its attacks at the Kremlin and ministries, but the television studios and the Ostankino transmitter!

These assailants would like to return STV to the years 1992-94 when, under director Malec, not a single piece of positive information about Slovakia, the successes of Meciar's government, and our progress slipped into television news, but only heaps of lies from our critics, opponents, and ill-wishers.

Given that the post of the president of the Slovak Republic is held by a person who attacks our government and parliament, scandalizes the political scene of our state, and approaches his own state in a grossly unobjective way, the seizure of control over these four key positions by political forces that did not want the Slovak state, and that seek to reverse our sovereign status and Slovak statehood, would represent a sufficient springboard for a complete reversal of our social development, including the possibility of their request for international intervention against Slovakia.

The opposition forces demonstrated to us their methods, ambitions, and aims before, when, after twice overthrowing the legitimate government, they left behind them ruined agricultural cooperatives, decimated herds of cattle, destroyed ore mining, halted arms production, conceptless destruction of industry, mass unemployment, which we are only now succeeding in reducing with great exertion, and, above all, the surrendering of our economic potential and our market to foreign hands through coupon privatization and investment funds. They demonstrated their political, cultural, and human standards at the 15th meeting of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, which was a shocking display of their lack of culture, vulgarity, arrogance, and wrath.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

The struggle for sovereign Slovak statehood did not end on 1 January 1993. Quite the contrary, the present situation confirms that our opponents are not capable of accepting our statehood and seek to reverse this situation by literally any means and well-tried distasteful methods, with massive support from abroad.

Slovakia: Current Account Slides From Surplus to Deficit

AU2905142596 Bratislava HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Slovak 28 May 96 p 1

[CTK report: "Current Account in Deficit"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to a National Bank of Slovakia announcement, the current account of the balance of payments recorded a deficit of 346.1 million Slovak korunas [Sk] in the first two months of this year. In the same period last year, the current account was Sk91.3 million in surplus. The situation in the capital account is the exact opposite. The surplus for January and February 1996 reached Sk192.8 billion. Last year's deficit for the same period amounted to Sk120.3 million

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Hungary: Article Views IFOR Relationship to NATO Admission

AU2905172396 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 25 May 96 p 4

[Article by Miklos Derer: "NATO Has Entered Hungary, but for How Long?—IFOR: Illusions and Possibilities"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Our active and passive participation (the sending of a "limited independent Hungarian engineering unit") in the IFOR [Implementation Force] action to restore peace in the south Slav [Yugoslav] region and the parliamentary decision allowing the transit and temporary stationing of IFOR troops have stirred heated and contradictory emotions. According to the views of those who accepted parliament's decision enthusiastically, truly positive processes have been begun. Even though we have not joined NATO, NATO, as it were, has entered Hungary in the form of the Americans. Therefore we are important, the enthusiasts roar, and, in fact, from time to time, we even like to present ourselves as the most important ones for the success of the south Slav action. Although the initial expectations regarding economic prosperity have not come true, cooperation with the Americans stationed in Taszar at least helps to change our attitude and strengthens our NATO compatibility.

On the other hand, our participation in the IFOR bustle has generated vehement opposition. Some people have objected, saying that new occupiers have replaced the old ones and that the presence of the new foreigners violates our hard-won sovereignty and questions our newly achieved independence. According to this opinion, the use of Hungarian soldiers outside our borders carries unnecessary risks and, in the service of foreign interests, exposes our sons to dangers that cannot be justified.

The enthusiastic and uncritical supporters as well as the extreme opposition that cannot see beyond the narrow immediate interests and possible inconveniences are obviously unable to approach this issue rationally and analytically. Naturally, those who welcome our participation in the IFOR action and the presence of the U.S. bases as a de facto NATO membership overvalue the country's military, political, and general geopolitical significance for the Atlantic alliance. It is undoubtedly true, however, that, in this concrete case, namely in the south Slav action, Hungary has some political significance—not primarily as a potential NATO member state but as a partner state that cooperates closely with NATO. Presumably NATO does not want to remain involved in the Bosnian conflict forever. We can also assume that it is not in NATO's interest for one of its future member states to border on the scene of a long-term conflict and, through this, drag the given country as well as the alliance (in accordance with the North Atlantic treaty's well-known fifth passage, which promises assistance) into a barely manageable conflict with unforeseeable consequences. Therefore, it is advantageous for NATO to have the U.S. rest and supply bases in a country with good geographical access and, in this case, for this country not to be a NATO member. For this reason, rather than making it easier, Taszar might even delay our desired NATO admission. In other words, for Brussels and Washington, from the viewpoint of our admission, the most important problem might be our extreme proximity to the site of the conflict, rather than our neighborhood relations with Romania or Slovakia; it is to be avoided that a constant war zone should exist on the border of a new NATO member state.

What has been said so far only represents a conceptual construction. In another approach, in a not so geopolitical way of thinking, if NATO decisionmakers look at the chances of south Slav peace in the framework of pan-European security, NATO membership might also be a positive factor in addition to the nearness.

After all, the character of the south Slav action is closer to the latter, broader approach. In the ultimate analysis, Hungary is not simply participating in a NATO or U.S. venture but in an international peacemaking action recognized and supported by the United Nations and conducted with the participation of 14 NATO and 15 non-NATO countries. Not participating in this effort would have been politically irresponsible, would have demonstrated a complete lack of constructive foresight, and would have constituted our self-made exclusion from the international community.

However, the question of "what next" is somewhat different from participation in a one-off action. The Hungarian parliamentary decision allowing the transit and temporary stationing of IFOR troops in Hungary, the establishment of a logistical center, and the use of airports does not define the end of the IFOR troops' mandate in Hungary (in contrast to the precisely defined stipulation that the Hungarian bridge-building peacekeepers at the Sava River can only remain outside the country until 31 December 1996). Even if they make statements to the contrary, for experts and politicians, it is clear that it is impossible to make peace and to complete the military, civilian, and political tasks by the given deadline. The reconciliation process guaranteed by foreign military forces and resting on the momentary balance of the accumulated hatred might prove to be a brief break, and, without the disciplining weapons, emotions can get out of hand in a more horrifying way than evere. At the same time, the domestic political situation in the United States requires that the one-year deadline

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

defined by Congress be taken seriously. It is mainly thinking in terms of performing the mission more effectively rather than extending it, and, at the moment, it seems that it will withdraw its troops at the end of the year. This automatically means the withdrawal of the other countries' troops, too, because it has been proved that the powers that have opposing interests (and that might then use their own national infrastructure rather NATO's) cannot act successfully even in this explicitly European task without the presence of the Americans. What if the likely situation arises that the Bosnian powder keg cannot be diffused in time? It may be suggested that the Western European Union [WEU] will take over NATO's role, but this is unrealistic. The WEU participated in three minor actions on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. It helped observe compliance with UN sanctions by sending ships to the Adriatic Sea, it did the same on the Danube River, and it operated a joint police force in Mostar, which was divided between the Bosnians and the Croats. However, the WEU, which has kept itself in reserve and at full readiness and has only recently started to wake from its dream, does not have the ability to facilitate larger actions, and it is unable to function without NATO's infrastructure. To use NATO's capabilities, however, some kind of U.S. participation is also needed. It has been proved that air force in itself is not enough to coerce the parties in the conflict. And this is where the circle is completed.

So what kind of possible solution might affect Hungary's situation and participation? Theoretically (but not in practice), withdrawal is the most likely scenario at this moment. It is less likely that Taszar will continue to function as a NATO base. Without membership, this would also be difficult for us to accept, and it would mean a premature expansion of NATO's infrastructure to the east, which is contrary to the expressed interest of Russia, whom they want to win over and involve in the cooperation. The former Spanish solution is also a possibility—whereby the United States, rather than NATO, would maintain an infrastructure in Hungary in the interest of a bilateral agreement. (I would be rather skeptical about parliament's and the population's reaction to this). Should the need arise for Taszar or another base to be used for international purposes, I find a solution within the framework of the Partnership for Peace to be most likely, in which a pan-European, or if you like, Euro-Atlantic base with peacekeeping, humanitarian, and search-rescue capacities could be set up with an international, Hungarian, or mixed staff to help implement the answers to the new-style regional European crises.

Naturally, this is only a theoretical construct that can be destroyed any moment by the rapidly changing reality, and, as we all know, the final outcome can be completely different from the outlined scenario.

Hungary: Horn, Opposition Clash Over Air Force Exercise

AU2905140596 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 29 May 96 p 4

[Correspondent's report: "The Opposition Continues To Demand Keleti's Resignation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the opening of the parliament session on 28 May, Prime Minister Gyula Horn presented a report on the final results of the investigation into the MiG affair. The investigation was prompted by the participation of eight MiG-29 combat aircraft of the Kecskemet Air Force unit in a live-firing exercise in Poland without parliamentary approval.

Gyula Horn declared that there was negligence in the matter of the military exercise in Poland. In issuing the orders for the exercise, the Air Force and Air Defense Main Command failed to make sure there were legal bases or parliamentary approval for the action. The relevant Defense Ministry deputy state secretary was also negligent, as his task was to make sure that there was parliamentary approval for the exercise. The Defense Ministry received a letter from Army Headquarters, complete with a specific date for the military exercise in Poland, a letter in which the army proposed inviting the members of the parliament's Defense Committee. The deputy state secretary failed to inform the administrative and political state secretaries, and thus the defense minister, about the date.

Gyula Horn said Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti bears no personal responsibility in the matter. The moment the defense minister learned about the exercise in Poland, he immediately stopped it by right of his legal supervision.

Gyula Horn agrees that the parliament's Defense Committee should also investigate the affair. In the course of government investigation, written documents emerged that prove that 10 MiG-21 combat aircraft participated in exercises in Poland in May 1992, followed by 10 MiG-21's and six MiG-23's in 1993, and an air-defense missile exercise also took place in Poland in June 1993. Neither the defense minister nor the Hungarian Parliament discussed or approved these exercises.

According to Gyula Horn, the Constitutional Court should be consulted on the type of military exercises abroad that require parliamentary approval. Regarding military exercises based on valid international agreements and peacekeeping activities carried out at the request of the United Nations, the Constitution does not

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

require parliamentary approval. The aforementioned exercises in Poland are taking place on the basis of a bilateral agreement signed in 1991.

The opposition parties disagreed with the prime minister's report and continued to demand Gyorgy Keleti's suspension. Jozsef Szajer, parliamentary deputy of the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ], called Horn's speech a "whitewashing" and said that in his view Keleti's dismissal is inevitable. Tamas Isepy, parliamentary deputy of the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP], asked the prime minister how he expects citizens to display a law-abiding attitude when a government member violates the Constitution without being called to account. Zsolt Lanyi, parliamentary deputy of the Independent Smallholders' Party [FKGP], said it was inappropriate for the government investigation to be carried out by the Defense Ministry's political state secretary. According to Ervin Demeter, parliamentary deputy of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], the defense minister repeatedly violated the Constitution, because Hungarian combat aircraft also visited Austria without parliamentary approval. Ivan Szabo of the Hungarian Democratic People's Party [MDNP] declared that it is unacceptable that the prime minister and his minister want to place political responsibility on the administration. Imre Szekeres of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] noted that the visit by Hungarian combat aircraft to Austria was not a military exercise. The MSZP group in parliament also agreed that the Defense Committee should also investigate the issue. According to the MSZP group, the defense minister fulfilled his political responsibility. Reacting to these observations, Gyula Horn declared that the MDF is demanding an investigation while not a single minister in the previous parliamentary cycle had offered his resignation, and the MDF government never admitted committing any mistakes.

Hungary: Defense Committee Supports Chief of Staff Candidate

LD2905203496 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 29 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The National Assembly's Defense Committee has unanimously supported the appointment of Ferenc Vegh as chief of staff.

The would-be successor of Sandor Nemeth told the committee that he wants to give the soldiers predictability. He added that an army of 45,000 soldiers, half of the current strength, would be enough to defend the country.

According to the major general, the army has been forced into crisis management due to a lack of funds, but it will still have unpaid bills. Next year, 3 billion forints will be needed for NATO entry preparations, Vegh said.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

B-H: Comment on U.S. 'Impotence' in Implementing Dayton Accord

AU3005142196 Banja Luka GLAS SRPSKI in Serbo-Croatian 29 May 96 p 2

[Commentary by A. Anusic: "Directed Confusion"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It seems to be an erroneous assessment that Western diplomacy (which is, by the way, embodied by the United States) is demonstrating impotence regarding the implementation of the Dayton agreement and particularly regarding the attitude towards the Serb Republic [RS]. One would rather say that Western diplomacy (read U.S. diplomacy) is "emanating" directed, that is, controlled chaos with a view to confusing and disorienting (if at all possible) the Serb people and its leadership.

There are many examples of this. So far, there have been many contradictory statements, assessments, demands, and above all threats (it is known against whom) from the United States at various levels. Thus, for instance, in a single day, U.S. diplomacy sent two completely incompatible reports: first, that members of the U.S. Army within IFOR [Implementation Force] will withdraw from Bosnia immediately after the Dayton mandate expires, and then that there is a possibility of their remaining even after that time.

Next, U.S. diplomats issued the ominous threat that "Karadzic and Mladic should be arrested and escorted to The Hague at any cost," only to "improve on" their statement later by saying that "IFOR has no mandate to arrest these two Serb leaders," but that this may be done only if IFOR members meet the two by chance!

On the next day, a different statement came from the White House to the effect that one should perhaps recognize Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's alleged stand (this is how the U.S. press put it) that "Karadzic and Mladic may stay in the RS, but should be isolated from the coming multiparty elections!" On the same day, or already the next day, the statement was denied: Milosevic's proposal cannot be accepted, but one should act in compliance with the request issued by the main prosecutor of the so-called Hague Tribunal!

The Western, that is, U.S. diplomacy, has acted in a similar way regarding their attitude towards the coming elections in the RS and the Muslim-Croat federation. Assertions were first made that the elections must be conducted during the agreed time frame (this September), only for them to be dropped the next day with insistance on postponing the elections as all the necessary conditions have, allegedly, not been reached!

What is and what may be the meaning of this "hot-cold" activity of Western diplomacy? First of all, the goal of such a diplomatic scheme is to try to confuse both the Serbs and their leadership, as well as U.S. allies in Europe.

Another conclusion that can be drawn is that the United States, being the main architect of the Dayton arrangement for the former Bosnia-Herzegovina is not sincere towards what it forced out and signed. It seems that it now does not really care about the strict realization of the Dayton plan, but is doing everything with a view to disparaging and calling into question that plan and its implementation in the field. Why? Perhaps because, on one hand, it still wants to keep the tension on the shaky ground of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, thus proving its upper hand on the old continent, and, on the other hand, it is trying at any cost to impute that its allies—European diplomacy—are totally incompetent and impotent in matters regarding the implemention of the Dayton plan.

In any case, this behavior of the current Western (U.S.) diplomacy is very dangerous and can only make the implementation of the Dayton agreement more difficult, and it is hard to believe that this is really the ultimate goal of the United States and its satellites. Perhaps the United States has given up the Dayton arrangement, having seen that it is impossible to implement in the field! Perhaps the United States is pleading "behind the counter" for the definite ethnic division of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina into two independent states, something that would not be bad for the Serb side! On the contrary!

Whether European diplomacy will present an adequate reply to its ally across the ocean at the upcoming Contact Group meeting in Geneva remains to be seen. In any case, the only truth is that the Dayton agreement is really at a crossroads.

Everything else is relative.

B-H: UN's Steiner Sees Possible Reintroduction of Sanctions

AU3005085796 Belgrade NEDELJNI TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 29 May 96 pp 8-9

[Interview with Michael Steiner, deputy UN envoy for the realization of the Dayton accord in Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Dragana Subarevic and Goran Rosic, via telephone from Steiner's office in Sarajevo; date not given: "Sanctions If Karadzic Calls Bosnian Serb Referendum"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [NEDELJNI TELEGRAF] The media speculate about the existence of an alleged secret agreement between Carl Bildt and Slobodan Milosevic to leave

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Karadzic and Mladic alone on one condition: That they withdraw from public life completely. What is your commentary?

[Steiner] I can only laugh. There is only one answer, namely, the one from Dayton. What this reply demands from the warring sides cannot be altered. Therefore, there can be no additional agreements. I assure you that there is no secret agreement and that this would mean violation of the Dayton accord.

[NEDELJNI TELEGRAF] The Belgrade media have reported that the Implementation Force had attempted to arrest Karadzic. Do you know any details?

[Steiner] I know absolutely nothing about this.

[NEDELJNI TELEGRAF] The international community in advance refused to accept the results of a referendum in which the Serb Republic residents would vote on trust in Radovan Karadzic. What were the motives that guided it to make this decision?

[Steiner] The Serb Republic is free to hold the referendum. However, if its goals are contrary to the decisions passed in Dayton, the international community must react and state clearly that it will prevent something of the kind. This is a man accused of war crimes, which is an additional reason for rejecting the results of the popular vote. If the referendum passes a confidence in Radovan Karadzic then this would be a sheer provocation and direct negation of everything agreed in Dayton. That is why we must react.

[NEDELJNI TELEGRAF] What do you expect from the new Serb Republic negotiator Dr. Biljana Plavsic, in light of the fact that she advocates "the hard line" from Pale?

[Steiner] You know our policy is not to have contact with persons accused of war crimes and, therefore, we did not have contact with Karadzic. His saying that he defers the authority of international liaison to Biljana Plavsic means nothing. We have contact with the entire Serb Republic government and the new prime minister and on the basis of everything that stems from this communication we make judgments about their policy.

[NEDELJNI TELEGRAF] The international community claims that Pale leads "an isolationist policy?"

[Steiner] I believe that the Serb people in the Serb Republic concretely want to feel safer, respected, and acknowledged as a people. They do not want to live under a regime such as were in the past, for example, in Albania. They do not want to be isolated from the outside world, they would like to maintain contacts with other countries and benefit from the international community's readiness to assist in reconstruction. That is why I believe that Radovan Karadzic's policy is not in the interest of the Serb people in the Serb Republic and is contrary to their desire to be a part of Europe.

[NEDELJNI TELEGRAF] If the policy of the Serb Republic toward the international community does not change, will the Serbs perhaps be punished with the introduction of sanctions?

[Steiner] I must tell you that if a referendum is held there, calling for support for the war criminal—then this will be in stark contrast to the peace agreement and we will have to react. It will be difficult to avoid the introduction of sanctions in such a case. I do not wish for this and I am happy that the Serb Republic has rid itself of sanctions. However, if some people in it do not want the realization of the Dayton accord and if they persistently refuse to bring war criminals to justice, then the ultimate measure will be the introduction of sanctions. Moreover, if it nevertheless happens that Pale persistently and deliberately provokes the international community, then the sanctions must be reintroduced, regardless of the fact that this would not be the right and the desired solution.

[NEDELJNI TELEGRAF] How realistic in your opinion are the chances that the elections in Bosnia will be held by 14 September? What are the main obstacles to the realization of the elections and which side in Bosnia-Herzegovina is "stalling" the most?

[Steiner] From the technical viewpoint, there is still an enormous task outstanding. The chief preconditions are the existence of free media in both entities, in the Serb Republic and in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, which at the moment is still not the case. Secondly, for the elections to be free and democratic, the control of the chief posts in the Serb Republic is also of enormous significance, because, at the moment, persons accused of war crimes are in power there. Radovan Karadzic cannot take an active part in the electoral campaign, directly or indirectly, because the elections would not be regular in such a case. It is possible to carry out the elections by 14 September; however, only if all sides immediately roll up their sleeves. [passage omitted]

[NEDELJNI TELEGRAF] Could the elections in Bosnia truly change anything and can they be regular?

[Steiner] I believe that the elections will not be held under ideal and democratic conditions. We cannot expect this. However, there must be a minimum of democratic conditions for the holding of the elections, although I believe that despite the international presence, there will be certain irregularities in the counting of the votes. However, objectively speaking we need the joint central authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and without the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

elections we will not get the joint institutions. We have not met all the preconditions for the elections, the freedom of the press is inevitable, especially free access to the electronic media and once this progress is achieved the minimum conditions for the regular elections will be secured. There must be cooperation of all sides and of those in charge of the preparation of elections, among them also the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. [passage omitted]

[Box, p 9]

Izetbegovic Must Avoid Making References to Military Solution

[NEDELJNI TELEGRAF] Alija Izetbegovic and Haris Silajdzic are fighting for a unified Bosnia. Does this mean that the Dayton peace accord does not apply for them?

[Steiner] Honestly speaking, the Dayton accord envisaged a unified Bosnia, the continuity of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the sense of international law and within internationally recognized borders. Bosnia-Herzegovina is divided into two entities; however, according to the peace solution it is one country. It is questionable whether the situation is truly such that the entities have the right to autonomy, to autonomous internal setup, and the realization of these rights parallel to the existence of the central authorities, chosen in the elections.

[NEDELJNI TELEGRAF] How would you comment on Izetbegovic's recent statement in Gorazde that any decent Bosnian will need a gun in peacetime, too, and that our children will liberate all of Bosnia one day?

[Steiner] Personally, I was very concerned over this statement and I discussed it with him, and he told me that he did not think so, that he did not espouse a militaristic solution. However, I believe that his speech could also be interpreted in this way and I advised him to avoid such statements in the future.

B-H: Bildt: No Further International Contacts With Plavsic

AU3005112996 Paris AFP in English 1119 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, May 30 (AFP)—Carl Bildt, the top civilian official overseeing peace in Bosnia, on Thursday said the international community would have no more dealings with the Bosnian Serb leadership because of its continuing violation of war crimes issues set out by the Dayton accord.

Bildt said in a letter to Bosnian Serb parliament speaker Momcilo Krajisnik that the international community was refusing further contact with Deputy President Biljana Plavsic. Plavsic was handed responsibility for foreign and other affairs this month by wanted war criminal Radovan Karadzic, who heads the Bosnian Serb entity.

"It is obvious that the international community cannot accept contacts with...Plavsic in her function as—assisting—a person who is seeking to hang on to public office in clear violation of the peace agreement," Bildt said in the letter.

Bildt has been trying to secure the resignation of hardliner Karadzic, wanted by the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia.

B-H: Serb Republic Vice President Plavsic Interviewed

AU2905100796 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 25-26 May 96 p 3

[Interview with Serb Republic Vice President Biljana Plavsic by "D.B." in Banja Luka on 24 May: "Finding a Solution Is in the Interest of All Three Nations"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "I am still the vice president of the Serb Republic and nothing has changed. Nikola Koljevic is also a vice president, and Radovan Karadzic is the president of the republic," Biljana Plavsic said at the beginning of the interview in Banja Luka on Friday, answering our question on whether she is now a little bit more of a president than vice president. Regarding the latest division of functions in Pale [Serb Republic capital], Plavsic said the following in her Banja Luka office:

[Plavsic] The president has the right to give authority to the vice presidents for them to handle certain duties, that is, in certain fields. In this way I was previously in charge of keeping track of the humanitarian field, although institutions exist that specifically deal with this. I, so to say, supervised them for the authorities. Now that peace has been established, we hope that we will also be capable of moving toward the future without humanitarian aid.

["D.B."] You have, therefore, only taken over that part [of the task] that deals with the contacts to the international community?

[Plavsic] This is what it is about: The international community was misinformed, and former Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic is to a great extent responsible for this. I am talking about the statements claiming that the state leadership does not wish to implement the agreement that was completed in Dayton. Kasagic, with his appearances and statements, created the impression, among a considerable part of the local public and the world, that

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

we in Pale are "uncooperative". He also created the impression that we are leading an "isolationist policy," and that he is the person with whom it is possible, and necessary, to talk. This is absolutely incorrect, and there is no logic to it. The Serb Republic is greatly interested in implementing the Dayton agreement, primarily because it has brought peace, and from our point of view it is better than any of the agreements that the Contact groups had suggested, and this not only from our point of view. I would say it is better for all three nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, although I cannot say that this is something that satisfies all of our interests. However, we are aware of the fact that a solution must be found that will be in the interest of all three nations, and only a balanced plan like this would be a guarantee for future good relations.

["D.B."] However, you cannot deny that there was a certain slow down, primarily connected to the international factors.

[Plavsic] I generally think that if a goal is to be achieved, then certain principles must be set up. The basic principle is unavoidable, and that is the equal treatment of all sides. This has, in practice, been questioned. The equality of the Serb side in relation to the Muslim-Croat Federation has been questioned. The method that has been valid during the war has been continued—that the Serbs are the guilty party. This was to stop with the signing of the Dayton agreement, since the Serbs cannot be cooperative if this is to go on. Kasagic wanted to portray himself as the only person with whom one could talk, as I have already said. However, this evolution of his softness (he was not always so) led to the situation when he once mentioned the expression reintegration. Of what?! The Serb Republic into Bosnia-Herzegovina? He was not aware of what he was saying. Moreover, this is also not foreseen by the Dayton agreement, and we who are responsible to the nation in the Assembly, we had to react, since this was in opposition to our planned determination.

["D.B."] Does the problem Banja Luka-Pale still exist, or has the removal of Kasagic made the solution to the problem more difficult?

[Plavsic] Regional feelings of importance exist everywhere, but I think that we all need to set ourselves some priorities in our minds. Emphasizing regions now would be a luxury, especially because we realize that there are many people who do not have a roof over their heads, many are unemployed, and there are even those that are hungry. He who thinks so narrowly, and thinks that he is not the prime minister of the Serb Republic, but of the Banja Luka region, is not fit for this job. And no one can be supported by the international community, but only by his people. And you know what the people say about those who are supported only by those on the outside....

["D.B."] A few days ago you were in Belgrade to see the Serb President Slobodan Milosevic. At one time the shaking of hands used to be omitted. How was it this time?

[Plavsic] He knows the reason for this, but at the moment and from my position it was not possible for me to bring about something personal. He called us because the view exists that we do not wish the Dayton agreement to be implemented. It is normal that he would definitely like to see what this is all about. He naturally did not think that we would not want it, but he just wanted to hear it. That was the reason for my visit to Belgrade, and because September [election time] is getting closer, President Milosevic was also interested in how the preparations for the elections are coming along, whether the time limits are being adhered to.... As far as the Dayton agreement is concerned, we have observed everything. However, cooperation with the international community has so far only been handled through Kasagic.

["D.B."] What are relations between Serbia and the Serb Republic like, in your opinion?

[Plavsic] It can be expected that there are to be good and bad relations on different issues, and this is normal. But one needs to keep in mind (on both sides) that we are dealing with a sole Serb nation, which needs to be brought into a position that is as good as possible. If we put this into a program, then there will be more good relations, and the bad relations will then be irrelevant. It is bad that we are dealing with two systems that are ideologically different. We support this country's development in the best traditions of the Serbs, religion, we want capitalism with a very good social program. We are going along this path because that is what the people want....

["D.B."] Would you not want a bit of China and Russia over here?

[Plavsic] God forbid! I wish with all my heart that the majority of the people on the right side of the Drina river would also be for this, and that they would move from the phase of communism into this system that we speak of. This is not something that I am personally for, but it would be best.

["D.B."] There is talk of the possibility that the territory of the Serb Republic could be cut into two parts?

[Plavsic] The dividing line at Brcko is controversial, and arbitrage has been foreseen for it. We will see

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

what happens. The international community will find it difficult to permit the citizens of Sarajevo to move again, since our people are moving from there into Srebrenica, Gorazde, as well as to Brcko. Brcko is Serb and it will remain so.

["D.B."] The elections are coming nearer. What can be expected in the area of the Serb Republic?

[Plavsic] It is up to every person to decide who they will mark on the ballot. I also think that the citizens will decide for the party (or parties) that will guarantee them a 100-percent guarantee for survival on this territory. But certain survival in a Serb state in which Serbs, whenever they were mixed, always experienced genocide, is only guaranteed by the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] and by some national parties. Let us say that the radicals are not noted with a question mark, but the Socialists are already problematical. Dragutin Ilic cannot force anyone to live with Muslims in brotherhood and unity just because his own wife is a Muslim.

["D.B."] If it were 1990 again, would you go through all this again?

[Plavsic] I do not know. I was doing academic work and at the university, and I was attracted to challenges in that domain. If it were 1990 again I may have gone through all this again. I do not like to pull out after I bind myself to something.

[Box, p 3]

Karadzic and Mladic

Innocent people have been charged. Those people who led the nation in the way the nation wanted them to. The charging of Radovan Karadzic is also a crime against the nation and everything that the nation considers holy. The charge against Ratko Mladic [Serb military commander] also means that he is being charged for the defensive war of the Serb nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Naturally, this defensive war was led by Karadzic as the supreme commander, but the war was waged with the agreement of many personalities, so these two are the champions of this policy. The charging of these two people therefore means charging the Serb nation over here. They could have formed any kind of institution, but every Serb thinks this way, although some circles do not understand us, and we do not understand them, either. I think that those who deal with the law here, as well as all over the world, have not been in a worse situation—of defending the ethics of their own profession. Everyone should rebel against such a court (in The Hague).

[Box, p 3]

"He Who Pays You Also Gives the Orders"

When asked about the financing of the Army of the Serb Republic from the side of the Army of Yugoslavia, as well as the announcement of the cessation of this financing, the vice president of the Serb Republic said: "It would be good to avoid the possibility of one person talking, but listening to the person that pays. Madeleine Albright [US Ambassador] at one time suggested this to Yasushi Akashi [former special envoy of the UN secretary general], but our generals did not wage this war according to an agreement with those who helped them with personnel and finances."

B-H: 8,000 Show Support for Karadzic, Mladic in Modrica

AU3005070096 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 29 May 96

[Telephone report by Vug Blagojevic in Modrica]

[FBIS Translated Text] An all-Serb rally in support of Serb Republic President Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic, chief of the Serb Republic Army General Staff, began in Modrica's central square at 1800 hours sharp [1600 GMT] as the national anthem "God's Justice" [Bozja pravda] was played in front of about 8,000 people of the Ozren-Posavina region and a prayer was said for the dead soldiers of the Serb Republic Army.

Novak Gojkovic, president of the organization committee of the rally and president of Modrica municipality, was the first to address the gathering. He said that we must not give up now, because if we managed to remain determined to fight for the Serb state until now, we must not give in. By taking our leaders from us, they are trying to occupy us and we must not let them do that. By protecting President Karadzic and Gen. Mladic, we are protecting ourselves and our state. So far, we have heard the speeches of Blagoje Simic, vice president of the Serb Republic Serb Democratic Party, Veselin Djuretic, Miodrag Jovlic, deputy from Doboj, and Dragan Kojic, representative of the Doboj association of soldiers. Father Savo Knezevic, deputy from Teslic, is addressing the rally at the moment.

B-H: Karadzic Supports Proposal To Return 'Confiscated' Land

LD2905183296 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1732 GMT 29 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 29 May (SRNA)—Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic,

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

today gave his support to the proposal by the initiative committee on returning land which the former Yugoslav authorities unjustly confiscated from its former owners in Semberija and Posavina.

After the talks with President Karadzic, members of the initiative committee met with Jova Miskin, director of the republican administration for geodetic and property and legal affairs, who told them that this institution is working on regulating the aforementioned issues. [passage omitted]

B-H: Brcko Mayor Claims Town's Status 'Politicized'

AU2905132796 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 28 May 96 p 3

[FONET report: "The Status of the Town Is Being Politicized"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bijeljina—The status of Brcko is one of the key problems for the Serb Republic and the Serb people in that region. This was stated by Miodrag Pajic, president of the Brcko Municipal Assembly, in an interview with SIM Radio in Bijeljina yesterday.

Pajic said that this issue is deliberately being politicized, or to be more precise, the issue of the arbitration is being politicized. International arbitration, announced for mid-June, can only start when the arbitrators have been appointed and the subject of the arbitration commission's work announced, he said. The Dayton agreement has clearly defined the subject of the arbitration—the border between the two entities, Pajic added. We stated this clearly to Carl Bildt during his second visit to Brcko. We also told him that this was a state, legal, and political issue, and that we can discuss it only at the state level, he said.

I will remind you that the Dayton agreement has given the Serb people the right to an integral entity. Calling Brcko into question would negate one of the basic rights of the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the right to an entity and rounded off territory, the president of the Brcko Municipal Assembly said.

B-H: Senior Serb Officers on Talks With IFOR Gen Walker

LD2905172796 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1233 GMT 29 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 29 May (TANJUG)—After separate talks in Banja Luka today with Lieutenant Colonel General Momir Talic, commander of the 1st Krajina Corps of the Serb Republic army, and Major Gen. Zivomir Ninkovic, commander of the Serb Republic Air Force and Antiaircraft Defense, British Gen. Michael Walker, commander of the Implementation Force [IFOR] land forces, said that the aim of his visit is "not only to focus his attention on Sarajevo, but also to visit other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

He went on to say that in his talks today a number of issues important both for IFOR and for the Serb Republic army were raised and that he thinks "the participation by IFOR and the Serb Republic army in the implementation of the military annex of the Dayton agreement is proceeding well."

Gen. Talic said he is pleased with his meeting with Gen. Walker, adding that he asked him to use his authority to help in the release of imprisoned members of the Serb Republic army.

"That part of the Dayton agreement has come to a complete standstill. We reached certain conclusions today on how to resolve this issue in concrete terms," Talic said.

He also stated his belief that the military part of the agreement has been implemented in a satisfactory manner and that he is hopeful good cooperation between IFOR and the Serb Republic army will continue.

Gens. Walker and Ninkovic said that their talks focused on reopening Banja Luka airport, the concentration of antiaircraft weapons, and guarantees for the civilian use of air space.

Ninkovic said that the issue of radar and rocket systems training was also discussed.

B-H: No Agreement Reached on Opening Banja Luka Airport

LD2905184396 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1507 GMT 29 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 29 May (SRNA)—Major General Michael Walker, commander of the air force and air defense forces of the Bosnian Serb Republic Army, and Gen. Michael Walker, commander of Implementation Force [IFOR] land forces, failed to reach any concrete agreement in Banja Luka today on the opening of Mahovljani airport [near Banja Luka] for civilian flights.

"We did not reach any concrete agreements but both sides expressed the wish to resolve all the issues we discussed today as soon as possible, and I believe that we will achieve progress toward this end," Walker told correspondents after his first meeting with Gen. Ninkovic.

The IFOR land forces' commander said they also discussed some other practical questions in terms of the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

civilian and military aspects of the Dayton agreement, including the question of the Serb Republic Army's air defense weapons.

"The talks were very useful, especially in regard to opening Mahovljani airport for civilian flights, siting air defense systems, and giving guarantees on the use of air space for the needs of the Serb Republic," Gen. Ninkovic said.

He added that the question of further training members of the Air Force on radar and missile systems—something which is in keeping with the Dayton agreement—was also raised, and he expressed the hope that today's talks with Gen. Walker would be finalized successfully.

B-H: Ninkovic Sends Greetings to Troops on Air Force Day

AU2905190696 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 27 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] On the occasion of 27 May, the Day of Air Force and Antiaircraft Defense of the Army of the Serb Republic, Major General Zivomir Ninkovic extended greetings to all the air force members. Here is part of what he said:

Under conditions that involved international power-wielders fabricating various resolutions and, at a certain moment, carrying out a classic operation involving over 1,000 aircraft ruthlessly pounding the Serb people, you carried out all the tasks set before you with the greatest professionalism, patriotism, and love for your homeland. In the future, I expect all of you to do your utmost in professional training and in the further strengthening of the air force and antiaircraft defense of the the Serb Republic Army so that you can be the guarantor of the freedom and protection of the Serb people at all times.

B-H: IFRC Explains Humanitarian Aid Plans in Pale

AU2905204796 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 28 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The International Federation of Red Cross [IFRC] and Red Crescent Societies has launched another appeal for funds to finance their activity in the former Yugoslavia.

At today's news conference held in Pale today, this humanitarian organization's delegation for the [Bosnian] Serb Republic stated that the plan is to collect about 82 million German marks, 23 million of which would be used to help the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat Federation.

According to delegate (?Klaus Amundsen), the (?programs) will be aimed at helping displaced persons, returnees, and people who are most in need.

The Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat Federation will be treated equally, in accordance with their needs.

The coordinator of the delegation for the Serb Republic, [name indistinct], explained that their program involves organizing the reception and support in the accommodation of the most needy returnees, [words indistinct] and secondary health (?aid), mobile [word indistinct] teams for help to the disabled and the elderly in repairing houses, and public health education.

Actions aimed at increasing the number of blood donors, [words indistinct] first aid, and training Red Cross organizations for [words indistinct] will also be launched.

B-H: UNHCR Interentity Bus Lines Currently Suspended

AU2405193896 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 24 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] With the intention to facilitate greater freedom of movement, the UNHCR, with the assistance of local authorities, decided to set up three bus lines that would link the towns in both entities, UNHCR spokesman in Sarajevo Peter Wolf announced today. He said that they envisage bus lines linking Grbavica-Ilidza, Mostar-Nevesinje, and Banja Lika-Zenica.

The bus line to Lukavica had until yesterday been functioning without any problems, but the Serbian authorities yesterday banned further operation of this route because, according to their interpretation, the bus was not authorized to be present on the territory of the Serbian entity, Wolf said.

Wolf reported that the first bus on the Mostar-Nevesinje route arrived in Nevesinje on Wednesday without any problems, but yesterday, following the bus's arrival in Nevesinje, one passenger was insulted, which created fear among the other passengers on the bus. For security reasons, this line, too, has been suspended until further notice. Therefore, out of the envisaged three lines not a single one [words indistinct], Wolf said.

B-H: Serb PM on Opposition to Cross-Border Bus Services

LD2905183096 Pale Srpska Radio-Televizija First Program Serb Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 29 May 96

[FBIS Summary] Pale Srpska Radio-Televizija First Program Serb Radio in Serbo-Croatian at 1400 GMT

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

on 29 May carries a seven-minute report from Pale, where Gojko Klickovic, prime minister of the Bosnian Serb Republic had talks with a senior UN official. Klickovic comments on his talks relating to cross-border bus services.

Klickovic says that all bus services, and any attempt to introduce bus services, under the guise of the freedom of movement will be prevented. We have learned that this is not being implemented by the UNHCR but this is being done mainly by people elsewhere, and we know where. Our representatives, the minister of transport and the minister of internal affairs, had talks on this in Sarajevo yesterday and they conveyed [words indistinct].

Our inspectors and the Ministry of Transport and Communications, in agreement with other [words indistinct] who should monitor this, prevented this. They said: We cannot allow the movement of any...[pauses] an organized movement or the opening of bus services without specific documentation, which they must have in accordance with our laws. After all, on our territory, according to the Dayton agreement, it is the laws of the Serb Republic that are valid.

B-H: Klickovic, UNHCR Discuss Freedom of Movement, Refugees

LD2905154396 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1250 GMT 29 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Pale, 29 May (TANJUG)—Gojko Klickovic, prime minister of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, received UNHCR Soeren Jessen-Petersen in Pale today. They discussed the implementation of the Dayton agreement, especially that part which relates to the repatriation of refugees and the freedom of movement.

After the meeting, Klickovic said he told Petersen that the Serb Republic government will fully implement the peace agreement.

As regards Annex 7, which relates to the return of refugees to their homes and the freedom of movement, we agreed that a little more time is essential in order to pave the way for its implementation, Klickovic said.

He added that, as regards the freedom of movement, there has to be reciprocity. This would guarantee greater security.

The introduction of regular bus services under the watchword of freedom of movement is an abuse of the Dayton agreement and the Serb side cannot permit this, the Serb Republic prime minister said.

Petersen expressed satisfaction that the new prime minister confirmed that the Serb Republic government will respect the implementation of the Dayton agreement, and he confirmed that he [Klickovic] agreed that it is necessary to create conditions of mutual trust for the refugees to return.

Klickovic expressed his readiness to work with the UNHCR to enable the visits of displaced persons to go ahead smoothly, Petersen said, adding that this is a first step toward paving the way for the return of refugees.

B-H: Official Warns Krajina Serbs Registering for Sep Elections

AU2905182096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 29 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Some 40,000 Serbs from the former Serb Autonomous Province of Krajina, who moved to the Serb entity after the reintegration of the Republic of Croatia's occupied territories, are registering as voters and preparing to vote in the September elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nijaz Muratovic, secretary general of the Council of Bosnian Krajina Citizens' Congress, said at today's news conference in Sarajevo.

Muranovic said that the Council of Bosnian Krajina Citizens' Congress has informed relevant domestic and foreign factors about this tendency and its possible consequences on several occasions, and added that [words indistinct] to prevent this attempt by the Serb authorities to directly influence the electoral results.

B-H: Serb Official Announces Formation of Ribnik Municipality

AU2905204396 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 28 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Jovo (?Banjac), president of the Serb municipality of Kljuc, convened the first session of the municipal assembly, since all the Serbs were expelled in September last year, for Friday, 31 May, in Ribnik.

In today's statement to SRNA he said that the Serb municipality of Ribnik, whose center is to be (?Gornji Ribnik), will be formed from parts of the former municipalities of Kljuc, [Bosanski] Petrovac, and Drvar, which were, in accordance with the Dayton accord, again made part of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic.

In addition to the four Kljuc communities—(?Vrbljani), [name indistinct], Ratkovo, and Sitnica—the future municipality of Ribnik will include [name indistinct], which used to belong to the Petrovac municipality, and [name indistinct], which was part of the former Croat municipality [words indistinct].

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

B-H: IFOR Confirms Bridge Near Bijeljina Dynamited

AU3005094696 Paris AFP in English 0932 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, May 30 (AFP)—The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) confirmed on Thursday that a bridge linking the two entities in Bosnia, the Republika Srpska and the Moslem-Croat federation, had been dynamited.

The bridge at Krstac, near the Serb-controlled town of Bijeljina in northeast Bosnia, is now impassable after being blown up by an explosive charge, IFOR spokesman Herve Gourmelon said.

He said that three-quarters of the wooden bridge, where many prisoner exchanges had taken place during the Bosnian war, had been destroyed by the blast, which happened in the early hours of Wednesday.

No one was injured and no side has claimed responsibility.

IFOR is carrying out an inquiry into the incident, which happened in an area for which the Russian contingent of IFOR is responsible.

The Russian contingent has organised a meeting with local officials on Thursday to discuss the issue.

B-H: Official Says 'Muslims' Blew Up Bridge Near Bijeljina

LD3005100396 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 0933 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Ugljevik [near Bijeljina in northeastern Bosnia], 30 May (SRNA)—Miladin Stjepanovic, president of the Ugljevik municipal assembly, confirmed for SRNA today that the Muslims have destroyed the bridge on the river Janja, about 10 km from Ugljevik, on the section of the road that leads to Teocak.

"The bridge was destroyed on 29 May in an area where, following an agreement with the Muslim side, the border between our state and the Muslim-Croat federation has been changed. The border now runs along the river Janja, which up to now has been part of the federation," Stjepanovic explained.

He said that the Muslims blew up the bridge because they were dissatisfied with the agreement reached. Stjepanovic added that the Muslim side has not allowed Serb police to take part in the investigation.

B-H: Mostar Elections To Be Held 30 Jun

AU3005112296 Paris AFP in English 1055 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, May 30 (AFP)—The EU administrator of Mostar, Ricardo Perez Casado, announced Thursday that elections would be held on June 30 in the southern Bosnia-Herzegovina town.

The Mostar municipal elections will be the first postwar polls in Bosnia.

B-H: Opposition Parties To Contest Mostar Elections

LD2905164796 Mostar Radio-Televizija Mostar Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 29 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Dr. Nijaz Durakovic, president of the Social-Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina [SDPBH], and Gradimir Gojer, its vice president, held a news conference today.

They told journalists about the party's commitments. In alliance with the Muslim Bosniak Organization [MBO], the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats [UBHSD], the Croatian Peasant Party [HSS], and [Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency member Stjepan] Kljuic's Republican Party, it will contest the local elections, which are to be held in Mostar at the end of June 1996. [passage omitted]

B-H: Silajdzic Interviewed on Politics, Elections

AU2505175196 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 20 May 96 p 4

[Interview with Haris Silajdzic, chairman of Our Bosnia Party, by Sanja Despot; place and date not given: "The Federation Is Not Here, Although Two Years Have Passed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We—among other Croatian and Bosnian journalists—interviewed Haris Silajdzic, former foreign minister and prime minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, during a pause between his numerous meetings with foreign representatives. Silajdzic was present when a $305 million contract for the reconstruction of a cement factory in Kakanj was signed with a German partner several days ago in Dresden. After that, he met Czech President Havel.

[Despot] Do you think that the fuss over the dismissal of Rajko Kasagic forebodes the impending removal of war criminals Mladic and Karadzic from the political scene?

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Silajdzic] I do not think that any serious steps will be taken against Karadzic, especially not before the elections in Russia.

[Despot] Then how do you explain the reactions of the U.S. Government, NATO, and Carl Bildt's office, which were more explicit than ever?

[Silajdzic] Words are very explicit when used instead of actions.

[Despot] Why have you said that you did not expect any actions before the elections in Russia?

[Silajdzic] Because of speculations about the need to avoid any disturbance of the Russian public, as well as about needlessly endangering the favorites of the West in Russia. That is why I do not expect anything important to happen. I would be very glad if anything did happen.

[Despot] You do not expect to see Karadzic in The Hague?

[Silajdzic] Yes, after a certain period of time. Not now.

Three Parastates

[Despot] Do you think that the elections will be held in Mostar on 31 May, and what will be the attitude of the Our Bosnia Party [Stranka za Bosnu i Herzegovinu]?

[Silajdzic] We will support the attitude of the political leadership in Mostar. We will support their decision, no matter what it is.

[Despot] To whom do you refer when you say the political leadership in Mostar?

[Silajdzic] To the present political leadership.

[Despot] Will the Our Bosnia Party have their candidates in the elections?

[Silajdzic] If we do, we will probably have some kind of a joint slate.

[Despot] How do you interpret the fact that the Party of Bosnian Women has entered the elections, and what do you think the role of that party is, led by Amila Omersoftic, in the Bosnian political scene?

[Silajdzic] Believe me, I have not thought about that.

[Despot] However, your confrontations with the editor in chief of the television, Amila Omersoftic, are well known.

[Silajdzic] You could not have heard me say anything. You should ask her.

[Despot] You have stated that 99 percent of the media in the territory controlled by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army are controlled by the SDA [Party of Democratic Action].

[Silajdzic] Yes, but not by the SDA—that is too general. They are controlled by a group of people who consider themselves entitled—"in the name of the people"—to monopolize the power and act like private owners of those electronic media. We spent 50 years watching that movie.

[Despot] You recently told Voice of America that there are three parastates in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the moment. What exactly did you mean?

[Silajdzic] We have one legal authority in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is supposed to exercise power over the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina; there is one authority in the Serbian entity, one in Herzeg-Bosnia, and many informal authorities within legal administrative bodies of Bosnia-Herzegovina; and there is very little power left to the legal authority—which I used to be a part of.

Persistent Violations of the Washington Agreement

[Despot] Will it eventually result in Bosnia-Herzegovina being divided into three parts?

[Silajdzic] It will result in tensions and conflict between the de facto and de jure situation, but the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina is impossible.

[Despot] What will prevent it?

[Silajdzic] The de jure situation—the same thing that prevented Hitler from conquering France forever, although he was in Paris. Nobody in Bosnia-Herzegovina must sign such an agreement. I would advise anybody contemplating the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina—and unfortunately there are such obsessions, even in Croatian political circles—to give it up. Those are illusions, and such people can only damage Croatia as a state entity. The relations between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are false and inefficient. Not a single potential that we have at our disposal, not even the economic one, is being used. I did my best in that domain. However, I lacked a genuine response on the part of Croatia, as our relations are based on paternalism instead of partnership—on a wrong approach to the job of bringing Bosnia-Herzegovina to Europe. Those ideas are incompatible with the real situation. Bosnia-Herzegovina is treated as a province, as a relict—those are anacronous, prehistoric ideas. Our relations must have a totally different basis, and only then can we live together. All of us could have profited by that, but some people prefer monopolizing power.

[Despot] Is there a chance for the Federation to survive at all?

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Silajdzic] It has to exist before it can survive. I cannot see it anywhere. All we have are meetings on the Federation: Petersberg II and III, Washington II and III, and we still have Sidney I and II to go.... Unfortunately, those meetings are only useful to the big shots from Herzeg-Bosnia, not to the Church, not to the Croats, not to the relations between the two countries. That has not changed in two years. Ever since the Washington agreement was signed, people have been working out various ways of violating it. The Federation is being made out of two national territories, which has not been mentioned in the Washington agreement—the Federation of cantons is regulated by that document.

[Despot] Would you not say—regardless of the events that took place before the agreement was signed—that even President Izetbegovic has been slowing down the Federation?

[Silajdzic] All I know is that we still do not have the Federation, even though two years have passed. The HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] and the SDA are parties capable of accomplishing it all in the Assembly, and they have not done it. That means that the brakes are on. The Federation is a fairy tale. I think that another attack on the statehood of Bosnia-Herzegovina is the fact that the international community perpetually focuses on the future, and their credibility is wasted on that, instead of on the external borders, integrity, and sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Changes in the Structure of Authorities

[Despot] What do you suggest?

[Silajdzic] The structure of authorities has to be changed. That is exactly why this party was founded. The Assembly and the Government have to have people who will work in the field in a different way, and who really have the best interests of Bosnia-Herzegovina at heart.

[Despot] Have your expectations from the time the party was founded been fulfilled?

[Silajdzic] We get lots of support. The number of members is the least of problems. The troublesome parts are the elections, the organization of elections, and the organization of the party. However, I think we have been doing a good job.

[Despot] The rumors about your being the American alternative to Izetbegovic—because of his connections with the Islamic countries—have never ceased, although you have denied it in the media. On whose support from abroad are you counting?

[Silajdzic] We have no support from abroad. Those are just simplified Balkan stories told in pubs. The United States has their interests, and I only have Bosnian interests at heart—I confronted the U.S. Administration whenever there was a need to do so, whenever they would not do what I thought was good for us, and vice versa. It is quite clear that no lines have been drawn—they will support you when it is in their interest, and the next moment they will support somebody else's policy. People often invent whole stories about my alleged meetings with different people in the United States. It is everybody's duty to take care of their own interests, and of their elections in democratic countries. Those stories are invented by the so-called SDA circles—they bring over people from the States to make decisions on the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and then they say I am the American man. I would be delighted to be the American man, and I will be, as soon as the transfer of some $4 million for the preelection campaign is completed.

Mystifications From Pubs

[Despot] Can you and the Croatian authorities have the support of the United States at the same time?

[Silajdzic] It is possible. A great country like the United States will always pull a hundred strings at one time. That is clear to anybody who knows anything about politics. Of course, my concept and the concept the Zagreb authorities have are very different. The day will come when we will do some serious work on the Bosnian-Croatian relations, and both countries will profit by that. Unfortunately, as I have already said, I did all I could do on my part, but the brakes are on.

[Despot] There are some interpretations that your and Izetbegovic's roads have never really diverged, that you are supposed to receive votes from the intellectual part of the population, and he from the common people—both for the same politics.

[Silajdzic] Why would I secretly cooperate with Izetbegovic? That is another example of the pub mystifications, and those can often be dangerous. Philosophical systems were created in pubs, and the disposition for the intervention in Kosovo was also created in pubs in the seventies.

[Despot] With which parties would you perhaps form a coalition?

[Silajdzic] It is too early to talk about that. We have not spoken to anybody about a possible coalition so far.

[Despot] How many Croats and Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina do you think will vote for you? Can you expect any votes at all?

[Silajdzic] It is for me to offer, and for them to take it or leave it.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Despot] In the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina? Have you done anything specific to organize preelection rallies in the Serb Republic?

[Silajdzic] We will participate wherever we can. For instance, I have recently visited Banja Luka.

[Box, p 4]

We Will Definitely Have the Elections

[Despot] Will there be elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina at all?

[Silajdzic] Yes, for sure.

[Despot] When?

[Silajdzic] It is up to the OSCE to decide when the conditions for the elections are created. I hope that will be as soon as possible, because I believe in elections as a stage in the process of democratization.

[Despot] Can the elections be successful without the return of refugees and displaced persons?

[Silajdzic] They can, as people can also vote abroad.

[Despot] The SDA criticized the election rules offered by the Provisional Election Committee. What is the attitude of your party?

[Silajdzic] The election rules are not good because of the article that allows people to vote in their present places of residence—which means that the Serbs will be allowed to vote in Zvornik, Foca, Banja Luka.... That was supposed to be an exception, and it has been converted into a rule. We are against that, as that is the legalization of genocide.

[Despot] Then is it possible to have the impartial elections that you said were necessary?

[Silajdzic] It is possible to have the elections if people vote abroad, and if Article 2 is applied only in exceptional cases.

B-H: Zubak Says Assembly Usurping Federation Rights

LD2905194096 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 29 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Kresimir Zubak, president of the Bosnia- Herzegovina Federation, has sent an open letter to Miro Lazovic, speaker of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly. The letter says:

The fact that the assembly was engaged in legislative activities yesterday is hindering the implementation of the federation because it extends and encourages the pluralism of legal and state authorities, which should be eliminated by the consistent implementation of the Dayton, Washington, and other numerous agreements. All attempts by the existing transitional republican authorities as well as by the assembly, of which you are chairman, to usurp some rights and duties of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation will fail and will have a negative effect.

Apart from drawing your attention to the consequences of the practice in which you are also taking part, deliberately or inadvertently, I wish to let you know the following for the sake of future assembly sessions:

The constitution of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is no longer in force from the legal point of view because it has been derogated by the constitution for Bosnia-Herzegovina agreed in Dayton. Consequently, laws can no longer be adopted by invoking the constitution as the legal basis; if this happens these laws cannot be deemed valid. The existing republican authorities cannot adopt laws, the assembly of which you are chairman included. The legal basis for adopting laws is the Dayton constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This can only be done by the bodies of power constituted in accordance with that constitution and in a prescribed procedure, the letter says.

B-H: UN: Little Hope of Fair Trial for 'Zvornik Seven'

AU2905145796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 29 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Seven Bosniaks imprisoned in Bijeljina informed the UN international police that the Serb authorities had given them two documents, UN spokesman Alexander Ivanko said at today's press conference in Sarajevo.

The first document states that their request has not been granted, while the second document states that they would undergo (?psychiatric evaluation) in the following days, Ivanko said, and added: Hopefully, the psychiatrist will not be Radovan Karadzic.

He said that two of the prisoners had met with a Zvornik judge who questioned them about their acquaintances who are allegedly hiding in the hills in eastern Bosnia. The prisoners moreover told us that the judge had informed them that they would remain in jail for as long as necessary, 50 years if need be, until they confess the truth. Ivanko expressed concern over the judge's stance, because he should be unbiased and should assess the situation based on facts, particularly as the prisoners signed their confessions under duress.

Since we know that the Serb media has already condemned the 'Zvornik seven,' that the Zvornik police

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

beat and threatened them, there is little hope for a fair trial, Ivanko stressed.

B-H: Transit Countries Grant Visa-Free Travel to Refugees

AU3005105296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] As of May, war refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina may pay two-month visits to their [word indistinct]. German Interior Minister Manfred Kanther and his Austrian, Swiss, Slovene, and Croatian counterparts have signed an agreement in Bonn that allows citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina to transit these countries on the way to their homeland without visas as of 1 May.

Kanther said in Bonn that, with this agreement, about 320,000 Bosnian refugees from Germany, as well as refugees currently in Switzerland and Austria, will be able to acquaint themselves with the situation in their country before their final return.

B-H: Daily Examines AID 'Overthrow' Attempt, Power Struggle

AU2905101296 Sarajevo AVAZOV FOCUS in Serbo-Croatian 16 May 96 p 6

[Article by Nerzuk Curak: "Who Wants To Break the Chief of AID?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Something is rotten in the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina! If it were not for something ugly and foul that is tearing down the structure of the Bosnian state, the executive authorities could not have been practically nonexistent in the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the moment I am writing this! All the ministers and their deputies have dispersed all over the world, making magnificent individual efforts to contribute to the establishment of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thus only two ministers were in Sarajevo on 15 May this year, and the offices of the absent ministers—as the gentlemen were so busy—were locked by 1600, as in the good old days of the communist leveling. In the Forum on the Federation in Washington, our officials' faces glowed with an almost childlike delight at being in the U.S. capital and being received by the president of the world's most powerful country. Moreover, the compensation was abundant, and there were also prospects of certain financial transactions of the kind that was carried out by one of our state officials who, on a visit to Tehran, asked the host to pay for his plane ticket so he could fly to Washington and visit his family. However, the gentleman did not fly to the States, but asked for—and I do not know whether his request was fullfilled—exactly 70 percent of the unrealized flight expenses to be reimbursed! What a perfectionist!

That is the general synopsis of the state officials' relations to the state. There can be no excuse for only two ministries, or rather two ministers, to be working seriously in our state! That only increases the importance of the question: What predominates in the structure of Bosnian authorities, the individual comprehension of the necessity for the survival of the Bosnian state, or the wish to promote individual interests—which is rarely in accordance with the interests of a state that is living through a post-traumatic period, as is Bosnia-Herzegovina? That question, which is eating at the tissue of Bosnia-Herzegovina like a cancer, is accompanied by another problem, the frequency of which has reestablished one of the most irresistible backslides of socialism: the fight for positions.

Professionals and Provocateurs

The fight, which does not necessarily have to pass without victims, is being fought out of the public eye, as an obscure attempt by formerly powerful people to make meticulously planned moves in the media and in politics, with an almost pathological intent to regain power, or at least to obstruct those who have taken their former positions. We could see it this month, when the "May overthrow" attempt was carried out in the Bosnian secret service, which has become more public than brothels.

That overthrow, which is politically difficult to discern, has a limited and radical goal. The limited goal is to show that the head of that service, young Kemo Ademovic, is too inexperienced to be the main secret agent, while the radical goal is very resolute: to try to "eliminate" the man, thus making the service leaderless. There is no intention there except what is obviously manifested as unwillingness to oppose crime, which Ademovic is sure to attempt if he keeps up the attitude he had during the war, because settling accounts with the Bosnian mafia—if we consider their political meaning—is necessarily a line of work for the AID [Agency for Research and Documentation] as one of the guarantees for the security of the state.

Tactic Camouflage

The head of AID seems to have realized his situation and disregards requests by the media and awkward speculations, making the most logical move: He does not start battles; on the contrary, he is trying to establish a structure with enough room for all professionals, regardless of whether the media treat them as men belonging to Alispahic, Munja, Hebib, or Kemo. Such an approach is a guarantee of quality—of course, if

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

the possible actions of moles in the service itself are prevented.

In that sense it is normal for good cooperation between AID and the federal MUP [Ministry of Interior] to exist, ensuring success in the field of public and secret security. Therefore, we are glad that the MUP and its head have not participated in the publicly revealed criminal affair about the "Ceneks" packages for police employees, as it was strictly a swindle by the District and "Ceneks." Abdulah Sahinpasic Saja, the omnipresent representative in the Bosnian Assembly, commented on that affair: "Well, Mirsada (Curcic-Selimovic, deputy federal finance minister—author's note) spent three days begging me to let her buy the packages from 'Ceneks,' as the district allegedly did not know what to do with all that money." (!?) Of course, the money was gathered from private firms by Sarajevo District in the name of "defense requirements."

However, if we consider the "rotten packages case" in terms of politics, it becomes another pair of shoes—and the daily that revealed the affair did not want that to happen—which might imply that Hebib and Ademovic are connected with Alija Delimustafic. According to the scenario, that is supposed to discredit them in the moral sense, especially in the light of the still valid charges pressed against Delimustafic, but also because of public opinion about that obscure man, who is obviously announcing his comeback. His former driver, Zorbic, went to Vienna, probably to bring him to Sarajevo.

That whole story brings up another question: Is the unconvincing connection that the weekly published—between Ademovic, Hebib, and Delimustafic—a mere tactical camouflage that will draw the attention of the public in the wrong direction, and thus enable the powerful Croatian-Muslim political circle to fish in troubled waters? The waters are most troubled—and the fishing easiest—in an unstable political system, and an unstable political system is a system with unstable security, a system that will promptly give up the federal MUP and swallow the Croatian bait of canton police without a federal police center. I do not want to believe that somebody is ready to let go of strategic matters for the sake of personal interests, to settle for an inch when they can have a mile.

They Doubt the State

MUP and AID are being destabilized, and the only people who do not believe that are those who do not want to believe it, the people who cannot read between lines. That process will go on as long as the internal political games and swindles enable the factors from abroad—and Bosnian equivalents of those—to give us Trojan horses for presents.

Those factors know that there is something rotten in the Bosnian state, because they took part in the corruption, and they will not hesitate to take the biggest piece of cake in the possible "strategy of chaos" that they themselves will create.

While Croatia opens the Belgrade-Zagreb highway and thus enables Banja Luka and the doomed Serbian super-enclave to become a potentially important political and economic zone, and while the European Community is openly showing that they want to give Herzegovina to the Croats, our unsatisfied people, hungry for power, would ally with devil himself to demonstrate their narrow-mindedness and greed once more, and to (un)consciously show the world that we are not mature enough to have a state.

And our offices are mostly empty.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Croatia: Party Leaders Voice Disappointment With Tudjman

AU3005093796 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 28 May 96 p 2

[Statements of five Croatian party leaders on the Presidential Council session held 25-26 May, compiled by Gabrijela Galic; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Tudjman's Autism

[Stjepo Martinovic, political secretary of the Croatian National Party—HNS] The very idea of summoning the Presidential Council is bad in itself because Croatia has its parliament—the central body in which one could discuss issues of national interest. It is indicative that the president has chosen people to talk about the subject he himself chose, which is reminiscent of the behavior of French kings. This two-day meeting has passed in a presidential soliloquy with the efforts of his men to correct their failed theses. The meeting was entirely useless and without any effect at all because it was not organized to reach any consensus. It is also counterproductive in that the president wanted to share the mistakes of the ruling party with the whole nation.

It is symptomatic that in his final speech he repeated 90 percent of his introductory speech, which means that he did not want to listen to anything during those two days. The whole meeting resembles a presidential "school of ducklings" and it is one more proof of Tudjman's autism.

Foreign Policy Ship Off Course

[Radimir Cacic, president of HNS] The two-day session of the Presidential Council shows that the state policy, which determined the direction of rowing, was floating in a direction that it did not expect. The foreign policy ship has gone off course and by this act they wanted to prove that it was not a disaster, or a mistake of the ruling party, but an international conspiracy. The meeting will yield no benefit, because essential discussions have not been started, nobody looked at the mirror and analyzed all the omissions of the ruling party, nor did anybody give a strategy of correcting those omissions and reaching the point we had planned to reach.

I did not apply to speak because I would have put myself into the framework of a manifestation that is of no use to Croatia, and there was not much time to say anything essential. Had I said anything, I would have pointed out that we had stood up to defend and were defending our constitutional sovereignty, there where one needs a strong position—in real integration with the European Union—we still need defense of our sovereignty, particularly of our economic sovereignty.

Attempt at Hiding One's Own Weaknesses

[Zlatko Tomcic, president of Croatian Peasants Party—HSS] It is symptomatic that the opposition leaders were invited to come in two rounds, which indicates that one was looking for the best solution of collocutors. Regarding the subject discussed, I think that the meeting was defective. Foreign policy determines internal relations, so without internal relations one cannot discuss foreign policy. From the introductory and final reports it is obvious that one was trying to justify the nonadmission of Croatia into the Council of Europe, but also to create fear of a great danger for Croatia from external enemies.

The two-day meeting was to create a specific unity. In short, the session of the Presidential Council was an attempt at hiding one's own weaknesses and an attempt at creating unity against the external danger, but without the possibility of discussing elements of that danger, to which we have ourselves contributed by our policy. This meeting could have yielded some results had we discussed the international position of Croatia in relation to internal policy.

Conspiracy Theory Against Croatia

[Antun Vujic, vice president of Social Democratic Party—SDP] The meeting was informative, but it did not include dialogue regarding different views of the international policy. It was a meeting of different appearances in which the official picture dominated, which showed that it has not got rid of the theory of conspiracy against Croatia. The oppositional representatives pointed out the lack of active Croatian policy, particularly regarding the solution of regional issues. I pointed out that we could not "get rid of the Balkans," if we do not contribute to the solution of the Balkan question. Croatia cannot be the last country in Europe, but if she wants to be a part of Europe, she has to be the first in something. That is the context of her environment. If she is, as they say, a regional power, then she must conduct some kind of positive regional policy, not run away from it. If she wants to be influential in the region, she can achieve that first and foremost by being the first in democracy, which is asked of her in particular. However, that is precisely what the supporters of this conspiracy theory do not want because that would bring into question their isolationism, in which they locally rule over Croatia, but not over the situation around her.

Croatia appeared through the disintegration of the bipolar world, and she behaves as if she is sorry for it, and she asks for its reestablishment so that she can be the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

last country in the West. That is a contradiction between Croatian conservatism and what her possible western allies ask of her. Many understand that, even some people from the authorities, but these things will not be realized until some serious changes occur. Therefore the question of the international position of Croatia is also her internal democratic question.

Totally Uncritical Stand

[Vlado Gotovac, president of Croatian Social Liberal Party—HSLS] In my opinion, what was basically wrong with that meeting was the totally uncritical stand toward us and our role in the events in this area. We had an air of unbearable perfection, without any serious critical remark about what we had done and how we had done it. The president kept the same position also in this assessment of internal relations in Croatia, having categorized once again the Zagreb case in the context of the destabilization of Croatia. What he heckled to Stjepan Radic while he was making his speech, saying that the Zagreb city mayor case was a national disgrace, proves that he insists on his own impeccable image and on his own identification with Croatia. That was floating in the air of that meeting all the time, and therefore that meeting had a largely manifestational character—it was supposed to prove that the president was right from the very beginning and until now. Some of the participants in the meeting said as much, by inviting him to continue with his policy in the same way, in the same direction, and without changes.

The opposition kept as constructive and as calm a tone as possible, but we cannot be at all satisfied with such a content and interpretation of the meeting. The majority of views expressed have already been known to the general public for quite a while, there were many reiterations, trivialities. On the contrary, this is the moment when one should thoroughly question oneself and tell the general public how matters actually stand now. For years we have insisted on the central European and Mediterranean character of Croatia, and demanded that the policy should be conducted in line with that. Now we rightfully insist on determining the consequences of the fact that it has not been done until today and is only now being done, and that it is being done today because any other solution would be dangerous for the country. The only benefit of this conference would be precisely if this question, as well as everything that accompanies it, was cleared, and all the national tasks resulting from it determined.

There were some remarks in that direction, but unfortunately nothing more than that. Thus one can say that the final speech delivered by the president made the whole meeting pointless. I had expected a constructive discussion, but after the president's introductory speech I realized that I did not belong in that meeting.

Croatia: Tudjman, IFOR Officer Praise Croatian-U.S. Ties

LD2905163396 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 29 May 96

[Report by correspondent Zoltan Kabok from the presidential palace]

[FBIS Translated Text] President of the republic, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, today received Major General William Farmen, Implementation Force [IFOR] commander for logistical support in Croatia, in a farewell visit. On this occasion, President Tudjman expressed satisfaction with the work of General Farmen and stressed the partnership in relations between the Republic of Croatia and the United States and especially the successful cooperation between the two countries' defense ministries.

In the talks, attended by Dr. Ivo Sanader, head of the president's office; Colonel General Miljenko Crnjac, chief of the president's military office; and Kresimir Kaspar, the president's aide-de-camp, President Tudjman said that the Republic of Croatia is determined to ensure that the Washington and Dayton peace agreements are implemented in full but that international support, and that of the United States in particular, is necessary if this is to be achieved.

General Farmen said that he is confident that partnership between Croatia and the United States will become more profound, that his experience of his term in Croatia is exclusively positive, and that he will inform his aides in Washington about it.

Croatia: Tudjman Pardons Several Accused of Armed Insurrection

LD2905192296 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 29 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] On the basis of Article 98, Paragraph 5, of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia; Article 1 of the Law of Pardons; and the proposals of the pardons commission on 28 May 1996, the president has decided to pardon certain people following requests from sentenced persons and in accordance with his official duties.

The decision means 204 people have been pardoned. One of these—a sentenced person—has been completely freed from having to serve a prison sentence. [passage omitted]

On the basis of Article 98, Paragraph 5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia and Article 1 of the Law

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

on Pardons, and following a proposal from the minister of justice, the president has decided to pardon those charged with, or sentenced to terms of imprisonment for, the crime of armed insurrection, as per Article 235, Paragraph 1, of the Republic of Croatia's penal code.

This decision affects 78 people, 58 of whom have had the charges against them dropped, while 21 people have been released from having to complete their prison sentences. [figures as heard] The decision comes into effect today.

Croatia: President Tudjman Profiled

MS3005110296 London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 30 May 96 p III

[Profile of Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, including remarks by Tudjman; carried in the FINANCIAL TIMES survey on Croatia]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] President Franjo Tudjman is a true believer whose dream came true.

For decades he nurtured the idea that he would restore the independence which Croatia lost a thousand years ago. Today the 74-year-old former communist general turned jailed nationalist dissident sits in a presidential palace built by Tito in the wooded hills above Zagreb surrounded by the symbols of his new state.

Behind his desk stands Croatia's ubiquitous red and white chequer-board flag on its red, white and blue background. On the wall hangs a huge painting of King Tomislav, the legendary founder of the first Croatian state. The king is on horseback receiving the homage of his loyal subjects.

Six years ago the forceful, silver-haired leader steered his party, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), to a landslide victory in the first free elections. The tide of popular support that swept him to power was a mirror image of the fervour whipped up in Serbia by his counterpart, President Slobodan Milosevic, another former high-ranking communist official to wrap himself in the national flag.

But there is a big difference between the two men. For Mr Tudjman, securing the independence of Croatia was a matter of conviction. For Mr Milosevic, as subsequent events have proved, Greater Serb Nationalism was merely a means to gain and retain power. After the trauma of 1991, when rebel Serbs occupied 30 per cent of the territory, Mr Tudjman steadily consolidated his position. He backed the creation of a modern army in violation of a UN-imposed arms embargo but with financial support from the 2.5 million strong Croatian diaspora, a blind eye from the EU and the help of retired US generals.

In 1993 Mr Tudjman went to war against the Moslems to carve out a Croatian mini-state in Bosnia. By the end of the year, however, Washington gave Mr Tudjman a simple choice: either stop the war against the Moslems and receive US backing for the recovery of Serb-held lands, or face sanctions and isolation.

He chose to side with Washington. The US link strengthened after the Washington accords of 1994 when Mr Tudjman formally gave up his original plan to carve up Bosnia with Mr Milosevic and agreed to Washington's plans for a Croat-Moslem federation. From then on Washington was on Mr Tudjman's side, and the strategic balance decisively changed.

A poster plastered throughout Croatia immediately after the army's re-conquest of Krajina last August showed Mr Tudjman, his arms raised in victory with the slogan, "the man who wins." Strategic road and rail links between central Croatia and the Adriatic ports were quickly re-opened and a few months later Mr Tudjman led his party to another electoral victory. But he fell short of winning the two thirds majority needed to write stronger presidential powers into the constitution.

Having fought four elections over the last six years while battling against what he describes as "Yugo-communist Serbian aggression," Mr Tudjman was furious when European foreign ministers questioned Croatia's democratic credentials earlier this month and postponed indefinitely Croatia's entry into the European Council

His anger reflected barely disguised contempt at Europe's role in the Balkans. "Disunited Europe was unable to solve the Yugoslav and Bosnian crises. It is united only in trying to discredit the Dayton agreement because that was reached under the stewardship of the US. They want to discredit Dayton at the expense of Croatia. But we will not become anyone's colony," he added.

Citing 21 reservations about Croatia's record in the field of human rights and press freedom, European foreign ministers delivered what Mr Tudjman sees as an insult to the democratic record of the new state. Instead of considering the steps needed to redress European concerns, however, he is bluntly unapologetic. The independent media "criticises everything that Croatia has succeeded in creating. That is not democracy; it is anarchy," he says.

But he is evasive and defensive when tackled on the central criticism of his regime—that it sanctioned the murder of hundreds of mainly aged Serbs who remained in Krajina after the Croatian army re-occupation, and destroyed their homes to make sure they never returned

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

to where they had lived for centuries. "More than 400,000 Croats, Hungarians, Czechs and Ruthenes, all non-Serbs, were expelled during the aggression by the Serb and Yugo-communist army to conquer Croat territory and make it part of Greater Serbia. Many Croats and Moslems were also expelled from Bosnia-Herzegovina," he recalls. "These people, who were expelled from their homes, whose nearest relations were killed, could not be controlled after the liberation, even though we ordered, stopped and even tried those who carried out crimes. There were even court martials," he said.

As for the expulsion of Serbs, Mr Tudjman added "the Croatian government, and I personally, appealed to all those (Serbs) who did not commit crimes, even those who took part in the uprising, to remain. But they collectively felt so guilty that they abandoned western Slavonia and Knin."

"The world is now accusing Croatia for that. But why did the Serbs also leave Sarajevo when Europe, the US and Nato were all there? Why did the Serbs also leave the land that was returning to Moslem control? They even dug up their dead which is horrible. It is because the Serbs in Croatia treated it as their colony and in Bosnia it was the same thing. They left like colonialists, like the French left Algeria," he added.

Several times Mr Tudjman repeated his belief that Croatia is not part of the Balkans, but of central Europe. Future relations between the former republics of Yugoslavia should be based on the Scandinavian model of co-operation between sovereign states, he adds.

With outstretched arms, he explains that normalisation between Zagreb and Belgrade is necessary for what he calls the "Scandinavisation" of the region. "Normalisation between the Serbs and the Croats, the biggest nations in this region, is as important as the reconciliation between France and Germany after the second world war. The consolidation of peace between these two countries made the creation of the European Union possible," he added.

In the same breath, however, he repeats that Croats share more with central Europe than with their former countrymen, although recent history tells a different story—of communities interlinked for centuries now torn apart by war.

The Croatian leader is unable to disguise his antipathy to Bosnia's Moslems, whom he sees as ethnic Croats who succumbed to the Turkish invaders five hundred years ago. But with continuing American support hinged largely on Zagreb's co-operation with the Bosnian Moslems he says he supports the Moslem-Croatian federation which was allocated 51 per cent of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Dayton agreements.

"In spite of the deep, civilisational nature of the differences between Croats and Moslems, the federation should survive because of the strategic, geopolitical link between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina," he says.

Croatia: SDA Leader Accuses Zagreb of 'Xenophobia'

AU2905150096 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 29 May 96 p 5

[Report by A.L.: "Bosniaks Eliminated From Public Functions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb, 28 May—Semso Tankovic, chairman of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] in Croatia, has announced that the position of the Bosniaks in Croatia is worse now than it was seven or eight years ago, that is, that in the previous system the Bosniaks were present in politics and in public and cultural life, and in the management of many prominent Croatian companies, while now "all the Bosniaks have been removed from public functions."

"The Bosniaks are a constituent nation in Croatia. Just take a good look at Croatia, and you will see that it developed, progressed, and moved forward with the help of the Bosniak spirit," Tankovic says.

Speaking about the demand that the Bosniaks get a deputy seat in the assembly, Tankovic said that he was not an optimist, "as this is up to the sensitivity of the political leadership of the Republic of Croatia."

"They have shown clearly that they suffer from xenophobia when it comes to the Bosniak issue in Croatia," Tankovic says.

Croatia: Slavonia Serbs' Hadzic Insists on Regional Autonomy

AU2905123096 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 24 May 96 p 13

[Interview with Goran Hadzic, president of the "Serb Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem," by Vladimir Matevski; place and date not given: "Checkerboard Will Not Pass"]

[FBIS Translated Text] This is the chance of a lifetime. We must use it and preserve the Serb people in the territories that they have inhabited for centuries. That is what Jacques Klein, UN transitional [UNTAES—UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] administrator, has put across to us. The fate of Serb Sarajevo simply must not repeat itself. Croatia within

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

its internationally recognized borders is unfortunately a reality, but we must remain and persevere.

That is the opinion of Goran Hadzic, president of the Serb Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem, who assesses that "intelligence and patience are needed the most" now.

"Croatia was, above all, compelled to implement changes in its legislation that will give the Serbs the guarantees for security and equality," Hadzic explains.

The Law on Amnesty, passed by the Croatian Sabor, is according to him only one in a series of steps that official Zagreb had to pass under the pressure of the international community.

Asked how he comments on the announcements by the Croatian politicians that he will nevertheless be tried for war crimes, Goran Hadzic says:

"I am not concerned in the least. My conscience is clear because I know that I did not commit any crimes. There are many Serbs who even get angry when they hear that the Croats are granting them amnesty for alleged war crimes. It so happens that they did not fight, because for the Croats all Serb fighters are war criminals."

Hadzic, however, claims that the Law on Amnesty passed by the Croatian Sabor does not satisfy Serb criteria.

"All Serbs in Croatia should be equal with this law. The amnesty must apply to the residents of Slavonia, Srem, Baranja, and also Lika, Krajina, Kordun, Banija, and all others. This is consistent with the Erdut Agreement."

Croatian Propaganda

President Hadzic claims that there was very little migration out of this district. The first to move were the affluent individuals who acquired their wealth in very dubious circumstances over the past few years. They had the money to purchase real estate in Serbia, but very few people here miss them.

"Unfortunately, a portion of the refugees from Western Slavonia also succumbed to the pressure and to Croatian propaganda. Some of them who lived in the villages bordering on Croatia could not endure the sheer thought of fleeing from the Ustasha knife for the third time, and they left. However, according to the latest reports, some of them are returning after they have secured their material goods east of the Danube. They did not want the picture of the exodus with bags in their hands repeating itself," the president of the Srem-Baranja district explains.

International mediators have frequently assured the Serbs that foreign capital would definitely come to the Srem-Baranja district. The figures they mentioned have varied, but the sum of $10 million was mentioned most often. Residents are nevertheless afraid that this financial assistance will be made conditional on acceptance of the Croatian state authority.

"The Croatian checkerboard will neither return nor survive here. We will never accept the Ustasha symbols, and the foreign observers know this. On the other hand the political solution has been finalized," Hadzic believes. "We are no longer raising the issue of the Croatian border, and these matters are clear. However, we must get autonomy, and when German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel is anticipating it, then this is a reality. General Jacques Klein has never posed any conditions with regard to the financial aid, and we are glad because of this."

Problem of Mosquitoes

"In the latest talks with UNTAES officials we discussed the revitalization of some facilities that would be useful for the Serb and Croatian sides," Hadzic explains. This primarily refers to reviving oil production in Djeletovici. The oil fields are not exploited by UNTAES members from Jordan, and the oil is not pumped. At the moment we need the oil tremendously, because the farmers need diesel to continue agricultural work. The opening of the pumping units will also give employment to a great number of workers, which is important for us bearing in mind that the employment problem will soon become the central issue."

The president of the Srem-Baranja district explains that one subject of the talks with UN officials was over what appears to be a trivial mater—the extermination of mosquitoes.

"The Croatians initially wanted to spray this area with their aircraft, to which we could not agree under any circumstances. In the end we reached an agreement that the spraying be carried out by special UN aircraft painted in blue, with a prior announcement in order not to upset our residents," Hadzic says.

Under the conditions of the current balance of power the Serbs of the Srem-Baranja district can be satisfied with the results of the talks to this point. President Hadzic cites as one success the imminent payment of pensions in the currency of the pensioners' choice. The earlier efforts made by Zagreb and the United Nations to introduce the Croatian kuna into the Serb territories through the pensions did not succeed.

"All in all I am optimistic because I hope that we will all live better in the near future. We will definitely be richer and more satisfied, and I hope that we will no longer

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

preoccupy ourselves with politics but live in peace and dignity, just like all normal people," Hadzic concluded.

[Box, p 13]

Strength in Numbers

Goran Hadzic emphasized to VESTI that there are more than 150,000 Serbs in the district. "Our biggest strength lies in this number. That is why we must stay. We should not fear, because we are on our own land. Let the Croatians who wish to return to Srem and Baranja worry about their behavior during the war, and about whether they can look their former neighbors in the eyes," Goran Hadzic says.

[Box, p 13]

Satisfied With Klein

For the time being we can be satisfied with the cooperation with UNTAES and especially General Jacques Klein. He, as opposed to some other foreign politicians, understood the problems immediately, Goran Hazic says.

[Box, p 13]

Refugees Will Return

Those who have left our territories for Serbia will nevertheless return in the end. I am sure of this, because such an opportunity only comes around once in a century, Goran Hadzic says, and adds that this is "an affluent region; the people are diligent and good, and we truly have every chance for prosperity."

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Poland: Prime Minister Voices Doubts About Intelligence Service

LD3005094896 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1930 GMT 29 May 96

["Rebroadcast" of speech by Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ladies and Gentlemen: An event unparalleled in modern history took place last December: The head of the Polish Government was publicly accused of collaborating with a foreign intelligence service. This resulted in a serious, although fortunately brief, political crisis. Those accusations against a person holding a key public office understandably caused significant agitation and anxiety among the public. A potential danger loomed over Poland's image as an internally stable and credible partner in international relations, a state striving for membership in NATO and the EU.

The government crisis was quickly overcome. When I took up the prime minister's duties, I declared with full responsibility that I would do my utmost to ensure that the accusations against my predecessor were completely clarified with absolute respect for the law. The prosecutor general and I did everything in our power to ensure that conditions were right for the prosecution service to fulfill its tasks in accordance with the fundamental principle of independence. As we all know, the prosecutor conducting the investigation discontinued the preparatory proceedings in the case and provided extensive reasons for his decision. In order to avoid any doubts as to the correctness of this decision, it has been passed on, under supervisory procedure, for inspection by the prosecutor's superiors. We can expect the final findings in the immediate future.

Directly after the discontinuation of the investigation, I asked the prosecutor general to consider the possibility of presenting to the public the evidence gathered in the case. My intention, in view of the exceptional nature and gravity of the problem, was to make it possible for anyone interested to form their own opinion, without being limited to the opinions of politicians and the mass media, as well as the numerous and most often highly selective information leaks that really plague our state. My request was accepted, and it shall be implemented shortly.

In view of the accusations made against the prosecutor conducting the case, connected with some of his statements made after the decision to discontinue the investigation, the prosecution service has started proceedings aimed at an unequivocal evaluation of these statements. All these steps show that the government approaches law observance seriously.

In view of the fact that the accusations made against the former prime minister were found to be groundless, the internal affairs minister instituted an internal inquiry at the State Protection Office [UOP], the objective of which was to assess the correctness and compliance with the official principles of the actions of the officers involved in this case. The commission conducting the inquiry was made up of people with unquestionably high professional qualifications that enabled them to perform their tasks soundly and competently. After a month's work, having examined all of the evidence gathered at the UOP and after interviewing face-to-face all of the UOP and MSW [Internal Affairs Ministry] officers who took part in the operations preceding the formulation of the accusations against the former prime minister, the commission prepared a report containing its findings, conclusions, and assessments.

It is a disturbing document. Its contents cannot fail to cause anyone who has truly matured to have a sense of responsibility for Poland feel that something very bad had happened; that in spite of all the changes that have taken place in our country, there can still be threats to the order of the democratic state as a result of serious irregularities in the actions of officers of the special services, even when there is only a small group of them. I must admit that personally I am perturbed by this, as a citizen, as a lawyer, and as prime minister.

The report, using a number of documented examples, shows very serious violations of the basic operational principles by officers of the UOP Directorate of Intelligence and Investigations Directorate. This concerns, among other things, the principles of procuring intelligence, recording it, verifying its credibility, and drawing conclusions. There is a strong suspicion that actions by intelligence officers led to the exposure of people supplying them with intelligence, thereby undermining the value and credibility of such intelligence. The records of conversations of key importance for the final conclusions contain significant gaps, often at the most important points. Some original tapes have disappeared, and the highest ranking officers who were the last to have access to them cannot recall what happened to them. Only abbreviated and edited copies remain among the records. There is much to indicate that the most important document in the case was not subjected to thorough analysis from the point of view of its content and credibility. And finally, it does not concern the former prime minister, the accusations against whom were made mainly on the basis of this document. There are serious grounds for suspecting that some operational documents were sub-

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

sequently amended to fit in with the previously formulated accusations.

In view of the results of the inspection, it transpires that the submission made by the former internal affairs minister to the Military Prosecution Service was based on foundations, many of which were not confirmed by operational documents or simply by facts.

These are just some of the findings of the inquiry at the State Protection Office.

Two and a half years ago when, in connection with one of the very important UOP operations, concerning the so-called container affair connected with controlled arms smuggling, suspicions about violation of the law were publicly voiced, the then internal affairs minister asked me for an opinion in my capacity as prosecutor general. After examining the records, with a deep personal conviction, I publicly declared that the UOP had not violated the law.

This time, in respect of the former prime minister's case, I am deeply convinced that the operations of the UOP violated the fundamental principles of proper and credible procedures. As a result, I am all the more convinced of the necessity of a thorough reform of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in particular the special services. It is intolerable that they should remain outside efficient and effective control. This carries the threat of political pressures and serious irregularities.

We shall implement the appropriate changes. I believe the government will get wide support for this, including in parliament. This is very important because the guarantees of state security and law observance should be excluded from routine disputes, which are often used for propaganda purposes.

At the same time, I believe that the results of the inquiry at the UOP should lead to a competent legal analysis, which should form the basis for a decision as to whether or not prosecution proceedings should be initiated.

And finally, a bitter reflection. Without prejudging the answer to the question as to whether the accusations against the former prime minister were politically motivated, there is no doubt that this case has become the subject of a disgraceful and intensive political game, a game often crossing the bounds of honesty and responsibility. Unfortunately, many people find it difficult to bring themselves to be objective.

Ladies and gentlemen, common honesty dictates that what is black should be called black and what is white should be called white. Just consider how many examples of distorted interpretation and of adapting appraisals and commentaries to political requirements there were in this case; how easily premature and groundless accusations where made, while inconvenient facts were ignored. Not every field is proper for conducting political campaigns. Let us summon up enough courage for a thoughtful reflection: What should be done so that we can be sure that the special services above all serve the country and that they observe the law. That is our common task. Although the political temperature around this case has risen very high, I appeal to the politicians, I appeal to all of you ladies and gentlemen who are listening to me: Let us not ignore threats. Let us create an atmosphere in which calmly, and above all responsibly, thoughtfully, and together, we shall be able to draw conclusions useful for Poland from the situation which over the last few months has arisen around the special services. This is important and truly necessary.

Thank you for your attention, ladies and gentlemen.

Poland: Papers React to Dismissal of 4 UOP Officers

WS2905130296

[FBIS Report] On 29 May two major Warsaw vernacular dailies, RZECZPOSPOLITA and TRYBUNA, carried editorial reaction to the recent dismissal of four officers of the Office of State Protection (UOP).

RZECZPOSPOLITA, a centrist daily ready widely in government circles, ran on page 5 a 350-word commentary by Deputy Chief Editor Bozena Wawrzewska entitled "The Parliament Omitted." The author, "surprised by the dismissal of the four UOP officers who were working on the 'Oleksy case,'" notes that "the method as well as the date of dismissing the UOP officers, including three generals, may lead us to believe that there is more to the issue than merely negative evaluation of their work." According to Wawrzewska, "the 'Oleksy case' is not an internal affair of UOP" and "a large portion of society looks upon it as a political game in which the secret services are participating." She believes that "whether these services acted in line with the law remains open. This will be assessed by the special Sejm commission (...) which is to look into the legality of the actions taken by the UOP, which means that, indirectly, it is to examine the legality of the measures taken by the officers who were dismissed by Minister Siemiatkowski." The journalist notes that "the preliminary report drawn up by the commission was favorable to the UOP employees. The final report will probably be ready before long. What if the commission does not see any irregularities in the UOP actions? We will probably witness a new wave of speculation on political circumstances and revenge."

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Wawrzewska concludes by pointing out that "in order to prevent such situations, two commissions were set up in the Sejm: a standing commission and an extraordinary commission, which were to ensure democratic control over the operations of the secret services. Minister Siemiatkowski apparently failed to notice this."

TRYBUNA, a leftist daily supporting the Democratic Left Alliance, carried a front-page, 250-word commentary by Chief Editor Dariusz Szymczycha under the "One Hundred Words" rubric. Szymczycha points out that "slandering the head of the Polish Government was enough to demand his resignation, which, incidentally, actually happened. The decision by the prosecutor's office and the internal proceedings within the UOP do not provide sufficient grounds to treat in the same way the officers who leveled allegations at the prime minister." According to the TRYBUNA chief editor, "those who are defending the four UOP officers are also defending the mechanisms of a party state, whether they want to or not. In such a state functionaries of the secret services are the only ones who are not to blame" for anything. Szymczycha argues that "since the so-called Oleksy case was started with the curtain raised, why cannot it be concluded in the same way? Does all the information gathered in the course of the internal UOP inspection have to be hidden in safes? As a citizen and a taxpayer, I would like to know who really discredited himself? Was it the entire secret services, or only one (former) minister and four of his officers?"

Poland: Presidential Aide on Relations With Ukraine

WS3005090596 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 29 May 96 p 7

[Interview with Jerzy Milewski, minister of state in the Presidential Chancellery, by Andrzej Wankowicz; place and date not given: "The Great Role of Ukraine"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Wankowicz] You visited Ukraine in May. What was the purpose of your trip?

[Milewski] The primary goal of my visit was to discuss issues related to the Consultative Committee of the presidents of both countries, details regarding resumption of work in the committee. I met with my counterpart and held talks with the heads of the Defense and Foreign Affairs Ministries. I also had an opportunity to hold unofficial talks with several other members of the Ukrainian cabinet.

[Wankowicz] How do you assess the current condition of relations between our countries? Political issues are not the only factors affecting them. Take the economy, for instance...

[Milewski] The relations which we have had so far should be termed as very good; both we and the Ukrainians stress this. It is impossible to ignore the fact that we have already made a great effort to create the foundations for our relations and to establish mechanisms regulating bilateral contacts. What is especially significant is the fact that the state authorities are not the only ones that are declaring a desire to expand cooperation—there are increasingly more joint initiatives from specific regions, towns, organizations, and groups of people.

Now, as far as economic cooperation goes, it is also developing very well. Last year's trade volume exceeded $1 billion, which, of course, does not at all mean that all the possibilities in this area have been exhausted. Even though we can see certain favorable phenomena, such as the stabilization of the Ukrainian currency—the karbovanets—Ukraine still has a long way to go to an efficient economy based on clear, stable legal regulations. This is certainly negatively affecting the extent to which Polish companies are operating in that market. Therefore, I believe that our fundamental task is to build an infrastructure that would render services to Polish companies trading with Ukraine, and first of all to those which are investing their capital in that country. We hope that we will be able to effect a long-awaited breakthrough in this area as soon as in the next couple of months.

[Wankowicz] What about military cooperation?

[Milewski] An interministerial protocol on the training of soldiers was signed. It was also agreed that teams of experts would be set up which would deal with the preparation of programs for scientific-technological cooperation, as well as programs for cooperation in airspace management.

[Wankowicz] You did not say a word about the joint Polish-Ukrainian battalion, whose formation has been announced by [Defense] Minister Dobrzanski.

[Milewski] The process of forming this battalion should be complete by the end of this year. At the same time, we are in favor of engaging in multilateral undertakings—hence our plans for closer cooperation within the Partnership for Peace program. It should also be noted that we are maintaining contacts not only at the highest levels. For example, cooperation between the Krakow and Carpathian military districts is developing very well. This aspect of "decentralization" in mutual contacts should be seen as particularly valuable.

[Wankowicz] President Kuchma will soon visit Poland twice. What are you expecting from these visits?

[Milewski] I would like to draw your attention to the fact that even though the two visits will be paid

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

within a short period, they will differ a lot. The fact that the Ukrainian president has been invited to the meeting of the heads of the Central European countries in Lancut demonstrates the importance Poland attaches to the active participation of Ukraine in the issues of our region. The second visit will be an official visit devoted primarily to bilateral contacts. It will sum up the relations we have had so far, and it will also determine the directions of further cooperation. I believe that during the visit we will also discuss Europe today and in the future; we will try to figure out what we can do to ensure stabilization and development of our continent. For a long time now we have been of the opinion that the development of friendly Polish-Ukrainian cooperation is favorable to our countries and societies; we also believe that since it has a favorable effect on the strengthening of the geopolitical situation in our region of Europe, it is also favorable to our neighbors. Finally, even though this should be taken with a grain of salt, I would like to recall opinions expressed in our press and say that these visit are needed by our journalists so they will be able to see that neither Poland nor the Polish president have forgotten Ukraine, and that mutual interest is also reflected in meetings held at the highest level.

[Wankowicz] How does the presidential center of power perceive the role of Ukraine in Central-East Europe? Is there a cohesive vision of Poland's policy toward this state?

[Milewski] We all agree that the present and future role of Ukraine must not be underestimated. All along Poland has been trying to support the independence of this country; as much as we can we are backing Kiev on the international arena. Due to its location, Ukraine is one of the countries whose future will determine the future of the continent the most. It is in all of our interests that the political and economic transformations in Ukraine are successful and that European-oriented tendencies are strengthened there. We all realize that Ukraine is one of the biggest barriers which could prevent the return of some old compulsory unions in the east of the continent. We already know that it is impossible for us to achieve our goal—to build a stable and safe Europe—without Ukraine. I must admit, however, that discussions on how to optimize the methods of carrying out this task are still under way.

[Wankowicz] Do you agree with the opinion voiced by [Foreign] Minister Rosati that Polish-Russian relations are more important than our relations with Ukraine?

[Milewski] I cannot remember such a statement by the minister. It seems to me that it would be difficult to introduce such a gradation. Both countries you mentioned are neighbors, and we want to have the best possible relations with Russia, Ukraine, and other countries. I think that relations with each of them should be based on open dialogue, on the will to elucidate possible doubts, and on discussion. We understand the delicacy of Russian-Ukrainian relations, but we believe that as time goes by there will be increasingly fewer controversies in the relations between the two states. It certainly is not our intention to interfere in the shape of these relations, and we expect that both Ukraine and Russia will adopt similar attitudes toward our relations with the other side. I believe that we all understand very well that harmonious development of cooperation in our region lies both in our and in Europe's interests.

[Wankowicz] Thank you for the interview.

Poland: Official: Poles in Lithuania Victims of Discrimination

LD2905173896 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1230 GMT 29 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Warsaw, 29 May—Jan Sienkiewicz, chairman of the Election Campaign of Poles in Lithuania, accused the Lithuanian Government today of building an ethnically homogeneous state. In Sienkiewicz's opinion, the Lithuanian authorities consistently pursue a policy of assimilating other nationalities and weakening them in all areas. Today's conference of Poles from Lithuania was organized at the Sejm by the Polish Peasant Party floor group.

In Sienkiewicz's opinion, the Lithuanian authorities not only fail to give back to Poles land to which there are prewar title deeds, but also distribute that land to settlers. Sienkiewicz pointed out that Lithuanian legislation did indeed order the return of the land, but "the law is not followed in practice." [passage omitted]

In the opinion of the leader of the Polish minority in Lithuania, the expansion of Vilnius by 10,500 hectares to "greater Vilnius" is "daylight robbery" aimed at Poles. On the one hand, urban land will no longer be recoverable, and, on the other, Poles will pay 10 times higher taxes and rent for it. [passage omitted]

In Sienkieiwcz's opinion, the Lithuanian authorities are also trying to curtail Poles' political influence. The plan to raise the electoral threshold 4-6 percent is meant to serve this purpose. "This is meant to eliminate the Polish community from having representatives in parliament," Sienkiewicz said.

The chairman of the Election Campaign also criticized the decree by the Lithuanian education minister, which has completely eliminated the Polish language from schools, which "flagrantly conflicts with the law on national minorities." [passage omitted]

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Lithuania is the only state in Europe where Poles, who make up 7 percent of the population, live in concentrated areas.

Poland: Government Criticizes Draft Laws 'Adverse' to Church

WS2905121696 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 29 May 96 p 2

[Report by the Catholic News Agency and "JT": "Parliamentary Drafts Rejected by the Ministers; The Government Defends the Church"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Council of Ministers yesterday issued negative opinions on two parliamentary draft laws unfavorable for the Catholic Church: on the attitude of the state toward the church and on income tax from legal persons.

In the first draft, Ryszard Zajac of the Democratic Left Alliance and Barbara Labuda (independent) postulated that courts and not a joint government-Church Property Commission settle church claims on property confiscated during the times of the Polish People's Republic. The government concluded that the change should first be discussed by the Joint Government and Episcopate Commission. "Violating the procedure could prove detrimental to mutual relations," says a government statement. "An arbitrary introduction of far-reaching amendments to the existing laws would disturb established methods of communicating and solving problems in relations between the state and churches." The government explains that thus far the Property Commission has reviewed only one-half of the 3,016 claims. Court procedures would cause the legal status of many controversial estates to remain unclear for a long time.

The government also disapproved of the parliamentary draft project of tightening customs relief on excise goods and passenger cars granted to the church from abroad.

Both drafts are currently resting at the Sejm. Despite criticism from the government, they might still be passed or rejected. The authors might withdraw their names, in which case the drafts will not be reviewed.

Poland: Bishop Expresses Hope for Church-State Accord

LD2905121096 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1105 GMT 29 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, secretary general of the Polish Episcopate, has admitted that arguments around the Concordat and the Constitution have cast a shadow over state-church relations as well as revealing the correspondence between the Vatican and Poland. In an interview for Polish radio, Bishop Pieronek added, however, that there are people who want agreement.

Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek declined to answer a question whether the relations between the state and the church have become warmer as a result of the meeting between the president and the primate [Jozef Glemp] on Monday.

[Begin Pieronek recording] I would not like to discuss the temperature here because so far we have had a rather cold spring. However, I think there are people who want agreement, and there are people who do not want agreement. I wish the first group success and the second group to come to their senses. [end recording]

[Announcer] Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek said the main subject of the talks at today's meeting of the government-episcopate joint commission will be the issue of pay for priests teaching religion in schools and ways of preventing violence in schools and the Army.

Poland: Cabinet Approves Communications Development Project

WS2905121596 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish 29 May 96 p 2

[Report by "ZOL": "Cabinet on Telecommunications; Privatization of the TP SA as a Strategic Action"]

[FBIS Translated Text] By 30 November of this year, the communications minister is to submit a privatization draft of the Polish Telecommunications SA, the Council of Ministers has decided. Its members approved documents regarding policies for telecommunications development.

It is estimated that receipts from telecommunications services in the years 1996-2000 will amount to 44.7 billion zlotys [Z], and in the next two five-year periods they will go up to Z71 and 119 billion, respectively

It is also envisioned that the revenues of the state budget from taxes and fees for conducting business activity in this sector will rise from Z3 billion in the years 1991-95 to Z9 billion in the years 1996-2000. There will also be license fees for telecommunications services, whose value is estimated at approximately Z2 billion.

The basic strategic goal is to strengthen and transform the domestic telecommunications sector so that it will be competitive on the open telecommunications market. To achieve this, it is necessary to privatize the Polish Telecommunications [TP] SA. Three independent studies on the directions of TP SA privatization are to be ready by the end of the third quarter of the year.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

However, the TP SA will continue to have a monopoly on international telephone services. Long-distance domestic calls will gradually be handled by independent operators.

Poland: Walesa: U.S. Polonia Head's Letter on Jews 'Mistake'

WS3005105996 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 30 May 96 p 2

[Report by PAP, "AN" under the "Poland in Brief" rubric: "Walesa on Moskal"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The recent letter by Edward Moskal, chairman of the U.S. Polonia Congress, criticizing the Polish authorities for excessive yielding to the "Jewish lobby" was a "moral and political" mistake, said Lech Walesa during his current visit to the United States. Walesa met with Moskal at the Holy Trinity Church in Chicago on Sunday [26 May]. On behalf of the former president, [former Presidential Spokesman] Marek Karpinski submitted a statement on the letter Moskal wrote to Aleksander Kwasniewski. "Lech Walesa believes that the letter was a mistake on two counts—moral and political," Karpinski stated.

Poland: Defense Commission Head on Hellfire Missiles Issue

WS2905133196 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 29 May 96 p 3

[Article by Krzysztof Kaszynski and Jacek Podgorski: "A Hell of an Alternative; Rockwell Lost in Australia, the United States, and Poland"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The U.S. company has several thousand Hellfire missiles stored in its warehouses in Atlanta. It went as far as to exert pressure on Polish authorities in order to sell them to our Armed Forces. Competitors from Israel were advised that modern technologies could not be admitted to Poland.*

In the course of talks with representatives of the Polish Defense Ministry [MON], the Rockwell delegation even suggested that the rejection of their Hellfire missiles might affect Poland's entry into NATO.

"I confirm. This issue was also raised during the talks I held with U.S. diplomats. I would prefer to say these were suggestions rather than pressure from the U.S. side," says Chairman of the Sejm Defense Commission Jerzy Szmajdzinski. "Did our membership in NATO ever depend on that decision?"

"Perhaps it did not get that far. The talks pertained to strategic partnership. We stressed our recognition of the role the United States plays and our desire to cooperate with that country in all fields. Cooperation, however, must account for our interests as well. As far as the bid is concerned, it is in our interest to introduce the most modern technologies to Poland as well as to produce and export subunits," Szmajdzinski replied.

$500-Million Deal

The bid for modernizing the Huzar combat helicopter and equipping it with antitank missiles began in October 1993. MON invited several renowned international firms to take part. Preliminary offers were submitted by March 1994, and three consortia were established for the purpose of this project: an Israeli one with Lockheed-Martin, a French one headed by Thomson, and a Swedish-U.S. one with SAAB and Rockwell. In November 1995, Deputy Industry Minister Roman Czerwinski sent a letter to all three, in which he informed them that, by 10 December 1995 at the latest, all of those interested must submit exhaustive offers. The only offer that was submitted on time was from the Israelis, for the NT-D missile. Interestingly enough, the decision to gived Poland access to modern technology was made in 1994 by the late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin.

Missile Reconnaissance and Failures

Rockwell did not give up even after the deadline for submitting offers had elapsed. It not only pressured the Polish authorities, but also tried to persuade the Israeli competition that it would not be good to have top-quality world technology reach Central Europe just yet.

The U.S. firm has recently suffered a number of failures in serious missile bids. It lost with the Israeli Raphael in a bid invited by the Austrian [as published] Air Force for the purchase of a long-range air-to-ground missile. Rockwell also lost a bid invited by the Pentagon for the implementation of the Longbow Hellfire project, namely for an antitank missile guided by a millimeter radar [radar milimetrowy]. The products of a consortium formed by the U.S.-based companies Lockheed Martin and Westinghouse were chosen instead.

Hellish Fire for Sale

According to reports from April 1996, the U.S. company is considering selling its military division for $3 billion. Boeing and McDonnell Douglas are mentioned among potential purchasers. Rockwell is currently stocking several thousand Hellfire missiles at its plant in Atlanta.

"I consider the issue of the antitank missiles closed," says Jerzy Szmajdzinski. "All we needed was an opinion from the Office for Public Orders claiming that the rules of the bid had not been violated. From what I know, such an opinion is ready, and it states that the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

law was not violated in any way. Final decisions on signing the proper agreements are to be made before the end of June," adds the chairman of the Sejm Defense Commission.

Poland: Activities of Organized Criminal Groups Outlined

WS2905110496 Warsaw SZTANDAR in Polish 27 May 96 p 5

[Report by "AK": "The Police Claim That Some 300 Criminal Groups Operate in Poland. The Turf War Is Over"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to police estimates, Polish criminal groups comprise over 4,000 people. Unofficially, it is said that they concentrate several tens of thousands of people.

The police claim that some 300 criminal groups operate in Poland, mainly in large cities. For example, three gangs—from Pruszkow, Wolomin, and Nadarzyn—dominate the criminal market in Warsaw Voivodship. The gang from the Warsaw suburb of Pruszkow has the longest—over 30 years—tradition, and so does the Szczecin group because of the territory on which it operates.

The turf war among gangs is probably over in Poland. Only local squabbles are currently occurring. For example, the Pruszkow group had to go to Sopot because local gangsters came for a payoff to their restaurant located near the pier.

To put it briefly, Polish organized criminal groups deal with everything that brings in profit, mostly theft, contraband, and legalization and sales of cars stolen in the West. The groups from Szczecin, Warsaw, and Poland hold the lead here.

—drug trafficking. Gdansk, Gdynia, Sopot, Szczecin, Warsaw, and Krakow dominate here;

—contraband of electronic equipment and computer parts (Szczecin, Lublin, Lodz, and Warsaw);

—contraband and sales of liquor and cigarettes purchased or stolen mostly in Germany and France (Warsaw, Szczecin, Gdansk, Gdynia, Sopot, Katowice, Lodz, Lublin, and Przemysl);

—"white slavery" (delivering women to West European brothels, usually against their will), which is mostly done by gangsters from the seacoast, western border cities, and Silesia;

—forgery, mostly of excise stamps (Warsaw);

—extortion from agencies employing prostitutes, shops, and restaurants, and debt-collection enforcement (Warsaw, Gdansk, Gdynia, Sopot).

Gangs also run liquor bottling plants but on a smaller scale because the police have recently seriously tackled this area of illegal activities. A few trucks of smuggled spirits have been impounded.

During the past few years, gangsters have been trying to switch to "clean" businesses. With the help of legal firms, they launder so-called dirty money resulting from crimes.

For two or three years, money laundering in Poland has been an area of operations for foreigners—mobs from the former USSR and Asia. According to our interlocutor from the economic police, eastern gangsters smuggle money earned in Poland or transfer it through banks to avoid paying income tax.

Polish gang connections with Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus concern mostly contraband of cars and drugs.

In addition to shipments of cars and drugs, cooperation between Poles and western gangs, predominantly from Germany and the Netherlands, concern "white slavery." Over the past few years, this type of dealing has increased 20-fold. Last year the police recorded that mobsters either shipped or tried to ship almost 500,000 women [as published] to the West.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Romania: Defense Minister To Visit Peacekeepers in Bosnia

AU2905180996 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1600 GMT 29 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Tomorrow and Friday, Romanian National Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca will inspect the Romanian sappers battalion, which is deployed as part of the IFOR [Implementation Force] mission near Zenica in Bosnia.

On that occasion, the Romanian defense minister will meet with Admiral Leighton Smith, IFOR commander, and General Michael Walker, commander of the allied rapid reaction corps, as well as officials and representatives of the local administration, reports our correspondent.

During the talks, they will broach various aspects of the current political-military situation in Europe, Romania's participation in the Partnership for Peace program, the human, material, and financial efforts made by our country within the IFOR mission, and its readiness to continue participating in that mission.

Minister Tinca will examine the current stage of the Romanian battalion's cooperation with the multinational peacekeeping force, as well as the the Romanian battalion's objective in the Gorazde-Sarajevo corridor.

On Friday, the Romanian military delegation will attend a ceremony to inaugruate the Doboj bridge.

Romania: Senate Head Reiterates Country's Wish To Join EU

AU2905200696 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1600 GMT 29 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The EU-Romania joint parliamentary commission session opened in Bucharest this afternoon.

The opening speech was made by Senate President Oliviu Gherman, who briefly summarized the history of our country's relations with the European community and said that these ties date back to 1969, when negotiations began on several accords for the exchange of goods. All this shows that, despite unfavorable circumstances, Romania has managed to prove its European vocation, as well as the fact that it belongs to this spiritual space.

Terming it a fundamental aspect of Romanian foreign policy, Mr. Gherman reiterated Romania's desire for European integration and highlighted the significance of the existing consensus regarding the national strategy to prepare for Romania's membership in the EU, the elaboration of which, in July 1995, was joined by representatives of the government, representatives of all the political forces represented in Parliament, university staff, and numerous experts.

The same ideas were formulated in the message addressed by Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu to the delegates attending the session of the EU-Romania Joint Parliamentary Commission. The message was presented by Gheorghi Prisacaru, head of the European Integration Department.

In his speech, Mr. Giuseppe de Michelis di Slonghello, Italian ambassador in Bucharest and representative of the incumbent EU presidency, referred, among other things, to the historic reconciliation between Romania and Hungary. The Italian dignitary stated that the Romania-EU Joint Association Council recommends that this issue should be resolved and that the basic treaty with Hungary should be signed as soon as possible.

In turn, Mrs. Karen Fogg, the Bucharest representative of the European Commission, highlighted the Romanian public's support of the government's strategy to prepare for the country's entry into the EU, reports our correspondent, Gabi Benescu.

Romania: Uruguayan President Arrives on Official Visit

AU2905195896 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1900 GMT 29 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] This evening, Uruguayan President Jiulio-Maria Sanguinetti arrived on an official visit to Bucharest at the invitation of Romanian President Ion Iliescu. The guest was met at the airport by an honor delegation led by State Secretary Dan Mircea Popescu. The official reception will be held tomorrow morning at Cotroceni Palace.

According to our correspondent, in addition to talks between the two heads of state, the schedule also includes meetings of the Uruguayan guest with the president of the Romanian Senate, the prime minister, and members of the parliament foreign policy panels.

They will also sign official bilateral documents during the visit.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Romania: Bucharest Poll Shows CDR's Ciorbea Leading Nastase

AU2905215596 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 23 May 96 p 3

[Unattributed report: "IMAS Poll: Victor Ciorbea Ahead of Ilie Nastase in Race for Bucharest General Mayoralty"]

[FBIS Translated Text] IMAS [Marketing and Public Opinion Polling Institute] conducted a poll 5-14 May among a representative sample of 909 individuals. They used the aleatory and stratified sample model of the people residing in all six districts of Bucharest. This sample is representative of eligible voters in Bucharest. The ratio of the polled persons is statistically equivalent to the population of the capital city in terms of gender, age, and education. The margin of error is plus or minus 3.3 percent. The questionnaires were filled out in respondents' homes by means of direct interview.

The Intent To Vote

If the mayoral elections were to be held next Sunday, would you go to the polls?	
	Percent
I certainly would	76.0
I probably would	11.4
I probably would not	3.2
I certainly would not	9.1
No answer	0.2
TOTAL	100.0

Previous elections have shown that actual presence at the ballot boxes is always lower than the figures indicated in polls. We assess that voter presence in the first ballot of the local elections will be 76 percent (the proportion of those who declare they will surely go,) but it is certain that more than the half of the people entitled to vote will show up, which means that the 2 June ballot will be valid from this point of view.

Assuming that you do vote, who will you vote for?	
	Percent
Victor Ciorbea	35.4
Ilie Nastase	32.8
Anton Vatasescu	11.8
Doru Viorel Ursu	8.5
Dinu Patriciu	4.5
Mihai Erbasu	2.7
Ion I. Bratianu	2.3
Alexandru Athanasiu	0.3
A different candidate	1.7

Social-Demographic Profile of the Voters Supporting the Principal Candidates

Generally speaking, the social-demographic features that differentiate voters who favor Victor Ciorbea [candidate running for the opposition Democratic Convention of Romania—CDR] from those who favor Ilie Nastase [running on behalf of the ruling Social Democracy Party of Romania—PDSR] are identical to those already known between the electorates of the CDR and the PDSR. The statistically significant factors resulting from the poll are as follows:

—Voters favoring Victor Ciorbea are more educated than supporters of Ilie Nastase: 48.5 percent of those who favor Ciorbea have attended at least postgraduate courses, which is true of only 27.5 percent of those who support Ilie Nastase.

—Ciorbea is favored more by students (6 percent as opposed to 3 percent for Nastase) and by university graduate experts (18 percent as opposed to 8 percent.)

—Nastase is favored by trained workers (22 percent as opposed to 13 percent.)

—Retired people tend not to vote.

—Most female voters favor Nastase (they represent 55 percent of the electorate favoring him,) while most male voters favor Ciorbea (52 percent of his electorate).

—The majority of voters who do not intend to vote or who have not made up their minds who to vote for are among the poorest people: 38 percent of them say their "family income is insufficient even for bare necesities," an assessment made by only 25 percent of those who intend to vote.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Which of the CDR member parties do you like most?	
	Percent
PNTCD [National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party]	23.7
PNL [National Liberal Party]	4.8
PER [Romanian Ecologist Party]	0.6
PNL-CD [National Liberal Party-Democratic Convention]	0.6
A party outside the CDR	0.6
A party that has left the CDR	0.3
No answer	4.1

What is your general political preference?	
	Percent
CDR	34.5
PDSR	13.1
USD [Social-Democratic Union]	7.9
PRM [Greater Romania Party]	3.7
A different party	11.4
I am not interested in politics	19.7
No answer	9.7

In the chart representing the political preferences of the electorate favoring "a different party," we included all the parties favored by less than 3 percent of the voters: MER [Romanian Ecologist Movement], 2.3 percent; PAC [Civic Alliance Party], 1.9 percent; PDAR [Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania], 1.3 percent; PL '93 [Liberal Party '93], 2.2 percent; PS [Socialist Party], 0.7 percent; PSM [Socialist Party of Labor], 1.5 percent; and PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party], 1.0 percent.

Romania: PDSR's Nastase Calls For Tolerance Toward Minorities

AU2905181396 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 27 May 96 p 23

[Article by Lucian Purcareanu: "Adrian Nastase Launched a Message of Tolerance Toward Minorities While Touring Transylvania"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The electoral caravan of the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] rolled through Oradea and Arad at the end of last week. In Oradea, economist Gheorghe Tataru was appointed the ruling party's candidate for the position of mayor. During a meeting with the voters, the latter presented his platform, which includes constructing a highway around the city, modernizing markets, introducing methane gas, and building a university campus. PDSR Executive President Adrian Nastase told his supporters that the PDSR will distance itself from the extremist actions of the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR] and the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR]. He said that "the time has come for the PDSR to assume the mission of tolerance toward minorities." He said that the ruling party is thus coming forward with a balanced idea, devoid of any extremist exaggerations. Adrian Nastase criticized the UDMR's autonomy projects, characterizing them as incomprehensible . "We have two solutions: Either we shoot all the Hungarians in the country, or we reach an understanding with them under normal circumstances. Of course, we support the second variant," the PDSR leader concluded.

At the end of the same visit, the delegation led by Adrian Nastase also participated in the meeting of support for Ban Octavian, the PDSR candidate for the position of mayor of Arad. The PDSR executive president noted that the party organizations in Transylvania have begun to have a life of their own and have managed to double their membership in recent months. "I am convinced that the results in the local elections will be very good," Adrian Nastase added.

Romania: Constantinescu Opposes Separate Elections

AU2905162996 Bucharest ZIUA in Romanian 23 May 96 p 1

[Note by L.I.ZZ: "Emil Constantinescu Is Afraid To Fight Alone Against Iliescu and Roman"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In a restricted circle of leaders of the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR], CDR President Emil Constantinescu vehemently chided the leadership of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party [PNTCD] for its initiative to ask for the separation of the presidential and parliamentary elections, sources from within the CDR told us. Constantinescu expressed his worry about the possibility of a direct confrontation with Ion Iliescu and Petre Roman, without the backing of the CDR engine, the same sources report.

PNTCD leader Ion Diaconescu had asked that the presidential elections take place in the fall and the parliamentary elections in early 1997.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Romania: UDMR To Support CDR Candidate for Cluj Mayoralty

AU2905133196 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 27 May 96 p 3

[Article by Virgil Lazar: "The Solution Against Cultural Barbarism, Primitivism, Xenophobia, and Extremism"]

[FBIS Translated Text] During an impressive electoral meeting—from the viewpoint of its prevailing atmosphere and attendance—the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] decided last Saturday to support the candidacy of Radu Sarbu of the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR] in local elections for the position of mayor of Cluj-Napoca Municipality. The top leaders of that organization—Bishop Laszlo Tokes, UDMR honorary president; UDMR President Bela Marko; and UDMR Executive President Csaba Takacs—participated in and addressed the rally. Bishop Laszlo Tokes's speech was extremely balanced. He said, among other things, that he holds the Romanian people and culture in very great regard and urged the Hungarian inhabitants of Cluj to actively cooperate with the Romanian population to combat extremist nationalism, revisionism, and interethnic aggression. He also called for tolerance and understanding. The decision to support CDR candidate Radu Sarbu was greeted with applause.

Lajos Molnos, president of the Cluj County UDMR organization, said: "The main goal of the UDMR county organization in the local elections is to change the current nationalist, extremist, dilettante, and submediocre mayor, who in the last four years has done incalculable moral and cultural damage to our city. We cannot imagine that cultural barbarism, primitivism, xenophobia, and extremism should reign supreme in Transylvania's spiritual capital for the next four years. Our aim is to further increase our representation in the municipal and county councils, thus ensuring that the opposition has a majority in the respective councils. After a careful analysis of all available data and information, we noted that the CDR candidate, Mr. Radu Sarbu, is the only candidate with a real chance of winning the elections, who has a program that—through its provisions to ensure the city's prosperity and peace—is the closest to our wishes. Therefore, the UDMR will support the CDR mayoral candidate in Cluj. We are convinced that we made a good decision, and we hope that all the city's inhabitants who want peace, quiet, and a civilized environment will vote for the CDR candidate, Radu Sarbu."

In conclusion, lawyer Peter Eckstein-Kovacs, Cluj municipal councillor, explained in detail how useful the cooperation with the CDR representatives in the local council had been, something that often managed to hamper the political, populist, and demagogic actions of current Mayor Gheorghe Funar.

Romania: CDR Candidate Complains About Election Tactics

AU3005133696 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 28 May 96 p 2

[Interview with Radu Sarbu, candidate of the Democratic Convention of Romania for the office of Cluj City mayor, by an unidentified ROMANIA LIBERA reporter; place and date not given: "The Cultural Center of Transylvania Has Become, Due to the Funar Administration, the Subject of Jokes"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Reporter] What is your opinion on the current election campaign? How is it progressing?

[Sarbu] For several reasons, I have a poor opinion of it, first because it is hardly progressing at all. Mr. Funar did his utmost to delay the placement of the advertising boards and the lottery assigning places to the parties. What is more, he completed the drawing three weeks ago but numbered the boards only later. Aside from this, in Cluj each party is entitled to advertise on half of those boards (that is, on about 1.5 square meters,) but it is forbidden to display more than three posters of 30x50 cm each. All our posters were torn down within 24 hours. Furthermore, the local [public] television and radio stations did not allot air time to us until 16 May. The private stations are very expensive, and we have very little money. I am disappointed by how few sponsors we have and how few people donate money. Our financial resources are 20 to 50 times lower than those of the PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party]. We, the electoral command, as well as our candidates, work a great deal, but as we do not have money to gain access to the media, it is very difficult for us to reach the voters.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Federal

FRY: Milutinovic, Primakov Sign Cooperation Protocol

LD2905203196 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1933 GMT 29 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 29 May (TANJUG)—This evening Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic and Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov signed a protocol on cooperation between the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry and the Russian Federation's Foreign Ministry.

Speaking to journalists after the signing of the protocol, the two ministers stressed that their talks today were meaningful, friendly, and important for future relations between the two friendly countries.

The Russian foreign minister, who arrived today on a two-day official visit to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, had a meeting with Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic before the signing of the protocol.

FRY: Statement on Milutinovic Talks With Russian FM

LD2905201896 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1843 GMT 29 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 29 May (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic had talks today with Russian Federation Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov who is paying an official visit to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY].

In open and friendly talks, the two ministers exchanged views on the most important issues of developing bilateral cooperation, on priorities in economic cooperation, on the current development of the peace process, and on relations in the Balkans and in Europe.

The development of overall relations and cooperation between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Russian Federation were assessed as positive; these relations are being developed on the basis of friendship, equality, mutual respect, and interests.

Both sides concluded that these relations have good prospects, to which the two countries will pay particular attention. They also expressed pleasure with the continuity of the political dialogue and stressed the need for its further intensification.

Particular attention was paid to economic development between the two counties. The Russian Federation, with its rich and positive experience, has been and will remain one of the most important economic partners of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The two ministers welcomed the establishment of direct contacts between business partners in the conditions of a free market economy, which will be further encouraged by the two sides finalizing the legal bases for and removing administrative and other obstacles to the free movement of goods, capital, and technology.

The issue was also raised of resolving more quickly the Russian partners' debt to Yugoslav enterprises from the previous period. It was also said that the resolution of this issue will contribute to the speedier realization of important mutual interests.

The ministers agreed that scientific and technical cooperation in the sphere of culture has reached an enviable level and pointed to the need for its quality and volume to be increased to the level appropriate for the traditional cultural, spiritual, and historical links and closeness of the people of the FRY and Russia.

Views were also exchanged on the situation in the Balkans and on international topics of mutual interest. The conclusion was reached that the Balkans is an integral and inalienable part of Europe and that the stability of irope was completely inseparable from peace and stability in the Balkans.

Cooperation so far between the two countries in the peace process and the removal of the consequences of the Yugoslav crisis was assessed as positive. It was said that the FRY has fully carried out all its obligations in accordance with the Dayton-Paris peace agreement.

The Russian side paid tribute to the FRY and to its leaders for their consistent policy of peace and their decisive contribution to the achievement of the Dayton-Paris agreement and its successful implementation so far. It supported the efforts being made to ensure that the FRY immediately take its rightful place in all international organizations and forums, starting with the United Nations and the OSCE, and including the IMF, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization.

Both sides agreed that the coming into being of the peace agreement for Bosnia is a precondition for lasting peace and stability in the area of the former Yugoslavia and in the Balkans. Both sides consider that the preparations for the elections in Bosnia are a top priority and that the holding of elections within the envisaged timetable is vital for the successful implementation of the peace agreement.

It was assessed that full and equal international treatment of the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat Federation in all aspects and all phases of the implementation of the peace agreement, including the process of renewal and reconstruction, is vital for the final success of the peace process.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

The beginning of the implementation of the Basic Agreement on the Srem-Baranja region was assessed as positive. Full support was expressed for the UN Transitional Administration in its consistent implementation of the agreement, and all its provisions and deadlines, including the provision on the duration of the transitional period.

The most important aim remains the guaranteeing of the full equality and security of all the inhabitants of the region, regardless of their nationality, including refugees from other parts of Croatia who have sought refuge there.

There was particular discussion of the exceptionally difficult problems of the 700,000 refugees in the FRY. The joint standpoint was reaffirmed concerning the need to pave the way for their voluntary and safe return and the energetic removal of all administrative and other artificial obstacles and restrictions. Tribute was paid to the Russian side for its humanitarian aid to refugees in the FRY.

Ministers Milutinovic and Primakov are to sign a protocol on cooperation between the FRY Foreign Ministry and the Russian Federation's Foreign Ministry.

FRY: Milutinovic Says Talks With Primakov 'Constructive'

AU2905202896 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 29 May 96

[Statements by FRY Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic and Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov in Belgrade on 29 May—recorded; Primakov speaks in Russian with superimposed translation into Serbo-Croatian]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Milutinovic] I would like to greet our esteemed guest. We started our talks today, and we will continue them this evening and tomorrow. The talks we have had have been quite constructive. All the more-important issues regarding our bilateral relations were on the agenda. Since this is the first official visit by a Russian foreign minister in some time, we hope that we will round off our bilateral relations at today's and tomorrow's talks and establish relations for better future cooperation.

We discussed the peace process in detail, and we agreed on a series of issues.

[Primakov] First of all, I would like to thank my colleague for inviting me to visit friendly Yugoslavia. As Minister Milutinovic said, we have already had significant talks. They were very open and friendly. We discussed many issues regarding our relations. There were also issues regarding the solution to the Yugoslav crisis. We agreed on the holding of the elections in Bosnia since they open the road to many positive changes, to the stabilization of the situation, to the complete lifting of the sanctions, and the creation of new conditions for the development of economy.

We will continue the talks tomorrow on issues that we judge are of interest to both sides.

FRY: Primakov Calls For Definitive Lifting of Sanctions

AU2905172096 Paris AFP in English 1705 GMT 29 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, May 29 (AFP)—Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov called Wednesday for the definitive lifting of sanctions against federal Yugoslavia, suspended last year following the signing of a Bosnian peace accord.

Primakov, who arrived for talks with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, said Moscow wanted to lift the threat of sanctions being reimposed if Belgrade was judged to be hampering implementation of the Bosnia peace agreement.

"The lifting of (the threat of) sanctions against Yugoslavia" and the "stabilisation of the situation" in the region were key Russian priorities, Primakov said.

UN sanctions against the rump Yugoslavia of Serbia and Montenegro were imposed in May 1992, but suspended last November in the wake of the Dayton peace accord which ended almost four years of war in Bosnia.

The meeting came ahead of a Geneva meeting Sunday between US Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic and his Croatian counterpart Franjo Tudjman.

FRY: Montenegrin President Holds Talks With Russia's FM

LD3005105196 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1002 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 30 May (Tanjug)—Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic, after talks with Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov, noted in particular the continuity and success of the dialogue and cooperation between Russia and the FRY.

"As part of overall relations between our two states we insist on cooperation and special positions for the Republic of Montenegro," Bulatovic said.

He added that besides recalling the long tradition of successful relations between the two countries, most attention in the talks was devoted to possible contributions in

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

terms of speeding up the realization of the peace process in Bosnia.

Bulatovic was particularly pleased to stress that "the Russian Federation would soon be opening a consulate in Podgorica."

Minister Primakov said that he was very satisfied with his meeting with the Montenegrin president. He said that in the talks he had pointed out that Russia favors the unity of Yugoslavia, although it also wishes to have good relations with the republics that make up the FRY.

He hoped that Montenegro would recover as soon as possible from the consequences of the sanctions, and he recalled the long tradition of relations between Russia and Montenegro.

FRY: Government Accuses Croatia of Holding Serb Prisoners

LD3005121896 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1010 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 30 May (SRNA)—The FRY Government has accused Croatia of still holding several hundred Serbs in prison, the commission for humanitarian issues and missing persons attached to the Yugoslav Government has announced.

"According to the Cooperation Agreement reached between the FRY and Croatia in Zagreb on 17 April, the two sides are obliged to release all POW's, but Croatia is crudely violating the Geneva Convention and the Dayton Agreement and is refusing to carry out its obligations," a statement says.

In this connection, the commission has decided to send a sharply worded protest to Croatia, in which it says that "the Yugoslav side has respected the agreement and released all prisoners who were in its prisons."

FRY: Status of Human Rights in Kosovo Defended

96BA0273A Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 17 Apr 96 p 1

[Article by Z. Zejneli: "The Press, Resettlement, and Religious Rights"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Pristina, 16 Apr—In connection with the report of Elizabeth Wren, special UN reporter on the state of human and minority rights on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, the federal government has issued a press release in which, concerning the assessments in the report, it expects the "special reporter" to base her activity on verified facts. One of the reasons for the reaction of the federal government was certainly that passage of the report which has to do with the issues of exercising human and minority rights in Kosovo and Metohija.

Only the facts can provide a real picture of the overall situation in Kosmet, and that is why they need to be mentioned once again.

It is a fact that Albanians have 98 percent of the trade in Kosmet in their hands. To achieve that, they had to obtain permits from the agencies of the Republic of Serbia, that is, the state which their political organizations and leaders do not recognize.

It is also a fact that members of the Albanian minority are the largest beneficiaries of the Pension Fund of the Republic of Serbia and also of the family supplement, which the Albanians do not renounce, although the money comes from the "regime of Serbia." Nor do the Albanians renounce services in the health area, and it is a fact that 95 percent of the patients in all hospitals in Kosmet are Albanians, and in addition they are being treated without payment just like all other citizens.

Members of the Albanian minority have been boycotting the educational sector, and they are working according to curricula of the nonexistent "republic." The readings which they study speak against Serbia and Yugoslavia. It is a fact that the government of Serbia is trying to find a solution so that Albanian pupils will return to their school desks. But it is also a fact that the Albanians do not recognize the Serbian language as the language of the state in which they live and exercise their rights, although Serbian is only one of the subjects which they have to learn, just as they study French, English, or German in school without any problem. It is also a fact that 98 percent of pupils belonging to the Albanian minority are attending class and no one is hindering them.

As to the comment that resettling refugees in Kosmet will change the demographic composition in Kosovo and Metohija, it is a fact that according to the last census more than a million Albanians lived in Kosmet, and there are only 12,000 displaced persons who have found asylum in Kosmet. The mere datum that every year 50,000 children are born in Kosmet, 99 percent of them Albanians and new inhabitants, states clearly that there is no danger of any change at all in the demographic composition in Kosmet.

After several years, the Albanians are saying that they do not have or they are being kept from having newspapers and magazines in their own language. In Kosmet, there are 25 newspapers in the Albanian language and one each in the Serbian, Turkish, and Gypsy languages.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Numerous examples can certainly be cited as to all the ways the Albanians are exercising their rights in the state which they do not recognize. Certainly there are definite problems, but these are not problems which cannot be surmounted, nor are these problems which ought to be of concern to the world organization. The reason for that is that all state organizations, including the FRY, are ready for cooperation with all institutions of the United Nations and with its special reporter. In this matter, however, the discussion must be with arguments, and it is a fact that 11 mosques have been built in Kosovo and Metohija in just the last two years, and the Albanians have been getting permits from the agencies of the Republic of Serbia for all those religious structures.

FRY: Milosevic Accused of Preparing War in Kosovo

96BA0279C Belgrade SRPSKA REC in Serbo-Croatian 6 May 96 pp 15-16

[Article by Milovan Brkic: "Milosevic's 'Lazar's Supper'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the eve of the Battle of Kosovo, so the story has come down to us, Emperor Lazar arranged a famous supper with his lords and military leaders during which decisions were made about "going into battle" and other tactical and technical matters of warfare.

In this confusing time in which over the last five years Serbia has lost all the battles thanks to its Emperor Lazar, President Slobodan Milosevic, a decisive battle for Kosovo is expected, which, there is no longer any doubt, we will lose for the last time, and that will be forever.

Such are the times.

Careful analysts of the policy of the Serbian Tyrant have detected strong preparations the regime is making to "strike Kosovo."

Obligations Under the Dayton Agreement

Since he was installed in power at the Eighth Meeting of the Serbian League of Communists (September 1987), with the policy "Serbia will be unified or it will not exist," Slobodan Milosevic has come closer and closer to the second part of his slogan.

Living always in a state of emergency, seeing enemies everywhere around him, waging war against everyone, against the whole world, against international economic and judicial institutions, against all the other republics and peoples, the Tyrant has brought Serbia to the gates of hell. It is now up to him to take that last decisive step. He is making intensive preparations for it.

In signing the Dayton Agreement Milosevic made it possible for the international community, through its military presence on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to prevent the regime in Belgrade, as an internationally recognized state, from taking part in further conduct of the war. He also tied the hands of the remainder of the Serbian segment of the population in Slavonia and made it possible for them to fight on behalf of the regime in Belgrade.

Of the goal "all Serbs in one state," all he has left is Serbia.

After so many years of evil done by its policy, the regime has confronted the obligations assumed in Dayton. There is no longer a war; the indicted Serbs must be remanded to the War Crimes Tribunal; human rights must be respected in Serbia, both those of the Serbs and also those of the ethnic minorities; and the question of Kosovo, its status, must be settled; police and media repression must be stopped; property, according to the obligation assumed, must be privatized; and the question of ownership must be regulated in the Constitution and law.

All of these matters, which sorely affect the regime in Belgrade, go against its basic political doctrine: For the present, it is known that cooperation with the Court in The Hague is being refused, domestic rights and freedoms are still being suppressed, there is no question of privatization, and as for Kosovo....

Peace has put the regime in Belgrade in a panic. Pensioners and metalworkers are demanding money from it, social tensions have risen to astounding proportions, the economy is in shambles, and all systems, starting with electric power, the roads, and the railroads, are in utter disarray. The Army has been decimated, broken up, humiliated. Serbia still has a strong police apparatus, but that strength is only apparent. Serbia has about 200,000 policemen under arms. Nowhere in the world since the beginning of organized states have there been that many policemen per capita.

With this domestic and foreign policy, the regime in Belgrade, which is tending toward preservation of communism, private property, and thought control, has come up against the open efforts of the Montenegrin leadership to extricate itself from Belgrade's fatal embrace.

Powerless to solve domestic economic problems, which are also disastrous for its foreign policy without support of the public, and under the terrible pressure of the international community to allow examination of his finances, the Tyrant is doing everything to take terrible

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

revenge on the people, "who do not deserve any more of his leadership."

One Country, Two Masters

In order to postpone his removal from power, the Tyrant wants to provoke new military conflicts, expecting postponement of his execution by the international community.

The president is harboring two basic hopes [line missing] ... the Malta Agreement between Gorbachev and Bush, for Serbia to belong to a "community of Orthodox peoples" with Bulgaria and Russia. This hope of Milosevic's is condemned to failure, because the prospects of Gennadiy Zyuganov becoming president in the upcoming elections in Russia are insignificant.

Milosevic sees the second hope which might help him to stay in power in a new war in which he once again would figure as the "strongman of the Balkans" and a new guarantor of the peace.

Milosevic's strategists are intensively preparing war in Kosovo and unrest in Montenegro.

Belgrade has planned in detail how it is going to bring down Milo Djukanovic, the Montenegrin prime minister who has managed to bring Montenegro closer to the world, to the centers of political and economic power, clearing the way for direct cooperation of international economic and military institutions with Podgorica, without Belgrade as an intermediary; it was his support which helped the governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia [NBJ] to give the regime in Belgrade a good slap in the face. The indictment for high treason and quite a few other crimes has already been written, and even the "evidence" has been prepared.

The "blue litmus" of events with Montenegro is the discontinuation of the broadcast of the Montenegrin television news on the Second Program of RTS [Radio-Television Serbia]. That is how it began with Croatia.

Detached to some extent from the Goebbels manner of poisoning the public, the Montenegrin news program disrupted the "unity of news and propaganda activity." Reprisal had to follow. The Montenegrin leadership, realizing "with whom it was dealing" and facing the impossibility of meeting the basic needs of its public, had to seek a way out of the blind alley. With this policy of complete privatization, it has jeopardized the ideological foundation of the Belgrade regime's policy. This brought about a paradoxical situation: one country, but two masters, two policies. A battle had to follow, there was no choice.

The regime in Belgrade is counting on the support of Seselj's Radicals (this old military provocateur has regularly been at Milosevic's side when people had to die), on the strong support of the Yugoslav Army, which has concentrated strong military units (the region of Montenegro is held by the Uzice Corps!), and on the support of Montenegrins who hold key positions in Belgrade.

The result of this conflict, aside from the high casualties, is well known: Montenegro will get full international assistance and will go its own way.

Nevertheless, the greatest drama is the one which will play out in Kosovo.

After the Pattern of Chechnya and Israel

Using the sentiments of citizens who were taught to look upon Kosovo as the cradle of the Serbian nation, the regime will turn its hungry citizens and their hunger and anger toward the regime in the direction of Kosovo. In addition to the powerful media propaganda, aid will come once again from Vojislav Seselj.

Why is a battle for Kosovo expected?

The international community is calling upon the regime in Belgrade to respect the agreement signed in Dayton and to guarantee autonomy and civil rights in Kosovo. In practice this means that the regime must pull out of Kosovo several tens of thousands of police, to open up the news media in Albanian, and even to liberate the Serbs imprisoned in Kosovo. If it does that, the regime in Belgrade gets almost two million enemies and more than a million of them who will not vote for him. But what use has the Tyrant of territory where his opponents live, where those who will not vote for him live, whom he cannot pressure, cannot indoctrinate, and cannot rob? This is the main and vital question to which the Tyrant (every tyrant) finds a simple answer: Either keep them in captivity if you can, and as long as you can, or cut them loose. There is no other choice for the Tyrant. It is really difficult to suppose that the Tyrant, after so much evil inflicted on Kosovo, can overnight, even under the strong pressure of public opinion and the international community, allow Kosovo to become a free and autonomous part of Serbia in which human rights would mean something.

While he is preparing war in Kosovo, Milosevic, say those who are quite well-informed about his intentions, is mindful of the war in Chechnya and Israel's war in Lebanon. On the excuse that this is "Russia's internal affair," [Boris] Yeltsin has obtained tacit consent of the international community "to straighten out things in his own backyard," just like Israel, to which the United States gave clear support for it to combat "the terrorists" of Hamas. Milosevic intends to use those two cases for a decisive battle in Kosovo.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

In preparing the war in Kosovo, the Tyrant has in mind that this is a part of the territory of Serbia and he restored Serbian Krajina to the legal state of Croatia, and he concludes from that that the world community must recognize his right to do this. If it considered the Serbs in Krajina to be rebels, Milosevic figures, the Albanians in Kosovo must have the same status. But....

Just like all the others, this policy of Milosevic's is also condemned to failure.

Activation of the Old Provocateurs

By creating tension in Kosovo, with increasingly frequent murders with an ethnic basis, Milosevic, first, gives that necessary thrust toward ethnic homogenization on both sides. And this also justifies the stronger presence of the police in Kosovo and postponement of dialogue with the Albanians. He continues to think that Comrade Zyuganov will in June be the top man in Russia. The entire policy of the regime in Belgrade has always been based on the ideological hope of the tyrant that the Communists will (soon) return to the world scene. In that case, Kosovo would be under his paw and his iron boot.

Every death in Kosovo is a great joy to the Tyrant. Death is the basis of his rule. If war flared up in Kosovo, Milosevic believes that its internationalization might draw Macedonia, Albania, and Greece into the conflict, and then again he would "have the status of a strongman" as negotiator.

It is realistic to expect that the conflict in Kosovo cannot be internationalized. Albania will not be drawn into the conflict, nor will Macedonia, and even Macedonia, which has the United States for a patron, will not be taken in by Milosevic's provocation.

Milosevic's old provocateurs and sowers of senselessness and death are being activated in Kosovo at this very time.

Because Gennadiy Zyuganov still has not been elected, and China is still very far away, and its ally and friend Greece has finally come to its senses and decided to "get Belgrade back for the act of recognizing Macedonia," for the present Milosevic is merely creating the atmosphere in Kosovo for a general conflict.

It is interesting that in keeping with the tested formula, the regime and the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] are reacting mildly and with restraint to the provocations in Kosovo, hoping in any case to conceal their intentions and plans. Their barking is done instead by the duty barking dogs, the band of Vojislav Seselj, which is shouting for war for "holy Kosovo." This group of deranged provocateurs will once again play their roles. In the same way they appealed to us for a war for Krajina and holy Serbian land in Bosnia.

The strong concentration of activities of the Serbian MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and Army services confirms the ominous suspicions that war in Kosovo is inevitable and therefore also Kosovo's final departure from Serbia. Facing the evil which will befall Kosovo, the death of several thousand people, perhaps even 100,000, and the refugee Serbs from Kosovo, this province will end up completely ethnically pure and outside control of the regime in Belgrade. The international community will take over this brutally occupied territory as a protectorate, and the plans along that line have been drawn up. This will be yet another bloody battle lost by Slobodan Milosevic.

In the negotiations which representatives of the international community have been conducting intensively these past days with the legitimate representatives of the Albanians in Kosovo, they are being advised to restrain entirely from being provoked by the Serbian regime, taking the human casualties in a dignified way. This explains the striking restraint in the assessments of the Albanian leadership and of all the parties in Kosovo. In the "period of neither war nor peace" in Kosovo, parties and various political commitments have emerged among Albanians. The regime in Belgrade will once again achieve a strong homogenization of the Albanians. And the objective of all of this is to separate them from Belgrade for centuries and centuries.

Into a War Without Opposition

In the battle in Kosovo, the regime plans to use chemical warfare and nerve gases, to shut off the PTT [postal, telephone, and telegraph] system, to shut off the electric power and water systems, to curtail the food supply, and to open the border to Macedonia and Albania so that the Albanians move to those states.

War on a territory with such a homogenized population is lost in advance. The Serbian Tyrant and his war strategists know that. But the blood of evil flows in their veins, and they must satisfy their bloodthirsty passions. The death of 100,000 people is a great inspiration to them. Large quantities of food, blankets, and consumer goods have been set aside from commodity reserves for the Serbs who are to flee "from their age-old hearths." Reception centers and a true "backup position" have been concentrated in the border zone with Kosovo. Minefields are being laid over the entire territory, with "explosive centers" which are activated by remote control and cause destructive explosions and create panic in the public.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

In the war which he will start the Tyrant will easily get rid of the grumbler Dragoslav Avramovic, governor of the NBJ, money will be printed, the budget will be approved, and in wartime, as a rule, there is nothing for the opposition to demand.

And when he loses the war, Milosevic will sign the truce, Kosovo will be behind us, and he, at least so he imagines it, will again be seen as a peacemaker. Do we have to go with him to the very bitter end?

On the eve of the Battle of Kosovo, which he lost, Emperor Lazar arranged a supper for the lords.... What the Tyrant has decided in some supper of his own with his tutors and intends to do in Kosovo will soon be evident.

Serbia

Serbia: Belgrade Defends Cooperation With War Crimes Tribunal

AU2905154996 Paris AFP in English 1539 GMT 29 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, May 29 (AFP)—The Yugoslav government insisted on Wednesday that it was cooperating with the international war crimes tribunal in The Hague, while at the same time accusing the tribunal of bias.

On Tuesday, the UN Security Council issued a statement saying that it "deeply deplored" Belgrade's continued refusal to cooperate with the tribunal, which it said was unjustified.

But Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic told a press conference that this was not the case.

"Yugoslavia is cooperating with the tribunal even though we believe that, up to now, the tribunal has not been treating all the parties involved in the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia equally," he said.

Kontic said that the tribunal had ignored seven reports submitted by his government detailing war crimes committed against Serbs, and that in civil wars all sides broke the rules of war and of humanitarian conduct.

He said that last week's visit to Belgrade by Bosnian Serb commander Ratko Mladic, indicted for genocide and crimes against humanity, was an isolated case.

The tribunal had protested that Mladic was not arrested by the authorities.

The incident "should not cast doubt on the question of our overall cooperation with the tribunal," Kontic said.

He recalled that, earlier this month, Belgrade authorised the setting-up of a tribunal office in Belgrade of which the head would have diplomatic immunity.

Serbia: SPS Leader Praises Milosevic's Policy on Kosovo

AU2905142696 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 26 May 96 p 6

[Unattributed report: "Kosovo—Milosevic's Greatest Success"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Since the establishment of the new constitutional system in Serbia significant achievements have been made in strengthening the functions of all the bodies in Kosovo and Metohija and in creating conditions for an equal dialogue and a peaceful solution to all the current issues, said Tomica Raicevic, member of the Executive Committee of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS].

"This is doubtless one of the greatest successes of the consistent policy of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and the SPS," Raicevic said at the session of the regional SPS Executive Committee in Pristina.

He stressed that the current constitutional system enables the members of all nations and ethnic groups that live in Kosmet to enjoy equal rights in deciding on their own future, but also obliges them equally to defend and respect all the rules of that democratic order.

"Unfortunately, this has not eliminated completely all the attempts at manipulating with Kosmet and the fate of the people living there. We are still facing attempts at instrumentalizing Kosmet in an inappropriate, irresponsible, and unprincipled way, and there are two reasons for that," Raicevic said.

"Our lasting commitment is to solve all possible disputes through a dialogue of equals with full respect for the legitimate rights of the members of all the nations and ethnic groups. The SPS promotes the further strengthening of the democratic process, democratic constitutionalit,y and order in Kosmet. We are convinced that this will open up long-term prospects for peace and equal coexistence of all the peoples in this region," Raicevic said.

Montenegro

Montenegro: Djukanovic Views Republic's Status in FRY

AU3005105196 Belgrade BORBA in English 29 May 96 p 13

[Unattributed report: "Montenegro's Interest Is To Remain in Yugoslavia"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Milocer—The Montenegrin premier said on Sunday it was of political and vital

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

interest to the republic to remain in Yugoslavia, regardless of certain objective or momentary differences with Serbia.

Speaking to journalists assembled for the annual May convention, which this year includes 30 journalists from abroad, Milo Djukanovic said the political forces calling for Montenegro's secession from Yugoslavia would win no more than 15-17 percent of the votes at the elections, as they did in 1992.

Replying to a comment by an Austrian journalist that Serbia and Montenegro held different views on privatization, Djukanovic said there was "no universal model of privatization."

He said what was acceptable to one republic need not necessarily be acceptable to the other. He added, however, that "this cannot be the cause for a rift between the republics."

Speaking about democratization in Montenegro, Djukanovic said it was important to further develop parliamentary democracy, improve the work of state organs and institutions, and apply the principle of the freedom of the press.

The Montenegrin Premier said the situation in ex-Yugoslavia was calming down, but the international community should redouble its efforts to expedite the enforcement of the civilian side of the Dayton Peace Accords.

Yugoslavia has consistently fulfilled the obligations assumed under the Dayton accord and no one seriously considers reimposing sanctions on Yugoslavia, Milo Djukanovic told.

"Unfortunately, speculations on reimposing the sanctions on Yugoslavia and the distorted image of us in the media discourage any intensive influx of foreign capital which we need to recover from the sanctions and to develop," Djukanovic told journalists in the seaside resort of Milocer.

The question of continuity, on which Yugoslavia insists, should not hinder its inclusion in international financial and other institutions, said Djukanovic, describing this as an "important and complex question."

He said the economic aspect of the question of continuity was, "resolved in 1992 with the acceptance and agreement on succession."

Speaking of the stand on the legal and political aspects of the problem, he said "we (Serbia and Montenegro) are the founders of the Former Yugoslavia and believe we have the right to a seat in the United Nations," just as Russia had with regard to the former Soviet Union.

"This is the legal interpretation but, unfortunately, due to the negative stand of the U.S. representative in the United Nations, the issue is outstanding. However, this is no reason not to regulate relations with the former Yugoslav republics and the world," said Djukanovic.

Djukanovic said the condition for Yugoslavia normalizing relations with Croatia was the settlement of the status of the Prevlaka Peninsula, a strategically important spot for both states, where UN peacekeepers are deployed.

Croatian president Franjo Tudjman agreed in Dayton, Ohio, to accede Prevlaka to Yugoslavia, with certain territorial compensations, and to allow the Bosnian Serb entity of Republika Srpska access to the sea, but "apparently had to abandon the agreement" owing to internal tensions.

Djukanovic said Montenegro and Yugoslavia would continue to seek solutions to the question of Prevlaka peacefully, including international arbitration.

Commenting on the Balkan Ministerial Meeting in Sofia next week, Djukanovic said it was "time the Balkans attained majority," without outside interference in resolving problems.

Djukanovic said priorities in foreign policy included relations with neighbors, developing good cooperation with Italy and Albania, and fully normalizing relations with the new states in the former Yugoslavia.

Djukanovic underlined the significance of relations with the European Union and the United States, adding that "these are leading world powers with potential investors" and that "contacts were necessary to amend the tarnished image of us projected by the media crusade we had lost."

Montenegro: PM Blames Failure To Arrest Mladic on 'Negligence'

AU2905141596 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 27 May 96 p 2

[Article by B. Plamenac: "General Mladic in Belgrade Due to State Officials' Negligence"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Budva—Yesterday, as part of a three-day visit by a group of foreign journalists to Montenegro, a press conference with Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic was prepared for them at the Hotel Maestral in Budva. After the prime minister had delivered an introductory address, in which he stressed all the essential characteristics of the political and economic situation in Montenegro, the visiting foreign journalists asked numerous questions,

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

most of which concerned General Mladic's recent sojourn in Belgrade. Journalists from the French weekly L'HUMANITE wanted to know why nothing had been done to arrest General Mladic when he arrived to attend General Djukic's funeral. Prime Minister Djukanovic stressed that the question had not been asked in the right place, but repeated the already known stance that the international public should not be biased, and should stop looking for war criminals among only one party to the war in the former Yugoslavia.

As far as General Mladic is concerned, I wish to say that the FRY's policy does not allow indicted war criminals to enter the territory of the federal state. However, we do not conduct a policy of rigid police control or a police state. It is probable that negligence on the part of the FRY's state bodies, caused by the situation surrounding the burial of a general, made it possible for General Mladic to appear at the funeral, and there is no need to come to grave conclusions regarding the FRY's stance toward the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague, Milo Djukanovic said.

In response to several questions regarding the final agreement reached in Dayton on the Prevlaka issue, Prime Minister Djukanovic stressed that a tripartite exchange of territory had been agreed in Dayton. Prevlaka was to remain in Montenegro, and the Serb Republic was to have access to the sea, but unfortunately, owing to internal political tensions in Croatia, President Franjo Tudjman failed to honor the agreement. A correspondent for the Italian paper CORRIERE DELLA SERA asked: "How can you persuade foreign investors to invest in your economic development if there is a risk of sanctions being reintroduced for your country, if the part of the Dayton agreement pertaining to the extradition of indicted war criminals is not observed?" Prime Minister Djukanovic expressed his conviction that the federal state would honor all its obligations. [passage omitted]

[Box, p 2]

Serbia Wants Privatization

In response to a question asked by an Austrian correspondent as to whether there will be a rift between Serbia and Montenegro over different stances regarding privatization, Mr. Djukanovic said that so far none of the Serbian officials had opposed privatization.

"There can be no talk of Montenegro wanting privatization and Serbia opposing it. The process has started in Serbia, although it would have been better if it had started five years ago, which is the case in Montenegro," Djukanovic stressed.

Montenegro: Commentary Says Karadzic Has Become 'Stronger'

AU3005105096 Podgorica MONITOR in Serbo-Croatian 24 May 96 pp 21-22

[Commentary by Perica Vucinic of the Alternative Information Network: "Stronger Than He Used To Be"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The exciting episode that started with the replacement of the Serb Republic [RS] Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic and went on with the "self-divestment of power" by RS President Radovan Karadzic has already finished. The question of why the Serb and international political factors are wary of admitting that fact belongs to the sphere of political honesty and the strength of political wisdom.

Let us recall. On 15 May, RS President Radovan Karadzic "relieves of duty" Prime Minister Kasagic; official Belgrade and representatives of the international community deem the "release" illegitimate; already on 16 May, the released prime minister has a meeting with Carl Bildt, high representative of the international community for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, who consider his replacement to be illegitimate; on 17 May, RS Assembly Speaker Momcilo Krajisnik was seen visiting Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic; the next day, the RS Assembly decided that Kasagic should be replaced, which he accepts. The new prime minister designate is Gojko Klickovic.

In the middle of the tempest in which the already former RS prime minister Kasagic, from "Mr. Nobody," as Brussels diplomats called him, within one day became "Mr. Somebody," Radovan Karadzic transferred his foreign political powers to Biljana Plavsic, one of the two RS deputy presidents. "We are facing more peaceful days. In this period, our primary task will be to perform many duties in solving the status of refugees, employing demobilized fighters, starting the economy, reconstructing the country...," Karadzic explained this "de-accumulation" of tasks. Taking place at the moment is "washing hands," "selling a pig in a poke," or, in a word, cynicism. Therefore, a man is "leaving" and only the beginning of his departure is certain!

However, for the people who want to see, they now see that Radovan Karadzic's political rating, which had been plummeting during the last year, has grown to towering heights in only a few days of the storm that has been throwing around Prime Minister Kasagic like a straw and catching several representatives of the international diplomacy in its whirlwind.

Dr. Miodrag Zivanovic, head of the Banja Luka Social Liberal Party, has noticed that the RS president made

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

a formal concession to the international community—he "distanced himself" from the office and came out stronger than he used to be. "In fact, Karadzic is in a comfortable position, just as RS Assembly Spokesman Momcilo Krajisnik—he is the chief and executor of many things, albeit responsible for none. He walled himself with the people around," Zivanovic says.

It seems that Radovan Karadzic has emerged from the recent events as a man who got much out of nothing. He gave Biljana Plavsic something he did not have in the first place—his foreign contacts. He dragged Bildt and Solana into arbitrating about what is legitimate and what not in the internal RS relations, therefore into a kind of a discrediting position. Finally, for himself he ensured a cozy position of a person who will therefore only take care about employing demobilized fighters and refugee accommodation in the "more peaceful days." Almost idyllic!

Judging from the way he started, Karadzic is on the way to dampening another conflict that existed in the relations between the authorities and the (Krajina) opposition. In the stage in which he consented to hiding behind Biljana Plavsic, the next move of his new political mimicry may be to move the government to Banja Luka, whereby he would skillfuly heed the opposition's insistence on the Krajina reginal identity and, probably, avoid reproaches for centralizing power at Pale. To a certain exent, this was announced by his new prime minister Klickovic with the statement that in the future "all ministers will work at one place, that is, at the government seat that will soon be decided upon by the RS Assembly." Banja Luka as a temporary capital city of the RS is concerned by the forthcoming "arbitration" about Brcko for, if the whole thing has not been already "arbitrated," Brcko will, as a place which would possibly cut the rest of the RS teritory away from the "capital city" of Banja Luka, have a completely different weight than it has now.

An additional problem for the opposition leaders, and they are mainly from the Banja Luka region, is Pale's skill in dampening the conflict that began with Kasagic's replacement. Being deprived of any possibility of airing any of its programs or stands over the monopolized media, the Banja Luka opposition welcomed the Kasagic-Karadzic conflict so it will at least be able to publicly state what it supports and what not. It is for that reason that the entire opposition bloc, apart from Vojislav Seselj's radicals, rallied on prime minister Kasagic's side although it never liked the man. "He is not much, but what do you do when there is nobody else," was the comment of one opposition leader about this rather unnatural symbiosis.

Defending the former prime minister, the RS opposition spoke in favor above all of the policy of opening towards the world on the foreign plane, and of recognizing the "existence of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the extent it is recognized by the world," as a member of the Banja Luka Intellectual Forum formulated it. It was for this reason that the opposition tried to create a personality out of Rajko Kasagic's mediocre image. Thus, even Banja Luka Mayor Predrag Radic found himself on Kasagic's side. Radic was one of the people whom Kasagic, while he was, as "Karadzic's man" in Krajina, president of the Banja Luka Executive Commitee, used to denounce regularly to the center in Pale. Let us add here that Kasagic was then a Pale man who banned Mayor Radic from even appearing on Banja Luka TV, let alone addressing his fellow citizens. It is interesting that later, as prime minister, Rajko Kasagic complained that Banja Luka TV, due to Pale's ban, was inaccessible to him.

The only thing left to the opposition, as it has been prevented access to microphones or cameras, in the situation when its arguments in the dispute with authorities are either being taken away from it or alternatively being made easier for it, is to direct its glance toward Belgrade. Belgrade, however, acts as if it does not know what this is all about.

First, Ivica Dacic, spokesman of the ruling SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia], minimized the conflict between Kasagic and Karadzic, saying that what is involved is only another trick prior to elections. Then the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia deemed Kasagic's replacement an illegitimate act. After that, Momcilo Krajisnik explained that Belgrade has not been acquainted with the change to the RS Constitution; whereby he explained the reaction of the mother republic—and things calmed down. Belgrade is acting as it did in the case of the Serb "state" in Croatia in which it first insisted on installing at any price the authorities which it would be able to control fully, and then dropped everything. Because, just as they were at the time prior to the fall of the Republic of Serb Krajina, the authorities in Serbia are pregnant with internal problems: with strikes or threatened strikes, fall in production, a looming new wave of hyperinflation....

Belgrade perhaps now counts on sharing interest spheres with Karadzic's SDS [Serbian Democratic Party], along with the tendency toward controlling [Bosnian] Krajina, something which seems to be irresponsible and necessarily implies overstimating one's own influence. Belgrade perhaps also counts on all opposition parties coming under the umbrella of the SPS sister party of the Socialist Party of RS, something which is irresponsible as it is much easier for a personality (not merely an im-

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

age) than for a party to unite the opposition bloc, but Belgrade does not have such a personality.

The third solution would be the following: Belgrade is at the moment supporting Radovan Karadzic's SDS. By "renouncing power," carrying out shuffles within the authorities, and replacing the prime minister who was invoking the Dayton peace plan as if he had always been holding it on himself, Karadzic is in fact only testing the peace document.

The ease with which Kasagic's fall was received, the confused reaction to the Pale shuffles and new division of work, and international mediators' controversial statements regarding Mostar's destiny, are only showing that Karadzic fits the general trend, that he sensed the moment of hesitation and cunningly took advantage of it. "The certain beginning of the end" means nothing at the moment.

Kosovo

Kosovo: Rugova Welcomes EU Efforts To Improve Situation

AU2905201496 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 29 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] President of the Republic of Kosova Dr. Ibrahim Rugova received today (Wednesday) in Prishtina [Pristina] Mr. Antonio Torsiello, head of the Regional Center of EU Monitor Mission in Belgrade, and his aide, Mr. Franck Placon.

Dr. Ibrahim Rugova and EU observers discussed the situation in Kosova in the light of recent developments and the outbreak of violence.

President Rugova said the occupation regime which Serbia has imposed here, with a continuous campaign of repression against Albanians, has been imbued with the danger of degenerating into an open conflict here. Recent provocations are aimed at undermining efforts to pursue a peaceful settlement to the Kosova issue, President Rugova said.

The people of Kosova have been committed to peaceful means in their bid for independence, Dr. Rugova said, noting that the best way to ensure a settlement is respecting the will of the people. Recalling the expressed political will of the people of Kosova in the 1991 Referendum, President Rugova said that an independent and neutral Kosova, open to both Albania and Serbia, is an optimal solution to the issue. He stressed that an interim international administration in Kosova would create conditions for a negotiated settlement.

Mr. Torsiello said EU was concerned over the situation in Kosova and shared an interest in different aspects of the reality in Kosova.

President Rugova welcomed the interest and efforts on the part of EU to see an improvement of the situation and a solution to the Kosova issue.

Kosovo: Parties Consider Albanian Elections 'a Historic Victory'

AU2905180496 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 29 May 96

[Telephone report by Leke Musolli from Pristina]

[FBIS Translated Text] The general assessment of the people in Kosova is that the free parliamentary elections in Albania and the strong victory of the Democratic Party [PD] are a historic victory for the state and the Albanian people in general.

In a greeting telegram sent to Albanian President Dr. Sali Berisha on the occasion of PD's victory, Academician Besim Vokshi, chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Kosova, stresses: Your victory in the elections is another victory of the democratic forces in Albania and, with no dilemma at all, can be seen as an expression of the faith the Albanian people have in you and the policy lead by the PD in Albania. I wish that this victory gives you more energy, patience, and strength on your path toward a powerful Albania affirmed in the democratic world, the greeting telegram states.

Meanwhile, in a public communique, the Social Democratic Party of Kosova hopes that, by continuing the road followed so far, which has achieved so much for the Albanian people, Albanian President Sali Berisha and the PD will pay more attention to overcoming the shortcomings, which will undoubtedly be in the interest of a more expeditious development of Albania and will also have a positive influence in the other parts already detached from the Albanian body. That is why we are convinced and expect President Berisha and the PD government to commit themselves more to the just resolution of the Kosova issue.

As the Kosova Information Center reports, the Democratic League of Kosova Presidency branches in Gjakove [Djakovica] and Fushe-Kosova have sent greeting telegrams to Albanian President Sali Berisha on the occasion of the PD victory.

A telegram by Dr. Rexhep Boja, chairman of the Muslim Community in Kosova, sent to President Berisha states: Your victory is a guarantee of the free expression of the religious and national feelings in Albania.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

BULK RATE
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
PERMIT NO. 352
MERRIFIELD, VA.

This is a U.S. Government publication produced by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

FBIS collects, translates, disseminates, and analyzes foreign open-source information on behalf of the U.S. Government. Its publications may contain copyrighted material. ***Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.***

— Bracketed indicators before the first sentence of each item describe the way in which the material was processed by FBIS.

— Headlines and all bracketed explanatory notes are supplied by FBIS.

— Personal and place names are rendered in accordance with the decisions of the U.S. Board on Geographic Names as adapted by FBIS. Unverified names in radio and television material appear in parentheses and are spelled phonetically; words and phrases in parentheses preceded by a question mark are unclear in the original and deduced from context.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

U.S. Government Customers

For a list of FBIS products, to subscribe to an FBIS publication, or to indicate a change of address contact:

FBIS
P.O. Box 2604
Washington, DC 20013-2604
Telephone: (202) 338-6735
FAX: (703) 733-6042

Non-Government Customers

Subscriptions are available from the National Technical Information Service:

NTIS
5285 Port Royal Road
Springfield, VA 22161
Telephone: (703) 487-4630
FAX: (703) 321-8547

New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.